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This thesis develops a policy-oriented account and evaluation of pay
determination and associated employment changes for U.K. nursing staff
in the 1980s, within an analytical framework for understanding nursing
pay processes and outcomes over longer time horizons and with greater
generalisability. In particular, an analysis is conducted of the Pay
Review Body for Nurses and Midwives and of the interlinkages between
pay determination, grading and training at different levels of
aggregation. The study is multidisciplinary, employing a wide range
of primary documentation, and findings from national-level interviews
and local case studies at eight district health authorities in the
West Midlands region.
The thesis divides into three parts. The first locates nursing pay
determination in historical context. Structural characteristics in
the health division of labour and in the wider political economy lend
a degree of apparent continuity to nursing pay levels. However, this
appearance masks important change which must also be understood. The
second evaluates the origins of nursing pay review, its processes and
outcomes. The conflicting bargaining positions and power relations
between the 'Sides' in pay review are noted, together with the
continued importance of negotiation and of 'non-pay' issues. The role
of the Pay Review Body is considered alongside nursing pay outcomes.
Although the Review Body could be seen as contributing to conservative
outcomes for nurses' pay, there are complex feedbacks within the
system which must also be understood. The third section considers
'non-pay' issues and tne interplay of national and local forces in an
evaluation of local managerial perspectives on nurse resourcing and
employment changes in the 1980s. It is argued that a 'crisis' occurred
in the late 1980s, rooted in history and political economic
circumstance, and that the process of pay deceritralisation should be
understood in this light. This process, however, is a risky and
uncertain one.
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G1AFTh ONE
INJOWFlON
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NURSING PAY DEERMINATI0N
The magnitude of the nursing paybill makes the determination of
nurses' pay one of the most important areas of NHS and public sector
pay policy. The paybill for nurses and midwives, at over five billion
pounds for England alone, is the largest single element of NHS
expenditure. The paybill accounts for approximately 36% of the
Regional, District and Special Health Authorities (RDSHA) revenue
expenditure and 47% of total RDSHA salaries and wages. The RDSHA
sector itself accounts for over 70% of all NHS expenditure. The
nursing paybill generally increased as a proportion of expenditure in
the 1980s, with a slight dip in the early 1990s. The RDSHA sector of
the NHS is highly labour-intensive; the ratio of the current to
capital accounts is 9:1, with wages accounting for nearly 80% of the
current account (all figures for England,1991, calculated from 1-IPSSS,
1992:15-27).
The size and significance of the nursing workforce means that wage
policy impacts heavily upon health service resourcing and provision,
and has an important effect on the labour market more generally. The
NHS nursing workforce in Great Britain is composed of over half a
million people, or around 485,000 whole time equivalents (WrEs) (PRB,
1992:23) and accounts for around half of RDSHA employment. Nurses
form the largest single occupational group in the NHS, which is
itself one of the largest single sources of employment in Western
Europe with over one million workers. Nurses also form the largest
single occupational group in the overall public sector and account for
some 2% of the national labour force.
At the same time, the characteristics of the nursing workforce and
employment make wage policy an intrinsically interesting area. The
vast majority of nurses are women - 90% in 1992 - and just under 40%
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work part-time. There has been little significant change in either
aggregate characteristic over the past decade (Thornley & Winchester,
1991:Section 1; HPSSS + NHS Workforce, various years). Contrary to
popular belief, most nurses are aged over thirty (MRS Workforce,1992).
In the labour market more generally, nursing 'has long been regarded
as the most extreme example of the influence of gender on occupational
choice', while within the MRS it exhibits patterns of horizontal and
vertical segregation with associated low pay and gender inequalities
(Thornley & Winchester,1991,ibid:4; see also; NUPE,1990; EOC,1991).
Studies have also recorded the significant presence of black and
ethnic minority nurses and shown evidence of racial inequality and
discrimination (Salvage, 1985:38; Pearson,1987; COHSE,1990:2; Kings
Fund,1990; CRE in IRS,1992:8). Nurses are also highly differentiated
by 'skill' and type of service provision. Over half the nursing
workforce is categorised as 'qualified' (enrolled or registered), and
nurses are predominantly employed in general nursing, followed by
mental illness and handicap and care of the elderly, with varying
proportions of 'skillmix' in each type of service. Sectoral change
has also occurred, with the niinber of nurses empioyed in the
independent healthcare sector increasing substantially in the 1980s to
just under 60,000 in 1988 (Buchan, NS,1990; NAO,1989).
The 'vast majority' of nurses are members of some form of
representative organisation (Salvage,1985:108), with the three trade
unions, the RC, COHSE and NUPE, accounting for the vast bulk of
membership and six other unions and professional associations
accounting for the rest. These organisations have very different
histories and nursing membership (Thornley & Winchester,1991:Section
2; Seifert,1992:thapter 2). Membership trends between the RCN and the
TUC-affiliated unions, GORSE and NUPE, have changed sharply in the
1980s. The nursing workforce is internally differentiated by all the
above characteristics. Women, and older women in particular, part-
timers, and ethnic minorities are disproportionately represented in
the lower parts of the nursing hierarchy. These characteristics are
replicated unevenly in different parts of the service and in different
representative orgariisations and qualifications are similarly
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distributed (Doyal,1979; Salvage,1985). There is evidence that class
characteristics are an important factor (Stacey,1988:189-190).
A wide-ranging series of changes has taken place in nurses' wage
determination, grading and training since 1979. Nurses' wage
determination, since the establishment of the NHS in 1948, consisted
of a highly-institutionalised and centralised process of national,
multi-employer collective bargaining, organised through the Whitley
Council system of a General Council and Functional Councils. In 1982,
however, a Pay Review Body (PRB) was set up for nurses, midwives and
health visitors, with national agreements covering a small number of
terms and conditions of employment conmon to all NHS staff still being
concluded in the forum of the General Whitley Council, and terms and
conditions of service for nurses other than pay being negotiated in a
Nurses and Midwifery Staffs Negotiating Council (NtIC). Senior nurses
were later separated out from corrrnon consideration by the PRB.
The NHS reforms contained in the 1990 NHS Act included the potential
for NHS Hospital Trusts (HTs) to determine pay locally, and various
forms of decentralisation of pay determination have also occurred
under the auspices of the PRB. A major job evaluation exercise was
also carried out; the clinical grading review of the mid to late
1980s. At the same time, changes in the type and organisation of
training have occurred, including the development of Project 2000 and
National Vocational QualIfications (NVQs). These changes have occurred
in the context of changes in the application of strict cash limits and
'efficiency' drives, and at a time of organisational and
administrative restructuring, much of which has been seen in the
public sector more generally.
RESEARCH FOCUS AND ANALYTICAL FRANEWORK
The research is structured around three main aims. Firstly, a primary
objective is to provide an integrated and up-to-date account of
nurses' wage determination, with particular emphasis on the 1980s. It
was felt that this would be useful to policy-makers, unions, managers,
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researchers, academics arid, above all, nurses themselves as no major
academic work has appeared on this topic. A preliminary research
report, written jointly with David Winchester, for the International
Labour Organisation in Geneva (1991/1993), reveals striking gaps in
the extant literature.
Secondly, the research aims to develop an analytical framework for
nurses' wage determination. The rapid pace of change in the 1980s
suggests the need to evaluate the role, process, outcomes, and
strategies of the actors in wage determination, defined here as
government, arbitration arid review bodies, management and employee
representative organisations. An important objective is to present an
analysis of bargaining strategy, and to examine the validity of
arguments used in the bargaining process. This, in turn, provides a
perspective from which to evaluate the 'market forces' argument which
has been so influential in the 1980s. A further aim is to explore the
different levels (national, intermediate and local) at which wages are
determined as well as the interlinkages between pay and 'non-pay'
factors, such as grading and training and the personal characteristics
of nurses and the significance of recent changes in 'non-pay' areas of
nursing employment.
The third major objective is to explore the wider theoretical
implications and policy relevance of this analytical approach. The
1980s have seen an increase in the literature on public sector
industrial relations, many of which have shared an interest in the
apparent moves to wage and industrial relations decentralisation,
often in the context of analyses of government's shift from its
perceived role as model employer (see Thomson,1983; Capelli,1983;
Ferner,1985, Fredman & Morris,1989; Mailly at al,1989; Kessler,1990;
Corby,1991; Davies,1991; Colling,1991; Ferner & Colling,1991;
Pendleton,1991). It is felt that this work provides fertile ground
for comparison and theoretical develoçnent, in which some of the more
diverse analytical ideas contained in the framework of the thesis can
be incorporated.
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Bec.ause of the relative lac.k of a unified theoretical foundation, part
of the challenge of the thesis is to explore an appropriate framework
within which to analyse nurses' pay determination and to integrate a
diverse policy, industrial relations and economics literature. This
has proceeded on three main levels. Firstly, an exploratory
historical and empirical evaluation of the nature of healthcare,
nursing and nurses' pay determination is undertaken to contextualise
the more detailed evaluation of recent trends. This approach gives
insights into historical continuities in nursing pay determination and
locates pay determination as the nexus of a much wider set of
political and social interactions. The historical analysis exposes
and clarifies the conflict-driven nature of nurses' pay determination
and the importance of power disparities between and within the 'sides'
to negotiation. This disequilibrium is further complicated by the
existence of mediating structures arid processes. The importance of
different levels of aggregation and of considering 'non-pay' issues,
such as grading and training, is also intimated. The emphasis on
historical and structural continuities suggests some interesting
analytical questions on how and why change occurs. However, in this
complex process, the main forces working to determine nurses' pay are
still obscured by the level of aggregation.
The second analytical focus of the thesis works by taking a shorter
historical period and examining nursing pay determination at
increasingly lower levels of aggregation to further clarify the main
forces in pay determination. This is undertaken by using tne pay
review process and pay outcomes in the 1980s to evaluate the
strategies of the parties to the process and the role of mediating
structures. This form of analysis enables clarification of the
continuity versus change theme and suggests the need for even lower
levels of aggregation. In particular, the need to evaluate the role
of local management and of underlying employment issues becomes clear.
The third focus of the thesis uses a combination of case studies at
local level, and aggregate and fieldwork data on employment, to re-
evaluate wider questions on the demand and supply of nurses and the
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role of wage levels and wage determination. This returns the analysis
full-circle to tne issues raised by the historical and structural
continuities and enables conclusions to be drawn on the role of the
parties, mediating structures and processes, and current proposals for
change in the level of nursing pay determination. It is concluded
that the disproportionate power of government in the process lends
some credence to the view that market forces work very weakly in what
is largely a demand-driven system. However, the complex nature of the
process has a number of powerful feedbacks which make pay policy in
this area considerably more constrained than is comonly assumed.
The above analysis builds primarily and eclectically upon industrial
relations and ins titutionalist policy-oriented literature, much of
which has been stimulated by the relative poverty of neoclassical wage
theory. While 'ttie process of wage determination is central to
economic analysis' (Brown and Nolan,1988:339), it remains one of the
most unsatisfactory areas in orthodox economic theorising and
empirical study. Classical economic theory admitted the importance of
social and political factors (see also Wood,1978), but neoclassical
theory is based on the idea that the wages of labour can be explained
in similar terms to the prices of c.omnodities through the interaction
of numerous individual transact.ors and the interplay of the market
forces of supply and demand.
This form of analysis, based on a series of highly restrictive
assumptions, leads to the conclusion at an economy-wide level that
'the rewards accruing to individuals can be wholly explained in terms
of their respective marginal contributions to output and of the
sacrifices entailed in the process' (Brown & Nolan,1988:343).
Although there have been a number of recent developments in certain
aspects of the theory, occurring largely under the rubric of
institutional economics (see overview in Sawyer,1989), 'the
observation of a far greater variety of wage outcomes than is
predicted by that theory tends to be rationalised in terms of
institutional rigidities' or poorly assimilated into the main body of
labour economic theory (Brown and Nolari,1988:343). 	 Thus, the
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persistence of discriminatory wages, for example, remains particularly
poorly explained (King,1990:122). Brown and Nolan conclude that
wages are undeniably market sensitive phenomena but it is important to
recognise that:
The wages of labour are not akin to the prices of comodities.
It is an empirical question how far, in any particular society
and circumstance, the market conditions of supply and demand
dominate, or are dominated by, the influence of custom and
political processes (1988:354).
For Barbara Wootton, neoclassical theory presented so many problems
and was so unrealistic that the question of analytical approach is
reversed: rather than starting from the point of an 'ideal type'
model, she argued that the analysis could more reasonably flow from
empirical observation back to inform theory:
the standing of a theory which explains wage structure in terms
of a continual pressure towards equality of net advantages in all
occupations, obstructed only by the practical difficulties of
mobility, or by monopolistic manoeuvres, must in the end be
judged by the measure in which these phenomena are perceptible in
the real world (1955:27, see also Phelps Brown,1977).
The presence of trade unions also signals the need for empirical
study. Neoclassical theory has largely treated unions as monopolistic
'institutional blockages' to the working of market forces. The
possibility of bilateral monopoly is admitted only rarely and usually
in the context of a theoretical 'extension' rather than as a
fundamental characteristic of wage determination. The analytical
point that a 'reconciliation of the "economic" and "non-economic"
approaches' might be possible has also been raised by Reynolds (in
Dunlop,1964:198) in that unions - and employers - may be strongly
influenced by economic factors despite the apparent importance of
custom and tradition in their behaviour. Though advanced mainly to
counter the above 'doctrinaire view that trade unions, being
"monopolies", must by definition have an adverse effect on the wage
structure' (1964:221), it re-confirms the fact that the actual effects
of trade unions remain a point for empirical investigation.
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An emphasis on empirical observation might also be considered
particularly pertinent for public sector pay determination. If pay
determination is handled badly by much economic theory, public sector
pay determination has received negligible attention. The few applied
case studies of pay determination have been almost exclusively in the
private, manufacturing sector and there has thus been limited
theoretical develoçnent. Its consideration raises a particular
conundrum for neoclassical theory which is based almost exclusively
upon the normative 'ideal' of perfect competition and atornistic
private enterprise. This concerns the conflicting objectives facing
government pay policy; in particular the 'level' at which economic
efficiency should be considered. At the macro level, public sector
occupational wages could be determined as part of wider public sector
pay and macroeconomic policy. At a lower level of aggregation, wages
could be determined at the national level of occupational supply and
demand. At yet a lower level, wages could be determined by the forces
of supply and demand in a local labour market. Finally, wages at the
micro level could be linked to worker productivity. There is no
extant theory to suggest which is the 'appropriate' level of
determination, either normatively or empirically, or how micro and
macro objectives could be reconciled. The very rare references in
public sector economics textbooks to public sector pay usually, in
fact, implicitly assume that the macroeconomic objective is of primary
importance (see, for example, Brown and Jackson,1990) but with no
particular justification.
Important considerations for the public sector have been raised by
writers employing industrial relations and institutional frameworks
and this tradition has strongly influenced the analytical framework
for the thesis. These considerations concern the fact that government
may have to balance quite different objectives and constraints apart
from those which might be termed 'directly economic'. For example,
electoral and wider political and social imperatives may be equally
important and may include the need to minimise industrial conflict in
sensitive service areas. The extent to which the forces of demand and
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supply, at whatever level of aggregation, then work through thus again
becomes an empirical question.
Wootton's outstanding study of the social foundation of wage policy
has been very influential on the present framework. In particular,
Wootton emphasised the important material effects that institutions,
including mediating structures, and bargaining processes could have in
wage determination and in conservative and rigid outcomes. Working at
a less aggregate level, Clegg and Chester's 1957 seminal exploration
of wage policy in the Health Service similarly pointed to the
ambiguous nature of institutions and bargaining arguments and the
importance of political factors. Allen (1960) explored the
relationship between government and trade unions, including the public
sector, more directly. The work of such authors, in particular,
demonstrates the need to re-evaluate the significance of the 'model
employer' concept for the NHS, and nurses in particular, and to take
different employee representative organisations into account. More
recently, this tradition of work in the public sector has expression
in work which has signalled the importance of incomes policies, cash
limits and levels of pay determination in any income-employment
tradeoff (Winchester,1983) along with the re-consideration of
normative questions about pay policy (Brown and Rowthorn,1990) and the
need for national coherence in wage determination for public service
workers (Brown and Walsh,1989). Seifert (1992) has also emphasised
the importance of different representational forms and industrial
relations traditions in understanding health service pay
determination.
Finally, the main focus of the thesis on nursing pay determination
raises fresh analytical challenges, which compound the above
theoretical and empirical complexities and introduce the need to
consider occupational characteristics such as gender, class,
hierarchy, skills and forms of representation. In this respect, a
wider literature from history, sociology and political economy has
suggested some avenues of enquiry which are incorporated in the above
analytical framework. The literature that focuses on health and the
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nursing division of labour strongly suggests that forms of
segmentation and associated forms of representation are vital to an
understanding of nurses' pay determination (Doyal,1979; Salvage,1985;
Stacey,1988; Carpenter,1988). Historical studies (Abel-Smith,1960;
Dingwall at al,1988) have particularly raised the analytical dilenrna
of distinguishing between structural factors and government and trade
union strategy, and raised the importance of non-pay factors such as
grading and training.
These considerations link in turn to wider institutionalist and
feminist theorising. Thus, writers such as Reich (1981), Gintis
(1976, 1987) and Friedman (1977) have emphasised the way in which
divisions within labour may serve to disunite labour and benefit
capitalists, and raise questions about the strategic or structural
nature of such divisions. Braverman (1974) has particularly
questioned how concepts of skills arise and Gintis has suggested that
'wage differentials are in no way captured by technical capacities of
workers...workers at different wage rates may be equally capable of
executing trie same tasks' (1987:79). Feminist writing has suggested
the potential for considering patriarchy alongside productive systems
(Walby,1986,1988) in understanding the gendered nature of some
occupations and has, more recently, recognised the need to embrace the
importance of internal institutional arrangements and pay structures
in particular (Rubery,EDC,1992).
In sulunary, the analytical framework of the thesis draws from a
diverse and multi-disciplinary literature and is constructed to
contribute to some of the above debates through a study of the
'internal' institutional arrangements for nurses' wage determination,
working from first principles and observable data and drawing
eclectically from wider theory on 'external' structures from the
preceding literature.
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RESEARCH METHODS
A key feature of the research methodology has been to work from an
aggregate level through to lower levels of aggregation. In part, th-is
is dictated by the nature of the thesis, which focuses on national
level wage and employment issues. However, this research design was
also intended to ensure that the thesis remains generalisable and
policy-relevant and to provide a point of comparison for lower-level
and more impressionistic data. The fieldwork was designed to
complement and deepen the analysis in certain areas, particularly by
providing qualitative data on the perspectives of key actors and the
constraints they felt they were under. A second major concern in the
research design has been to evaluate processes against outcomes and
vice versa, and this has meant that interviews and enquiries continued
throughout the research period where particular controversies or data
difficulties arose. The 'checks and balances' built into the research
design proved useful on a number of occasions, particularly in
exploring problems with aggregate data or with the occasional
'maverick' interview.
Three main categories of data and research methods were sought and
employed: primary source documentation; national level interviews; and
local level case studies.
Primary source documentation
Given the focus of the thesis, primary documentary sources were a
particularly important source and are listed separately in the
Bibliography in Sections II to IV. These sources included specialist
health and nursing documentation and literature, and a number of HMSO
and Hansard publications including: reports for all years from the Pay
Review Bodies for Nurses and Midwives, Senior Nurses, and for selected
years for other pay review groups; reports from prior pay reviews for
nurses; White Papers and Acts; Select Coirnittee Reports; Health and
Personal Social Services Reports; NHS Workforce in England; CSO Blue
Book; New Earnings Survey; Reviews of Whitley.
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Published and unpublished documentation was also obtained from the
Department of Health, UKCC, ENB, and other official bodies who have
requested anonymity. Published health authority information was
available in the form of NAHAT publications, and published and
unpublished regional and district HA data, and internal documentation
and studies circulated from the DoH to HAs, was made available during
some of the case study interviews. An tthive of daily news
clippings on nursing, health and the public sector was collected as a
valuable source of up-to-date information. The Kings Fund library
in London provided an excellent source of historical and current,
practitioner and policy, articles and books as well as special studies
undertaken by the Kings Fund itself.
Published and unpublished Management and Staff Side Evidence for most
recent years was obtained, along with copies of specially comiiissioned
reports and studies used in the pay review process. Full access to
unpublished reports, studies, letters, consultation documents relating
to the pay review process, changes in grading and training, and other
focuses of the thesis was also enabled through the co-operation of
officers from the main nursing trade unions and access to their own
documentary archives and other sources. Data was obtained from the
great majority of the professional associations and trade unions
representing nurses, midwives and health visitors. TLJC documents and
letters were also obtained.
Interviews at national level
The main purpose of interviews at national level was to strengthen and
deepen understanding of key issues and to obtain data and
documentation which would otherwise have been unobtainable. Thirty
semi-structured interviews were conducted with national and head
office representatives of training boards, nursing specialists, trade
unions and professional associations and, although the main emphasis
was on collection of quantitative data, these proved fruitful for a
preliminary investigation of qualitative issues. The trade union
officers from the RQ, COHSE and NUPE responsible for preparing and
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presenting pay review evidence were all interviewed, often on more
than one occasion. Over forty additional contacts, both formal and
less formal, to these national bodies and the DoH were made by
telephone and correspondence, for both quantitative and qualitative
data. Informal and social contacts with national and local trade
unionists (General Secretaries, National Officers, legal, professional
and research officers concerned with pay, equal opportunities, health
and safety, and specialist areas of nursing) over a number of years
proved invaluable for background data on the history, functions and
strategies of the unions, and the personal coauiitrnents and
perspectives of the trade unionists concerned.
'Case studies' at local level
The main purpose of the fieldwork at regional, district and local
level with managers, trade unionists and staff was to deepen certain
aspects of the research and complement other sources. The major
objective was to clarify the relationship between national-level
processes and outcomes and institutional objectives against the
employment and work organisation needs of lower tiers in the
structure. It was also felt necessary to get a more qualitative
perspective from nursing professionals and managers at the 'sharp' end
of provision of healthcare.
Preliminary interviews (ranging from one to three hours) were
conducted at regional, district and local levels in the West Midlands
region, which accounts for 10% of all NHS HA revenue expenditure. It
was then decided to conduct a series of structured interviews, ranging
in duration from one to three hours, at district level in the West
Midlands region with nursing management.	 These districts were
geographically randomized and gave a sample of rural, urban and inner-
city areas and covered over one-third of the region. Follow-up
interviews were conducted in one particularly interesting case and
interviews were also conducted in nursing, general, financial and
personnel management at district and Unit level. Although the main
emphasis of local fieldwork was to explore the perspectives of local
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management, a number of trade union representatives from regional
through to unit level were also interviewed on a less formal basis,
along with individual nurses, midwives, health visitors, district
nurses, nurses working for general practitioners and nurses working in
the independent sector. The latter was a fruitful line of enquiry and
remains an important area for further research and comparison. Around
thirty interviews were conducted over the research period with the
'formal' district level interviews mainly conducted in 1990 and 1991.
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
thapter 2 is a contextual chapter in which the main themes and
analytical focus of the thesis are developed. It provides an account
and evaluation of the historical development of healthcare and its
division of labour, nurses' representative organisations and pay
determination systems and outcomes. The role of grading and training
are then explored.
A very diverse literature drawing on history, sociology, political
economy and economics is brought together in the chapter. It is
argued that the healthcare system and its division of labour both
reflect and support the wider productive system and historical
inequalities in class, gender and race. However, the 'system' has
been prone to intermittent crisis due, in part, to the difficulty of
making rational or consistent cost-benefit decisions and, in part, to
the role of labour in influencing this calculation. The prior
stratification of the nursing labour force is shown to have had a
constraining impact on the 'effectiveness' of nursing representation.
Maintaining the 'tension' between the power of trade unions and of
professional associations, however, has been a delicate and difficult
operation for capital. The ultimate supremacy of either
'professional' or 'trade union' aims represents a threat to cost-
niinimisation. It is argued that the creation of the NHS and the
development of new pay determination systems represented some gains
for labour, but also contributed to the maintenance of the status quo.
thanges in the wider political economy had an important impact on
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nursing trade unionism and such change also led change in the
professional associations. An important argument in the chapter is
that grade dilution, an alternative cost-minimisation policy to wage
suppression, also laid the conditions f or the growth of trade
unionism. By the late 1970's, this threatened to challenge the status
quo.
thapters 3, 4 and 5 review one of the most critical of the changes
affecting nursing employment in the 1980's, namely the establishment,
process and outcomes of the Nurses and Midwives Pay Review Body which
replaced the system of 'free' collective bargaining under Whitley.
Chapter 3 employs a range of published and unpublished primary
documentation to examine the origins of the nurses' Pay Review Body
and explore its pragmatic and theoretical rationale. A detailed
analysis of prior forms of arbitration and review is conducted along
with an account of the industrial unrest giving rise to the nurses'
review body and the initial controversy surrounding its remit. The
chapter then explores the precedents for a review body system for
nurses in an evaluation of the other public sector review bodies and
their operation to date. Finally, some preliminary conclusions are
drawn on the theoretical rationale for review bodies.
It is argued that a close examination of prior arbitration and pay
review bodies in nursing must locate these as mechanisms which are
circumscribed by their times but have some corrnionalities in structure,
process and outcomes. In particular, each of the three main exercises
in 'pay-uplift' from the late 1960s increased differentials, and
persisted in female-female pay comparisons. Moreover to whatever
extent comparability was or was not stressed, the lack of a clear
explanation as to how recoirrnendations were arrived at must point to
the need for caution in evaluating the significance of the
comparability factor.	 The 'semantics' of the reviews very much
reflected the degree of industrial militancy at the time. Most of the
reports, however, were written using the jargon of economics, and
'efficiency' appeared, more or less explicitly, to be an important
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aim. The reviews can be seen to be largely influenced by electoral
'cusps' followed by periods of deteriorating relativities in nurses'
pay. Pay militancy continued to erupt, finally culminating in the
establishment of the N&M PRB, which split NHS staff and 'officially'
removed the 'free collective bargaining' from the determination of
nurses' pay.
The government was concerned to define the scope of the PRB's
deliberations and to skew the terms of reference to market forces
terminology. In the review of the operation of review bodies
established prior to the N&M PRB, it is argued that such an operation
has been far from unproblematic; periods of fall-behind still occur,
arid, in the case of the DDRB, industrial action has not always been
avoided. Comparability has persisted into the 1980s, again sometimes
more and sometimes less explicitly, depending very much on the staff
group concerned and the need to appease. Government shows a
disproportionate power to influence outcomes in all cases and the
important effect of avoiding 'head-on' confrontation is noted. In the
preliminary consideration of a theoretical rationale it is argued that
little justification can be found in liberal political economy and
that more radical interpretations are required which, in turn, hinge
on empirical investigation.
Following this line of enquiry, thapter 4 analyses the structure and
process of the PRB through a detailed evaluation and ordering of
evidence and reports from published and unpublished primary
documentation, supplemented by interview material. Some preliminary
notes are made on the type of criteria employed in evidence and
discussed in reports and reconinendations. The chapter reviews and
analyses the arguments put forward by both Sides and their reception
by the PRB and apparent influence on outcomes where this is visible.
It also explores the historical progression of the arguments and
changes in their importance.
The main findings from the review of structure and process are as
follows. Firstly, it is argued that, in line with findings in Q-iapter
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Three, the structure of the PRB raises questions about its political
economic location and apparent acceptance by Staff Side. Secondly, it
is argued that the criteria empioyed are skewed from the outset and
exhibit 'economistic' leanings, although Staff Side have frequently
'won' the argument on this basis and have exhibited great ingenuity
and increasing sophistication in dealing with the arguments.
Recruitment and retention has emerged as the most discussed criterion.
On most criteria there has been significant dialogue between
Management and Staff Side with the important exceptions of low pay and
equal pay, despite their significance for nurses. The process still
reveals deep conflict over pay and is influenced by underlying
employment issues, decided or negotiated elsewhere, but vitally
important to the pay determination process. Grading, training and
employment levels are seen to be particularly important in this
respect and the question is raised as to how far pay determination can
be removed from apparently 'non-pay' issues and whether, in fact,
conflict is driven to lower levels. In this latter respect, the role
of the PRB in tempering or channelling conflict must be open to
debate. It is further argued that the process has exhibited some very
unexpected feedbacks in the publicity it generates and the ability of
Staff Side to present a largely united front, particularly in later
years over the low pay criterion, and to persist with a 'negotiating
style'. Finally, the trend to decentralisation is noted, and the role
of the PRB considered in this light.
An evaluation of pay outcomes is conducted in thapter 5, using
calculations and data from a wide variety of published and unpublished
sources and the New Earnings Survey series. The analysis is split
into paybill measure and comparisons and the exercise constitutes an
attempt to develop a framework for rigorous analysis of pay outcomes.
The chapter then develops an integrated conclusion on the impact of
the Nurses and Midwives Pay Review Body: structure, process and
outcomes considered together. The argument is contentious and against
the conventional wisdom. 	 Firstly, it is demonstrated that the
widening of differentials and continuation of gender inequalities in
pay for nurses mean that nurses have made few gains and some real
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losses. Secondly, it is argued that trie Pay Review Body must in the
end be seen as a state institution which is instrumental in
controlling pay, not least through the suppression of pay aspirations.
The fact that government is seen to exercise disproportionate power in
the review process does not invalidate this argument. Thirdly, it is
argued that the crucial 'mechanism' in pay reviews more generally is
the 'process' which legitimates an otherwise unacceptable structure
and outcomes. However, this is by no means an unambiguous system.
For example, it does not resolve lower-level effects of pay outcomes
and it is argued that conflict is driven down to these lower levels.
Moreover, the exercise holds some unexpected feedbacks.
thapter 6 takes up this theme by exploring, mainly through fieldwork
findings from the local 'case studies', the impact the PRB system has
had on local nursing management and their perspective on the 'local'
demand and supply for nurses. The findings in this chapter begin to
highlight some of the crucial directions of power flows between
different levels and the links between pay and 'non-pay' issues in
nursing employment. In this way, more unpredictable feedbacks are
analysed, particularly relating to service provision, nurse employment
levels, work intensity and the role of 'professional' judgernent. The
main findings are that managers believed that while the levels of
nurses' pay were not particularly at issue, wider resource constraints
were. In particular, the strict application of national cash limits
and underfunding of pay awards were seen to have imposed resource
constraints at local level which had largely subordinated wider
questions concerning 'pure' demand for nurses or supply-side problems,
and could be viewed as a lack in effective demand.
The potential for non-labour savings was seen as very restricted, and
grading, training, work organisation, employment levels and mix, and
service provision therefore caine into particular prominence. The
fieldwork also revealed relatively negative attitudes to the
possibility of local pay determination and performance related pay for
nurses, particularly after the experience of clinical grading and the
conflict raised during that process. For managers, a kind of crisis
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point had been reached in the late 1980s and early 1990s which
clinical grading had exacerbated. Most felt some kind of grade-mix
dilution was inevitable, particularly given current training changes.
This perspective and the local findings are evaluated in Giapter 7.
It is organised around the issue of 'reshaping the workforce' and
explores the contradictions and conflict in nursing which re-address
some of the main findings in Oiapter 2. Here the 'non-pay' and
underlying issues to wage determination are explored directly along
with the main changes of the 1980s and early 1990s. This chapter
employs a wide variety of primary and secondary documentation and
fieldwork at national and local level. Firstly, the grade-mix changes
of the 1980s are evaluated. It is argued that 'grade enrichment' in
this period has to be understood as the outcome of a complex series of
processes which are mainly premised on resource deficiencies. They
include changes in employment levels and provision of healthcare,
changes in composition of services, thanges in training numbers, and
sec.toral shifts. It is suggested that managerial and professional
judgement has also been an important influence on grade-mix outcomes
and that this, in part, explains an attempt to circumvent nurse
managers through changes in managerial structures.
The chapter explores recent changes in training and prospects for the
1990s in the drive to 'reprofile the workforce'. It is found that the
training changes are contradictory and may put increased strain on a
system already in crisis. The drive to 'reprofile' and
dec.entralisation becomes, however, more understandable as a reaction
to crisis. The concept of 'reprofiling' is explored by analysing the
deep conflict over 'ideal models' of nursing and skills and valuation.
It is argued, however, that this conflict will emerge in full force if
reprofilirig and decentralisation occur and may prove a very risky
strategy, as may the strategy of attempting to rnarginalise
professional judgernent in management. Again, the difficulty of
separating crisis-reaction from strategy on the part of government is
emphasised but policy options are viewed here as very restricted.
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The latter point is considered in more detail in the concluding
chapter 8. Here, the main findings of the thesis are surrrnarised and
their theoretical relevance considered in an evaluation of continuity
and change in public sector and nursing pay determination. Finally,
prospects for policy in the 1990s are considered, particularly with
respect to the limits to decentralisation. It is argued that the
thesis, by demonstrating the internal drive to decentralisation in
nursing pay determination, paradoxically also demonstrates the degree
to which policy is constrained.
Qi&FFR
NURSING AND NURSES' PAY IN }USTORICAL CDNTEXI
This chapter sets a context for the evaluation of recent change in
nurses' pay, grading, training and employment which is undertaken in
the remainder of the thesis. Firstly, the historical development of
nursing is located in the wider context of the development of
healtricare and its division of labour. Secondly, the origins, nature
and development of nursing representative organisations are explored.
The historical development of nursing pay determination is then
examined, and the evidence of nurses' pay levels prior to the 1980s is
considered. Finally, an overview and evaluation of the importance of
grading and training in pay levels and pay determination is provided.
THE DIVISION OF LABOUR IN HEALTHCARE
In this section, systems of healthcare, the development of the health
division of labour and the movement of nursing from the domestic to
the public spiLere are located in the wider political economy. The
modern form of nursing is seen to have deep historical roots.
Healthcare in the 16th and 17th centuries took place primarily in the
domestic domain in rural areas where the vast majority of the
population lived. Most of these activities were undertaken by women
in the houseriold which was organised around the patriarchal family - a
domestic group in which the husband/father had power and authority.
Domestic healthcare was supplemented by folk healers and a variety of
mainly unqualified practitioners. All these categories of healers
included women, except for the minute London College of Physicians,
which had excluded them from the outset. There was some provision of
care for the poor by the municipal authorities.
In the 18th century, the main provision of healthc.are by women at home
continued. However, concern with public health was increasing, with
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the first quarantine regulations being instigated.	 Physicians,
surgeons and apothecaries were growing more numerous and attempting to
organise themselves professionally, and the forerunners of the modern
teaching hospitals were appearing along with the development of
clinical medicine. In this century, 'the scene was laid in the arenas
of public health and curative medicine, in both home and hospital, for
the development and triumph of biomedicine in the nineteenth century
as a male-dominated arid class-based profession' (Stacey,1988:59).
These early signs of a public healthcare system and a patriarchal
medical division of labour were both hastened and extended by the
rapid social and economic changes associated with the growth in
dominance of the capitalist mode of production, distribution and
exchange in the 19th century. The transition from feudalism to
capitalism had already had 'savage effects on life (and death) in the
countryside' (Doyal,1979:50). With the rationalisation of agriculture
many workers also became either underemployed or unempioyed, producing
widespread poverty and a movement into urban areas and industrial
employment. Towns and population growth expanded rapidly, housing and
sanitation were atrocious and, from 1816, mortality rates increased,
with the highest rates to be found in working class urban areas.
Differences in morbidity were also sharpened between different social
classes. Low wages, and a high demand for labour, drew women and
children into waged-labour and, for working class women, this marked a
tension between the domestic and public spheres of activity that
persists today (see Doyal,1979:150). The combination of poor working
conditions, housing and nutrition rendered working class families
particularly susceptible to infectious diseases. These diseases
became tne major causes of death in the 19th century and social
control was increasingly threatened by these conditions.
There were several different ways in which both the causes and effects
of iigh mortality and morbidity under this system were addressed.
Firstly, there were pressures for change at the level of the
productive system itself, in terms of employment and work conditions
and wages.	 Secondly, and with different emphasis, there were
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pressures to reform or ameliorate living standards, especially housing
arid sanitation. Finally, there were pressures to reform healthcare,
both in terms of access and provision.
The pressures caine from a variety of individual, collective and
institutional sources at local and national level. The dominant
source of change has been much disputed, not least because of its
fragmentary nature. However, significant improvements in mortality and
morbidity began to feed through from about 1870 and it has been argued
that these were due mainly to a combination of the effects of
improvements in working class living standards and public health
legislation (McKeown in Doyal,1979:56). According to Doyal 'curative
medicine was still very limited both in its availability and its
effectiveness, and...it is now widely accepted that it played little
or no part in the reduction of the national mortality rate which began
in the 1870s' (1979:141 - see also Walvin,1987:25). Healthcure or
healthcare, therefore took a subordinate but linked role in the 19th
century, though the desire of the working class to gain access to such
care as was available and to improve its provision should not be
underestimated. Its subsequent development may also have owed much to
the potential expense arid complexity of the alternative policy of
cleaning up British cities (Walvin,1987:29), or of the more radical
alteration of productive relations.
The contribution and growth of formal healthcare systems in the 19th
century should therefore be set in context of the wider socio-econocnic
system and changes occurring elsewhere under a broader definition of
health. The systems which did emerge were strongly class-based in
terms of both access and provision and reinforced existing patriarchal
tendencies. It has also been argued that these systems played a
powerful role in social control and moral regulation (see
Doyal,1979:148, Dean and Bolton in Stacey,1988:65, Dingwall et
al,1988:26). These forms are still visible in modern access and
provision arid have had a strong influence on the development of
nursing arid nursing representative organisations.
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A characterisation of healthcare in the 19th century would run broadly
as follows. The wealthy were generally treated at home by elite
physicians and surgeons or engaged women or nurses; hospitals of any
kind were an unattractive alternative at this time. The wealthier
middle class also purchased private treatment at home or in the
outpatients departments of voluntary hospitals. The lower middle
class or better-off working class could purchase, through various
funding schemes, treatment in voluntary hospitals or from doctors.
The non-chronically ill working class and poor received some very
limited philanthropic accocffnodation in voluntary hospitals but were
mainly 'treated' in Poor Law workhouses or Poor Law hospitals and had
limited access to doctors. Asylums and isolation hospitals treated
the insane or infectious. Thus for the majority of the working class
- and the majority of the population - healthcare still revolved
mainly around the domestic domain:
for much of the century, the great bulk of Victorians relied, in
times of illness, not upon doctors or hospitals, but upon the
practice of traditional folk medicines and upon local, corrrnunal
expertise (Walvin,1987:33).
Women in their homes or local paid women were more important than
formalised care and doctors for much of the population until late into
Victoria's reign for both nursing and healing (see also Peterson in
Stacey,1988:86). Herbalism was also part of corrnion practice and
belief, and many people treated tha-nselves. After the control of
drugs in 1868 and the subsequent patenting of medicines by the new
large drug companies, this trend increased. The old 'herbalist'
substances were often incorporated into the 'new' medicines and even
poor, working class people proved a lucrative new market for these
companies (Walvin: ibid).
With respect to hospital provision and the formalisation of medicine
and the medical hierarchy, the development of voluntary hospitals was
spurred by doctors and by mid-century had become the main locus for
medical education. 	 There was thus a strong tendency to take
'interesting' and non-chronic cases. 	 Philanthropic funding also
ensured that admissions were restricted to the 'deserving' poor;
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'patients were no more likely to be very poor than they were to be
very sick' (Dingwall et al,1988:2). Partly because of these
restrictions, otrier hospital provisions developed under the Poor Law.
The differences in scale can be seen in figures for 1861; 11,000
patients in voluntary hospitals, 50,000 sick paupers (Abel-
Smith,1964:49). The initial intention after the introduction of the
new Poor Law of 1834 had been to treat the sick at home and
institutionalise only the able-bodied poor, but there proved to be
inadequate medical relief and the sick poor had to be accorniodated in
workhouses or workhouse infirmaries.
Administration of the infirmaries was separated from that of the
workhouses only in 1867 under the Metropolitan Poor Act, which also
established the Metropolitan Asylums Board to administer hospitals for
lunatics, fever and smallpox cases. The workhouse hospitals were not
connected with medical education, the bulk of nursing was performed by
paupers, and the medical officers had no security of tenure and
ordinarily took positions part-time while hoping to develop a private
practice. By the end of the 19th century, the dramatic overall
increase in this two-tiered, but still limited, formal system was
visible.	 Approximately 39,000 sick were treated in voluntary
hospitals (1901 figure) and 100,000 sick treated in Poor Law
institutions (1911 figure) (Abel Smith, 1960:51;1964:189). The
development from the 1880's of private nursing homes and paybeds in
voluntary hospitals reflected and reinforced the increasing use by the
middle and upper classes of institutionalised care - 13,000 sick (1911
figure, ibid) - but most were still treated at home with an increasing
use of private nurses.
In the course of the 19th century a single mode of healing -
allopathic, or treatment by opposites - came to dominate all others.
It was centrally organised, legitimated by the state and male
dominated: 'medical practitioners became the leaders of all other
recognized health-care workers' and were successful in their claims to
be a 'profession', while the claims of nurses and midwives were less
successful. One account of how the professions caine to be male-
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dominated stresses the already-existing distinction between public and
domestic domains and the almost exclusively male nature of the public
world of the 19th century, along with patriarchal authority in the
domestic domain. Men were thus able to ensure that the occupations
which succeeded in their claims to professional status were male ones,
supported by the subordinate labour of nurses in hospitals and by
wives and servants in households (Stacey,1988:Part One).
These developments were linked with changes in social class
structures, the growth of cotmnercialism, and changes within the
medical hierarchy, especially in the struggles between hospital
consultants and GPs, in which the BMA was an important element. The
General Medical Council was established with the 1858 Medical Act and
GPs were subsequently represented in the 1886 Medical Act. By the end
of the century, a self-conscious occupation had emerged which aimed
for control of its work situation and clients and of its own supply
and remuneration (see Stacey,1988:78-97). Despite some valiant
attempts by women to be part of this profession, only 212 females out
of 36,000 registered medical practitioners were to be found in 1901
(Smith in Stacey,ibid). Midwives had been subsumed into the health
hierarchy, but in a subordinate role to doctors (see Anne Witz in
Walby,1988:74-90).
The roots of nursing as an occupation were clearly visible in the 19th
century. The successive reforms of nursing, almost entirely led within
the voluntary hospital system, defined nursing in ways that were to
prove remarkably resistant to change. Firstly, nursing in the 'public
domain' was to be distinguished from nursing as part of the domestic
domain. Secondly, its status in the health hierarchy was to be
established. Thirdly, its own internal hierarchy was to emerge.
From the outset, nursing reflected the Victorian class structure.
Whilst working class women had been increasingly drawn into waged
labour by capitalism, middle class women had been subjected to the
ideology of domestication. By mid-century the 'spinster' problem and
lack of public outlets for middle and upper class women led to the
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attempts by Nightingale and others to reform nursing as a respectable
occupation for themselves as well as for the 'better' type of working
class women. The way in which this was done was through their
connections in the male public and political domain. The model of
nursing which emerged was deeply constrained by historical
circumstance and the medical model (see Stacey,1988:94). There has
been a considerable debate about the role of Nightingale and other
reformers which turns on the extent to which nurses were instrumental
in their own subordination to doctors, or established their
independence from medicine. In the event, the model turned out to be
deeply patriarchal, hierarchical and class-based: nurses were
handmaidens to doctors, upper class women were trained to be leaders
(matrons) and there were 'lady-pupils', who paid for their maintenance
during training, and probationers, who received free training and
maintenance (Abel-Srnith,1960:23). These women were supported by a
greater number of untrained working class women. All were coninitted
to long hours and low pay and an ethos of 'public service', the latter
being influenced by Victorian charitable ideologies and by the
religious roots underlying part of the nursing reformist strands.
As noted, more people were cared for in workhouses and asylums than in
the voluntary hospitals. In the workhouse hospitals, few trained
nurses were employed at all; pauper nurses, often elderly women,
remained the core of the workhouse nursing services until the end of
the nineteenth century. The few nurses trained in workhouse
infirmaries often left for private nursing (Crowther in
Stacey,1988:95). In the workhouses, the caring role as opposed to the
medical scientific model of nursing predominated. The asylums by
contrast were mainly staffed by working class men as the custodial
role offered little attraction to upper class women. Towards the end
of the 19th century, asylum workers sought reform of their pay and
conditions through the trade union movement, which had an effect
later on the whole of nursing.
The first half of the 20th century saw some continuity and some change
in the 19th century healthcare system. Increasing medical knowledge,
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especially in bacteriology, laid the foundations for the development
of clinical medicine and the scientific basis for the growth of hi-
technology medicine with hospitals increasingly seen as the focal
point of healing. The working class gained increased access to CPs
through the 1911 National Insurance Act, but the poor and unemployed
(notably wives and children) were not covered. The 1929 Act brought
the majority of Poor Law hospital provision under the County Boroughs
arid local authorities which already had responsibility for isolation
hospitals, and provided for the establishment of general hospitals.
Access was still class-based and limited. The voluntary hospitals
were increasingly filled with middle class patients while the former
Poor Law hospitals tended for the working class or poor.
Hospital provision continued to expand. At the outbreak of WW1 there
were 45,000 beds provided in 800 voluntary hospitals and 120,000 beds
in 700 Poor Law hospitals, with 40,000 beds in military, fever and
smallpox hospitals. WW.1. had the effect of greatly expanding this
provision and the number of nurses (Abel-Smith,1964:252-3,281).
Private and domestic provision of nursing at home still continued, and
the growth in private nursing and convalescent homes was dramatic,
reaching 40,000 beds by 1921 (ibid). Private health drew then from
the voluntary and municipal sectors just as it draws now from staff
trained in the NHS. Prior to the establishment of the NHS in 1948,
hospital provision had grown to 130,000 beds in voluntary hospitals
(accounting for one third of hospitals arid ranging from small cottage
hospitals to the great teaching hospitals), 200,000 beds provided by
Local Authorities, arid a further 200,000 beds in 300 Local Authority
Mental hospitals, subject to supervision of the national Board of
Control (Guillebaud Coanittee Report in Clegg and Chester,1957:1-2).
With respect to the health division of labour, partly due to suffrage
and women's war work, all legal bars to women entering the professions
were removed by a 1919 Act; more women entered the medical profession,
although many barriers remained. Fiowever, midwives remained
subordinate to the male medical profession, despite being accorded
state registration in 1902, and nursing became increasingly
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stratified. The elite general nursing model, established in the larger
voluntary hospitals and the better public general hospitals, continued
to be sharply differentiated from that of the older workhouse
hospitals and asylums and from nursing care in the domestic domain.
Gender and class divisions within the healthc.are and nursing
hierarchies fed through into different modes of collective
organisatiori. These modes represented two very distinct strands of
thought on how to raise the status and conditions of nursing but were
also deeply influenced by the 'establishment' in the form of the
state, employers and medical profession.
Demands for reform in access to and provision of healthcare had been
increasing, fuelled by the extension of the franchise, the growth of
trade union membership from the late 19th century, and the Labour
Party. These demands were given more urgency by the demand for
healthy, and willing, men to fight in the Crimean War and the two
World Wars and by the increasing incapacity of the system to function;
the interests of politicians, administrators, the medical profession
and the middle classes in reform were thus increased. Moreover, given
the social, political and economic upheaval in the inter-war years, it
has been argued that 'increased state intervention of various kinds
(including the organisation of medical care) came to be seen as
crucial in the struggle to avert the possible collapse of capitalism
itself' (Doyal,1979:176.-177).
The healthcare system prior to WW2 was 'administratively chaotic' and
'quite inadequate to meet the medical needs of the British population'
(Doyal,1979:175). The increasingly parlous administrative and
financial state of the system, with inefficient and expensive
administration, general shortage of local government funds during the
Depression and insufficient payment from wealthier patients to support
the voluntary hospitals, led to an increasingly interventionist role
by central government in supervision, financing, and pay
determination.
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At the time that an expansion in hospital and private healthcare had
led to a greatly increased demand for nurses, the system was
increasingly unable to pay for them. Wages were also poor. Shortages
of nurses, particularly trained nurses, had already been noted in the
latter part of the 19th century and these became endemic in the 20th
century. With the advent of WW2, these shortages emerged as an
important aspect of the economic and political rationale for reform of
the health system:
while a peacetime government could, within limits, disclaim
responsibility for the nursing shortage which faced the voluntary
hospitals and local authorities, and reacted unfavourably on the
civilian sick, the outbreak of war made the problems of nursing
more of a national responsibility (Abel-Smith, 1960:161).
Trade unions also played a strong role in campaigning for better pay
to improve nurse recruitment and retention and for better healthcare
provision.
The Beveridge Plan of 1942 for the creation of a welfare state, based
in part on Keynes' reformist economic vision, became a central part of
the re-building of Britain after the War. The report included plans
for a social security system, family allowances and a national health
service, and demonstrated a coninitment to ec.onorni policies designed
to ensure full employment. Much of this built on demands that had
been put forward by the labour movement for decades. However, if the
plans appeared to be a type of settlement between labour and capital
they also appeared, at least initially, to be formulated and then
operationalised in a way that offered many benefits and
relatively few costs to capital [1]. With particular respect to the
NHS Act of 1946 and the subsequent establishment and operation of the
NHS in 1948, it quickly became apparent that, despite representing a
real improvement in medical care for much of the population, that same
population, including most of the workers in the NHS, were to be
excluded from any real control of it. Moreover, despite the principle
[1] See, for example, Gough,1979:75-101, on funding of the welfare
state.
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of 'universality', access was to remain uneven (see Black Report, in
Townsend & Davidsori,1980/1982). Benefits accrued to capital directly
through the profit opportunities offered by the NHS and, indirectly,
through the wider role of the NHS in improving the health of workers
and in maintaining economic, social and political stability after the
war.
The new NHS structure (see Figure 2.1) was determined by the outcome
of negotiations between the state and various establishment groups
FIGURE 2.1 THE NHS 1948-1974
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(previously Minister of Health)
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Services
SOURCE: Based on Doyal,1979:181
including the voluntary hospitals, former approved societies and the
leaders of the medical profession - as Stacey has put it, 'by an
administrative and political elite of men working with the medical
elite...mostly men drawn from the upper middle class' (1988:123).
The ambitions of doctors expressed through the BMA to retain clinical
freedom and economic security without salaried status, and the
insistence of the consultants on retaining the private sector, were
successful and influential in the new System. The tripartite system
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particularly benefited the consult.ants wtio, unlike tne GPs, were in
the end prepared to accept salaried status in the hospitals because of
all the c.oncessions they were able to obtain. Hospitals were removed
from local authority control and put under regional hospital boards
and Hospital Management Corrrnittees (HMCs) on which consultants had a
high level of representation. The teaching hospitals retained their
independent status whilst obtaining NHS funds and consultants were
therefore able to maintain a high degree of control over medical
advance and practice. Consultants could also choose to hold part-time
contracts and thus to combine a regular NHS income with private
practice, particularly through the use of NHS pay or amenity beds.
The hospital sector thus became dominant in the new NHS, followed by
the executive council sector which provided primary medical care. The
lack of resources awarded to the local authority sector, which
included environnental health services, midwives, health visitors,
home helps and district nurses, and the failure to provide an
industrial health service has been called the 'final nail in the
coffin of preventive medicine...[reflecting] the fact that these
caring and background services offered the least scope for tangible
profitability' (Doyal, 1979:182).
Within the hospital sector, hi-technology and acute areas attracted
more resources than those dealing with the chronic sick, and have
continued to do so despite demographic. change and a shift in the
pattern of disease from acute illness towards chronic problems
requiring caring rather than curing. It is an open question, however,
whether these latter changes in demand for healthcare now present a
challenge to the initial benefits perceived by capital in the NHS,
particularly inasmuch as they represent an increasing demand by 'non-
productive' sections of the population.
An initial response to the above developments, and the first of a
number of attempts to delimit the power of the medical profession, was
the reorganisation of 1974 (see Figure 2.2). This was designed to
increase central control and managerial efficiency and therefore cost
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FIGURE 2.2 THE POST-1974 NHS
Sec.retary of State
for Social Services
Department of Health
and Social Security
Regional Health Authorities:
14 regions in England
- - - Area Health Authorities: - - -
:	 90 authorities	 :
Family	 Districts:	 Coaiiiuriity
Practitioner	 District Managment Teams Health
Coimiittees	 Approximately 200 	 Councils
SOURCE: Based on Doyal,1979:184
efficiency. The reorganisation did not substantially alter the
curative, hierarchical, 'expert-led' nature of the NHS nor limitations
in access to it. The concerns of healthworkers and patients still
remained largely excluded, despite the formation of Coninunity Health
Councils (CHCs). It has thus been argued for the period up to the
1980's that 'the priorities of the NHS have tended, throughout its
history, to be defined in terms of the wider interests of capital
rather than reflecting the real needs of patients' (Doyal,1979:186)
though these interests may often be seen to be contradictory and
conflicting. Other accounts have stressed the role of the medical
profession itself in limiting change (see Ailsop and Levitt in
Stacey,1988:128) though this begs the question of class loyalties.
Reform in the organisatiorial and managerial structure of the Ni-IS has
proceeded at breakneck speed from 1981 onwards, with the introduction
of performance indicators, the pay review process, compulsory
competitive tendering for hospital support services and the abolition
of the area tier of organisation. 	 This process cuLidnated in the
changes resulting from the Griffiths Report (NHS Management
Inquiry,1983), which have brought in the ethos of general management,
the internal market and a greater degree of interaction with the
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private sector. Figure 2.3 illustrates the organisational structure
of the NHS (English) circa 1988, whi.h reflects the abolition of the
'area' tier of Health Authorities and the creation of a Health
Services Supervisory Board and an NHS Management Board. These bodies
were both created on the recoamendation of Griffiths, were located
within the DoH and chaired by the Secretary of State. Their purpose
was to set overall objectives and strategy, and oversee
implementation. The Griffiths Report also resulted in the
substitution of individual chief executives (known as general
managers) for the prior system of consensus management teams.
FIGURE 2.3 OUTLINE ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF ENGLISH NHS 1988
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The changes proposed in the White Paper, Working for Patients
(DoH,1989) and enacted in 1990 are shown in Figure 2.4. As Harrison
et al note, the 'intellectual basis...is the assumption that a system
of internal markets, in which NHS health care institutions compete
with each other, will produce both greater efficiency and greater
responsiveness to users' (1990:169). This has entailed the separation
of 'purchasers' and 'providers', further membership changes in Health
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Authorities, and 'fund-holding' GPs. The most controversial of the
changes is the creation of 'Self-Governing Trusts' (SGTs) and these
were overwhelmingly seen by trade unionists in interviews as an
unambiguous move towards privatisation and a deterioration in health
service workers' terms and conditions. The new SGTs have the freedom
to move away from national decisions on terms and conditions through
the Whitley Council and Pay Review Bodies and to determine their own
terms and conditions for workers. These changes of the 1980's form
part of the contextual background for changes in nursing pay, grading
and training explored in this thesis
FIGURE 2.4 PROPOSED MkJOR NHS FUNDING FLOWS, 1992-1993
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With respect to the division of labour in the new NHS, a 'broadbrush'
picture of the modern workforce shows a degree of continuity which
attention to changes, especially managerial changes, should not
conceal. Although there has been a great rise in the proportion of
staff accounted for by professional and technical, and managerial,
administrative and clerical categories, the latter particularly since
the 1980's, nurses still account for 50% of the workforce. Table 2.1
TABLE 2.1 NURSING STAFF AND OThER HEALTH AND PERSONAL SOCIAL
SERVICES EMPLOYMENT: ENGLAND 1990 (WTEs)
Health Service staff arid practitioners
Directly employed staff	 796,359
Of which:
Hospital Medical and Dental staff
	 42,870
Coarnunity Health Medical & Dental staff
	 3,978
Nursing staff total	 378,300
(of which):
Administrative	 1,830
Centrally based services
	 2,024
Blood transfusion services
	 1,274
Hospital staff	 328,056
Primary health care services
	 32,599
Health visitor students 	 812
Agency nursing staff	 6,705
Midwifery staff total
	 23,976
(of which):
Administrative staff
	 86
Hospital staff
	 19,689
Cocimunity health services 	 4,201
Agency midwives	 -
Professional & Technical staff	 83,987
Works professional staff
	 3,902
Maintenance staff	 16,019
Administrative & Clerical staff
	 129,716
Ambulance officers & control
	 2,786
Ambulancemen/women	 15,345
Ancillary staff	 95,689
Family Health Services:
Practitioners total
	
49,434
Local authority social services staff total 	 240,342
SOURCE: Compiled from Health & Personal Social Services
Statistics for England, 1992 edition.
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shows the occupational make-up of the NFIS in 1990.
It has been argued that a forrnalised, curative health system came to
dominate in the 20th century, largely at the expense of measures
addressing the productive system, preventive health measures and
thosebased on care in the comunity or at home [2]. The health
division of labour reflected and reinforced this system. The modern
nursing workforce has thus been deeply influenced by the wider
productive system, the form of healthcare, the medical division of
labour, and the domestic division of labour. A concern of this thesis
is to explore the extent to which changes have modified this legacy.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE ORGANISATIONS
The previous section emphasised the influence of the wider political
economy of health on the health division of labour. The development
of the modern nursing workforce could thus be seen to be circumscribed
by wider factors. Another part of the history of nursing lies in the
attempts by nurses to affect their own work and working conditions
through collective representation and organisation. These activities
were similarly circumscribed. Nonetheless, a complex set of
interrelationships developed against which changes in nurses' pay,
training and grading can be more clearly plotted.
The differences between professional associations and trade unions in
nursing and the health service have been historically specific and the
two forms have reacted upon each other. Both may appear very similar
at times; individual associations or trade unions may equally be
occupationally-based, concerned with pay and professional issues such
as training, qualification and grading and status. They may or may
not affiliate to the TUG or Labour Party, adopt non-militant
positions, use political lobbying, seek national pay determination and
bargaining, have local representative officials. Associations may also
[2] See also Doyal,1979; Kinnersley,1973; Black Report,1982, on the
continuing importance of the effects of the productive system on
health, and on the still-pertinent effects of social class.
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be subsumed within unions or become unions. However, differences
between nursing representative organisations have been important.
The early history of nursing professional associations and trade union
organisation shows the strong influence of political, economic and
sociological factors outlined in the previous section. Different
forms of representation initially reflected the divisions between
different health services, notably the voluntary hospitals, Poor Law
and later, municipal hospitals, and asylums, later mental hospitals.
Patterns of representation also reflected the health division of
labour and differential class access to healthcare.
General nurses in the voluntary hospitals followed a model based on
professional patterns, which stressed 'vocation, selflessness and
dedication' (Stacey,1988:109). In this they were strongly influenced
by the male medical profession model and their position in the health
hierarchy. The early crusaders for nursing reform had bean upper or
middle class women attempting to create a role for themselves outside
the domestic domain, and the subsequent nursing hierarchy reflected
domestic, religious and military hierarchies. The influence in
general nursing therefore was from top to bottom, with the reformers
and matrons in a position of great power. There was initially
considerable competition amongst the 'ladies' to form and lead an
association to gain more professional recognition, and considerable
sçlits amongst the establishment over how to deal with them.
Abel-Smith (1960) has chronicled the early development of nursing
associations. By the early 1900's a wide variety of such associations
had arisen. However, the British Nurses' Association, a self-selected
group of women, had a disproportionate influence. This association
had been formed by Mrs Bedford Fenwick, a 'very blue Tory' (p131) in
the late 1880's as a 'union of nurses for professional objects' and
contained the 'elite of the profession' (p69). The constitution and
membership gave strong weight to doctors and the London teaching
hospital matrons. The BNA started a register on which, up to 1889,
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lady-pupils who had received only one year of training were admitted.
Thereafter, future applicants would be required to have three years'
training and the BNA also sought national standards of training and
examinations. The aim to professiorialise nursing was clear. Although
training scnools in the late 19th century issued certificates, quality
varied. Moreover, it seemed necessary to 'draw a firm line between
those who were fitted to practise as nurses and those who were not'.
The 'militant lady-pupils' (p61) saw a need to intensify the training
and make it more intellectual and to draw away from the rather
practical course Nightingale had instituted.
All these ambitions were opposed in various ways by different
factions. Nightingale was opposed to registration, believing that the
professional competence and personal qualities of a nurse could not be
judged via an examination and that a year's training was sufficient.
A number of hospital administrators were deeply opposed to any measure
which would narrow the field of recruitment, especially one as small
as that of the upper classes which the ladies envisaged. The cost
savings that had already been achieved through a cheap student labour
force had to be set against potentially increased costs of training,
and possible shortages. Particular concern attached to the possibility
that salaries would be raised through the abolition of the cheap
labour provided by unqualified nurses, and the potential power of a
profession to restrict entry and control standards in the hospitals.
A split could also be seen between doctors in the London teaching
hospitals (BMA), who viewed the idea of a more skilled handmaiden with
some favour, and humbler GPs in the provinces (IMPA) who appeared to
feel threatened by the possibility of rivalry from registered nurses.
A fascinating battle between Mrs Bedford Fenwick and Nightingale
ensued, in which both sides drew support from personal connections in
the medical profession, hospital administrations and parliament. Many
matrons and nurses at this time were opposed to registration. The
battle for registration gained impetus from the registration of
teachers (1899) and then the Midwives Act of 1902. In the early
1900's several Bills were drawn up and rejected for nursing
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registration, with the government appearing to be split between
differing political loyalties. A Select Couinittee in 1905 recommended
registration, but also recommended a new type of nurse with a shorter
training. This latter recommendation was eventually taken up in 1943.
The balance of political and economic interests was finally altered by
the First World War. The introduction of more untrained women to work
in the hospitals united the upper class women in a desire for
registration, public sympathy for the nurses' case increased and women
won the vote. Also, the first of many subsequent shortages of nurses
in the 20th century arose. Perhaps most importantly, the major
political parties in the Commons had a more basic fear:
If you force nurses [by opposing registration] to form trade
unions in order to secure that which they regard, and rightly
regard, as a measure of justice and a right to them, you will
simply throw them into the arms of the Labour Party (Lord
Ampthill quoted in Abel-Smith,1960:93).
Thereafter, registration was a political certainty. A battle then
ensued between the BNA and the new College of Nursing to become the
major voice of the nursing profession. The College had been founded
in 1916 on an initiative between matrons and doctors, was against
striking, and was strongly backed by Peers who were heavily
represented on the teaching hospital boards. The battle was won by
the College, which was openly allied with hospital managements and was
prepared to pay some attention to the staffing needs of the hospitals
in the standards it laid down for the profession. A bill was finally
introduced by the Minister for Health and was enacted in 1919.
The Register which was created contained supplementary parts for male
nurses, mental nurses and paediatric nurses. People without formal
training or certification were admitted at the outset, but three
years' training was needed thereafter for admission (the first state
examination took place in 1925). A Council was established to oversee
the register and approve training schools. The General Nursing
Council was appointed by the Minister and consisted of members of the
political, medical, hospital and nursing establishment, and
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dispro1 ortionately represented the voluntary sector. When the Council
attempted to lay down a requirement for one year's prior training for
admission to the Register, Parliament intervened to stop it so doing.
In all these arrangements, untrained nurses or nurses with incomplete
training were completely excluded from the future of the 'profession'.
In addition, many who were qualified to enter for registration did not
do so.
Many more nurses, registered or unregistered, had had little to do
with this process as they were largely unrepresented in these formal
structures or within the nursing associations themselves. The College
of Nursing quickly became the dominant nursing association, despite
some competition from the BNA and the British College of Nurses,
formed in 1926 by the Fenwicks. The latter claimed to be an
organisation controlled by nurses as opposed to the College of Nursing
which had senior lay and medical establishment figures on its council.
Many nurses were excluded from College of Nursing membership; student
nurses were not admitted until 1926 (Carpenter,1988:178), male nurses
not until 1960 (Salvage,1985:113) and unqualified nurses were excluded
by definition. The College received its Royal charter in 1928,
becoming the Royal College of Nursing (RCN) with royal patrons and a
large list of titled non-nurses as Vice Presidents. The battle for
members and for 'professionalisation', however, was to continue.
The main competition to the early nursing associations and then the
dominant RcN, was the trade union movement. In the late 19th century,
'New Unionism' had extended the base of the trade union movement
beyond privileged groups of skilled workers. Early attempts by asylum
workers to form a trade union did not prove successful, bet in 1910-11
the National Asylum Workers' Union (NMLJ), later to become the
Confederation of Health Service Finployees (COHSE), was launched. This
was largely as a result of the professional association of the time,
the Asylum Workers' Association (AWA), failing to secure acceptable
terms and conditions for the bulk of asylum workers. The AWA had been
formed in 1895 by the medical and lay establishment, was based on the
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BNA model (which refused to take male mental nurses), and was
dominated by the elite of medic.al superintendents.
The conditions for both asylum workers and 'patients' in the 19th and
early 20th century have been movingly recounted, along with the
fluctuating fortunes of the new union by Mic.k Carpenter (1988:ppl9-
136). The historical roots of the healthcare system are again
significant. At the end of the 19th century the asylums had largely
become a means of controlling a permanently captive population at the
least possible expense on local rates. Asylum nurses' and attendants'
wages were at the bottom of the wage league, hours long and conditions
poor. Nursing was regarded more as a job of last resort rather than
as a vocation, particularly as in the early years the job consisted
more of security and control rather than of any recognisable 'nursing'
tasks. The nurses were working class and geographically and socially
isolated and therefore formed a cofirnunity of interests. Doctors were
few and far between, so the nurses had more responsibility. Female
nurses were brought in as cheap labour in the late 19th century and
the model of general nursing began to take root for both the male and
female staffs, particularly with the influx of general nurses as
matrons from 1900. The bulk of nurses, both male and female, however,
received little recognition in terms of pay and conditions for
qualifications and many were unqualified.
The NAWU was formed through the nurses' and attendants' identification
with the rising working-class labour movement in 1910-13 and
accompanying upsurge of militancy, though the NAWU was not from the
outset a particularly militant body. After failing to gain
improvements through legislation, however, the union shifted to more
local activism and eventually sought affiliation to the Labour Party
and then tne TUC to gain wider support. The higher turnover of female
nurses, along with the more professional identifications of some of
them and the barriers to their participation in the union were early
problems, but women were highly influential nonetheless in the gains
made after WW1 through local activism.
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The period 1914-1920 saw a doubling in trade union membership
generally, from 4 to 8 million. The increase in trade union membership
and militancy during the First World War gave rise to the idea of
government as 'model employer'; the coalition government was anxious
to avoid the spread of labour unrest, particularly in the munitions
industries. This led to the setting up of arbitration machinery,
independent tribunals for the civil service, and finally the Whitley
Reports of 1917 and encouragement to private employers to set up
national bargaining machinery over pay and conditions and to channel
conflict. However, this had little irrinediate impact for nurses, given
the general hostility of Asylum Boards. A period of militant action
by the nurses ensued, along with a considerable growth in NAJ1J
membership - from 12,000 in 1918 to an inter-war peak of 18,000 in
1920. The NAWIJ adopted a National Prograrrme, and sought affiliation
to the TUC in 1918. The asylum employers then sought help from the
Ministry of Labour to set up an 'Industrial Council' along Whitley
lines rather than face industrial action from NAWU. A conciliation
corinittee was duly established and the NAWU had succeeded in obtaining
recognition and significant concessions from 'one of the most
reactionary and authoritarian groups of employers in the country'
(Carpenter,1988 :80-150).
The subsequent years, 1920-31, saw a sharp economic downturn, a
decrease in public expenditure, and a loss of strength and membership
for the NAWU (12,500 by 1930). Authorities failed to observe the
Joint Conciliation Coninittee awards in full and as the tide turned in
their favour, began to make wage reductions. The union responded by
seeking local concessions where it could, developing the 'friendly
society' side of its activities and shifting its emphasis from pay and
conditions to questions of status and professionalism. Reforms were
taking place, albeit in a sporadic fashion and much influenced by the
political colours of the government of the day. Attempts were made to
transform the custodial asylums into curative mental hospitals,
culminating in tae 1930 Act passed by the Labour governement. NAWU
began to see the possible coinpiementarity of 'trade unionism' and
'professionalism' (ibid:98).
	
Improvements in wages and conditions
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were achieved in the late 1920's, with membership rising once again,
despite an all-time low in 1926, the year of the General Strike.
The NAWU changed its name in 1931 to the Mental Hospitals and
Institutional Workers' Union (MH1WU) but economic slunp and high
unemployment undermined its activity on hours and wages. By 1934,
however, its membership was again rising and wage cuts had been
restored. At this stage the chronic shortage of female nurses was
again coming to the fore. This was exacerbated by the growth in
demand caused by the growth in the public health service, the
competition of alternative factory and office work for women, and,
above all, the continuing poor pay, hours and conditions which failed
to compensate for the former. Proportionately fewer women were
joining the union at this stage, probably due in part to the growing
domination of general nurse matrons on the female side of mental
nursing so the union had limited success in remedying the problem,
despite a cocrrnitment to equal pay. The union also failed to address
the problem of lack of female participation in its structures. The
shortages persisted well up to WW2 and the state eventually had to
take a direct role in pay determination for this group, as f or other
groups of nurses and NHS staff. With the creation of the NHS and a
new pay determination system, the MHIWU amalgamated with the Hospitals
and Welfare Services Union (1946) to form COHSE and a trend away from
sectional interest to health service unionism was started.
Some progress was also made by trade unions in poor law institutions
and hospitals, which shared some of the characteristics of asylums;
both were larger institutions than the voluntary hospitals, nurses
tended to be working class, conditions were much worse than in the
voluntary hospitals, and there was the possibility of attracting extra
money to pay higher salaries (Abel-Smith,1960:132). However, nurses
in the poor law hospitals had other characteristics that also hampered
nurses in the voluntary sector from joining trade unions. The general
nursing model had been imported at the top of the hierarchy and
ti-irough the personal influence of the matrons, who were frequently
antagonistic to trade unionism, as were the hospital administrators,
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and encouraged professional association membership instead. This model
implied a tradition of selfless devotion to the sick, opposition to
strike action on the grounds it would harm the patient, and, to some
extent, aspirations of social elevation. The influence of
'professionalism' thus tended to divide the nursing workforce here as
elsewhere. Maggs argues that there was a degree of managerial
strategy in incorporating working class nurses into the hierarchical,
and ideological, structures of general nursing (Carpenter,1988:166).
A number of different unions and associations were formed in this
sector which attempted to orgarlise nurses, but there was less success
than in the asylums. In 1918 the Poor Law Workers' Trade Union
(F'LmJ) was established for all ranks in the service; around this
time, the Professional Union of Trained Nurses was also founded, with
a no-strike clause, and the Poor Law Officers' Association also formed
a nursing Section.
The PLU started as an industrial union but, with the 1929 Act and
the break up of the Poor Law and transference of its activities to
local authorities, no industry survived for it to represent. It
survived in the 1930's by increasingly becoming a specialised health
service union. The growth of nursing staff in this sector at the end
of the 19th century had not led to any general improvement in pay or
conditions. Pauper nurses were also the main form of nursing staff,
as has been noted. In the early 20th century the hiring of paid
nursing staff accelerated along with the practice of hiring trained
nurses as supervisors. However, by the end of WW1 this process had
been slow. Nurses tended to be working class and regarded as poor
relations by nurses in the voluntary hospitals, and those that could
left for the private sector after training. Many unqualified women
filled the gaps. Until WW2, pay actually had to be higher in this
sector than in the voluntary sector, in part to attract nurses at all.
Given the relative weakness of trade unionism in this sector, no
permanent national bargaining machinery was set up - the militancy
which had achieved this for the asylums was not there in sufficient
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measure to gain employer acceptance. Endemic shortages of nurses in
this, as in the voluntary sector, were perhaps the inevitable outcome
of a resultant failure to raise pay and conditions to levels
sufficient to recruit and retain.
The survival of trade unionism in this sector of nursing, as in asylum
nursing, nonetheless had an important, if indirect, influence on pay
and conditions. As Abel-Smith put it:
the real challenge to the position of the College of Nursing in
the twenties came from the growth of trade unionism among the
nurses and the possible association of organisations opposed to
the College with the wider Labour movement. The more militant
spirit among the working nurses arose out of widespread
dissatisfaction with pay and conditions of work (1960:134).
By threatening to compete with the RCN, trade unions tended to produce
a shift in attitudes over pay and conditions from the employers
and, in conjunction with shortages and funding problems, the state.
It is against this background that the 1919 Nurse Registration Act and
the formation and subsequent develoç*iient of the RCN must be
considered. Altriough many matrons were opposed to trade unionism,
some did join the PLWTU and it then became considerably easier for
other nurses to join without fear of victirnisation. The tendency in
the first half of the 20th century, probably spurred by registration
with the insistence on training and living in, was for younger, single
women to replace older widows and married women (Abel-Scnith,1960:118).
These younger probationer nurses had more options in the external
labour market and were beginning to rebel against pay, conditions and
harsh discipline in the hospitals. In 1919, the Nursing Times (later
to become the RCN's official magazine) had warned the College: 'it is
obvious that if professional societies work too slowly, the more
impatient spirits will join something that will secure them benefits'
(in Carpenter,1988:178). The RC.N subsequently established a Salaries
Coainittee, which published recoarnended pay scales from 1919, and set
up a Student Nurses' Association (1926). However, the trade union
movement in general was in retreat in the 1920's and these moves were
largely cosmetic and did little to improve pay or conditions.
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The 1930's saw a renewal of the movement to unioriisa nurses. The TIJC
exhibited a growing desire to assist in the recruitment of more women
workers, and growing shortages, press attention and the Lancet
Comission's report in 1932 criticising traditional nursing
institutions all played a role in raising trade unions' profile.
However, there were too many unions competing for the nurses. In
1937, the TUC formed a National Advisory CoGinittee for the Nursing
Profession and established a new Nurses' Qarter which included plans
for national pay determination. The National Union of County Officers
(NUCO) as the PLWIU had then become, joined the TUC in 1935. Health
worker numbers were expanding rapidly and by 1939 its membership had
increased to 13,000. It became a campaigning, even militant, union,
yet with a strong professional ethos. By 1939 the Guild of Nurses
within the NUCO became its most active and successful group,
attracting male nurses, student nurses, assistant nurses or untrained
nurses who were excluded by the RCN, and obtaining improvements.
The numerous Cofrinittees and Coninissions that reported in the 1930's
and during W k12 on the 'nursing problem' also testified to a growing
public awareness of nursing shortages and public pressure to resolve
them. However, at the same time, such bodies could be viewed as
largely holding operations by the state, employers and medical
hierarchy to avoid confronting the central issue. As with the battle
for registration prior to 1919, there was the appearance of disunity.
Thus, despite:
the widespread dissatisfaction over pay, conditions of service
and standards of education which were seen to combine in
depressing recruitment and encouraging industrial militancy by
nurses...the remedies proposed by the various factions within the
system were vulnerable either to the limited perspective of their
advocates or to the combined weight of their opponents (Dingwall
et al,1988:98)
Registration and the attempt to 'professionalise' had borne little
fruit in terms of pay and conditions, although it had raised the
perceived need for trained nurses and thus perceptions of shortages of
trained nurses. Poor pay and conditions created high turnover,
outweighing the cost advantages of cheap student labour, and employers
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increasingly substituted untrained or semi-trained nursing labour.
Inaction by the state, employers and medical hierarchy meant that the
shortages persisted through the Second World War and increased
political pressure for reform; in this way, nursing shortages were
themselves an important part of the pressure for a new healthcare
sys tern.
PAY DEERMINATI0N
Irrniediately prior to World War Two, the healthcare system was in a
state of financial and administrative chaos. Nursing shortages were
endemic and the fragmented, mainly local, system of pay determination
was increasingly identified as an important factor in this. At this
point, despite important advances, the great majority of nurses were
'outside the scope of collective bargaining' (Clegg & aaester,
1957:4). Pay levels reflected hospital ownership, local labour market
conditions, medical specialities, hospital conditions, and the extent
of union organisation. Thus, voluntary hospitals generally paid lower
rates than municipal hospitals because their conditions were deemed to
be more pleasant or more suitable for the socially more elevated
nurses that congregated there. Likewise, children's nurses were paid
less than fever nurses, and pay variations also existed between
different localities and across different grades. However, despite
this 'flexibility', 'there was no doubt that, by and large, hospital
work was badly paid' (Clegg & Chester, 1957:5) and for nurses 'both
pay and conditions of work were unattractive to prospective recruits'
(Abel-Smith, 1960:161).
There was strong pressure from the labour movement for reform and
health service unionism was beginning to reassert itself and attempt
to coordinate its activities. A desire for a national, integrated
health service and for national pay determination for its workers had
long been part of the labour movement's agenda. Two Bills were drafted
by the TUC seeking further improvements in nursing pay and conditions,
but both of these failed due, in part, to the Athione Conrnittee which
had been set up through RCN intervention to head off the growing
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rnovenient for trade unionism amongst nurses. When Athione reported in
1939, many of its reconinecidations closely followed the TUC Charter,
including that for the formation of a national negotiating body. The
cost implications, however, were particularly unwelcome to the
voluntary hospitals whose financial position was deteriorating.
National salary scales and superannuation arrangements would have
obliged them to match the higher standards in the municipal hospitals
(Dingwall,1988:103). The government also rejected the suggestion that
they should interefere in the setting of wages for professionals. As
Carpenter has put it, 'after all, the ccxrrnittee had served its
purpose. Just enough MPs had been persuaded to vote against the
Limitations of Hours Bill 1937, the reputation of the College had been
rescued and militancy among nurses was finally beginning to die down'
(1988:219). World War Two then shifted the focus elsewhere and the
work of the Athione Conmittee was halted.
The Emergency Medical Service was created in 1939 and required all
designated hospitals (some 2,400 of the 3,000 total) to receive
casualties, thus bringing both voluntary and municipal hospitals into
a regional scheme of planning, with staffing by full-time salaried
officials. The voluntary hospitals were given exchequer subsidies and
these rapidly became an indispensable source of income. In order to
effect a re-direction of nurses within the emergency service, national
pay scales were essential (Webster in Dingwall,1988:104), and an
increase in pay was also essential. In 1941, the government imposed
standard rates somewhat higher than those pertaining previously in the
municipal hospitals, and substantially more generous than those in the
voluntary sector. The cost implications thus deepened the
government's involvement in funding the hospital service and
strengthened the impetus towards central state provision of health
services.
The imposition of standard rates was only intended as a temporary
measure pending the establishment of a longer-term mechanism for pay
determination. The government set up a c.onTnittee chaired by Lord
Rushcliffe in late 1941, modelled on the Athione Report
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recommendations, and trie Committee gradually broadened its terms of
reference to include the determination of conditions as well as of
pay. Rushc.liffe comprised an employers t panel and an employee's panel.
Paradoxically, considering its long-standing opposition to state
involvement in nurses' pay negotiations, the Royal College of
Nursirg was allocated more seats on the staff side than any other
individual organisation. This was an important precedent, since
the Rushcliffe arrangements were perpetuated almost unchanged in
the N}1S Whitley Council (Dingwall,1988:104-5).
Following the 1946 NHS Act and tiie establishment of the NHS in 1948,
the hitley system was set up. Though the Whitley system appeared to
be a major advance for industrial relations in general and the trade
unions in the role it enabled for 'free' collective bargaining, the
system was circumscribed by a number of factors. The evidence
suggests that the state was not neutral in the system that emerged nor
in its attitude to the role that trade unions played in it. The
government had previously been ambiguous on trade union rights and had
failed to recognise that unions faced many more obstacles than
professional associations, which were generally favoured by
management. In the new NHS, Bevan created very little role for trade
unionists or nurses below the rank of matron on the Regional Hospital
Boards, and effectively excluded them from Hospital Management
Committees through a Circular issued in 1949.
The structure of the Whitley system for nurses and midwives consisted,
as for other NHS groups, in a General Council and a specialised
Functional Council comprised of Staff Sides and Management Sides in
which negotiations over pay and conditions were to take place. The
professional associations had been disproportionately represented on
the Staff Side in the Rushcliffe Committee, and this continued to be
the case in the Whitley system. Abel-Smith pointed out that the
membership claimed by the RCN included many non-active nurses and
membership of the staff side of Whitley therefore did not follow the
proportions of active nurses that were attached to the different
organisations (1960:193). NTJCO had renamed itself the HSWIJ in 1943
and combined forces with the MI{IWU, becoming COHSE on 1 January 1946,
with a combined membership of 40,000. The RON in 1946 had a
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membership of 41,500, with membership of its associated Student
Nurses' Association standing at 12,700 (Carpenter,1988:228,242).
However, it has also been noted that the unions were not in a position
to mount a challenge to this distribution of seats as NALGO was still
outside the TUG, and the affiliated organisations were disunited
(ibid:266). The presence of both trade union arid professional
association representatives was early seen as a possible source of
conflict and division on the Staff Side (Clegg & Chester, 1957:19).
In contrast to Staff Side divisions, the Management Side appeared
relatively united but still posed a problem for the successful
operation of the Whitley system. The purse strings were held by the
government, and the representatives of regional boards, the 'legal'
employers of nurses, and of the hospital management comiittees were
appointed directly by the government. Lower levels of management who
actually dealt with most day-to-day management were excluded entirely.
In this respect, the Management Side was heavily dominated by the
government, with a much wider agenda than day-to-day provision of
health services and the 'fair' or 'economic' remuneration of nurses.
The problem in part, as Lord McCarthy later put it, was that the Side
was divided between 'employers who do not pay and paymasters who do
not employ' (McCarthy,1976). Perhaps most pertinently, local managers
at the 'sharp' end of employment decisions were not represented at
all. On both sides, inadequate representation may have limited the
capacity of the machinery to improve nurses' pay and therefore resolve
shortages.
The intention of government to constitute and use the pay machinery in
a 'positive' way was also in doubt. The post-WW2 Labour government
was confronted not only by powerful vested interests within the health
system but also by significant economic pressures. From 1948, the
government adopted a policy of wage restraint and nurses were
certainly not irirnune from it. Public sector pay was an area where
government as employer could have particular effect in containing
wages and in providing an example in so doing to the private sector.
Because of their history, hierarchical relations, divided
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representation and public service ethos, nurses were particularly
vulnerable. In this important respect, the 'model' set by successive
governments as employer may be seen to have been in some contention
with perceptions of its original role in channelling conflict.
However, limitations existed on this 'new model' in the form of the
need to maintain electoral viability and in the form of the pressure
that did arise from nurses, their representatives, and sometimes
nursing employers.
The composition of the Staff Side had early consequences. In 1948
COHSE ran a campaign to achieve a minimum wage for student nurses,
largely against the long-standing view of the RCN that student status
was more important than their pay and conditions. The first militant
demonstration of nurses since the 1930's took place shortly before the
Nurse and Midwives Council (NMC) met, and students' pay and conditions
were improved. The RCN then shifted ground, but COHSE did not benefit
in terms of recruitment of general nurses to the union because 'the
victory was not in the final analysis seen as belonging to COl-ISE but
to the staff side of the Whitley Council as a whole, whose secretary
was Frances Goodall of the RCN' (Carpenter,1988:273). The pattern of
benefits from trade union activism accruing to the professional
associations was to continue; for example, in the late 1950's nurses
gained from the efforts of ancillary workers to obtain a 44-hour week.
The contrast between the NMC, dominated by professional associations,
and the ancillary workers' council, dominated by trade unions, again
failed to reap the rewards for trade union membership that might have
been expected. Some corinentators have ascribed a partisan role to
government in this. According to Abel-Smith, the professional
organizations were losing ground to the trade unions before the Second
World War and nurses were getting more militant. Government then
intervened 'by its choice of representatives on official comnittees,
by its ratifications and financial support of the decisions of those
comittees' and strengthened the position of the professional
associations. The trade unions thus became recognized partners in the
negotiating process but the benefits from the tougher methods of
negotiation that characterized the trade unions accrued to the
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professional associations as well as to the trade unions. Indeed, as
the professional associations held the majority of the seats on the
Whitley Council:
they may have gained more from the trade unions' toughness than
the trade unions themselves...for the loss of support for the
existing machinery might well have led to larger recruitment of
nurses by trade unions and the reconstitution of the negotiating
machinery with the trade unions playing a larger role. To some
extent the skill of the trade unions in collective bargaining
promoted the status and membership of the Royal College of
Nursing (1960:208).
The early operation of the Whitley system also led to suggestions that
the system contained an in-built advantage to government in 'delaying'
or 'depoliticisirig' settlements, particularly through the frequent
recourse to arbitration which came to characterise its operations.
Negotiations for unqualified and more specialist grades of nurses
'dragged on' for several years after the setting up of the NMC before
a settlement was made and it has been suggested by Carpenter that 'the
delays seemed to be deliberate government tactics' as nursing staff
'appeared to be snarled up in the employers' desire to pursue the
government's "wage restraint" policy' (1988:275). Clegg & Chester
also noted the possible willingness of management to take certain
claims to arbitration as this put responsibility for wage increases,
or failure to make them, at times of general wage restraint, one step
removed from the government (1957:94). In this respect, the machinery
may have succeeded to some extent in channelling conflict or securing
political cushioning.
However, the delays incurred in this system may in themselves have
been a source of irritation and the poor pay outcomes for nurses
almost certainly were. In 1950, the wage freeze, and the TUC's
withdrawal of support for it, in part foreshadowed the electoral
defeat of the Labour government by the Conservatives in 1951. Nurses
had achieved a once-and-for-all uplift in pay and conditions with the
establishment of the NI-IS, but a pattern of pay determination had been
set in motion which would persist for several decades. This is now
briefly reviewed, and evaluated in more detail in subsequent chapters.
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The 1950's and early 1960's saw a retrenchment in nursing pay and
nursing trade unionism that, with the benefit of hindsight, could be
regarded as quite remarkable given the beneficial economic environment
of those years. An active policy of grade dilution aided an equally
active policy of poor pay settlements for nurses. De facto cash
limits were in operation - the £400 million spending limit introduced
by the Labour government in 1950 was continued by the Conservatives
until 1954 - and these put pressure on negotiators and local
employers. The Conservative government thus continued and intensified
cost containment policies, further exacerbating nursing shortages.
NHS spending declined as a proportion of CDP, only improving
marginally after the publication of the Guillebaud Report in 1957
which had largely exonerated the NHS of charges of excessive
expenditure. Delays in pay negotiations, the build up of staff
resentment, and then arbitration epitomised these years and, combined
with different varieties of cash limits and grade dilution, meant
that an effective policy of pay restraint was in operation. In this
period, trade unions provided little effective resistence: health
workers increasingly organised on the basis of 'grade unionism' rather
than responding to the 'industrial unionism' COUSE had wanted, and
trade unions made little headway in recruiting general nurses. A
relatively generous deal was made for nurses in 1959, illustrating the
electoral influence on pay awards and how easily such influence could
filter through a supposedly 'free collective bargaining' system.
The early 1960's witnessed the start of overt incomes policies at the
same time that the prospects for trade union growth and activism
increased through grade dilution and resentment over low pay and
shortages. Selwyn Lloyd's call for a 'pay pause' in 1961 coincided
with cuts in public spending, and was enforced rigorously in the
public sector whilst left to employers to apply in the private sector.
It involved the blocking of nurses' wage claims, along with 34 other
claims, and was seen as grossly unfair. It has been argued that it
'destroyed the paternalistic relationship between health workers and
the central state' (Carpenter,1988:308) - to the extent that such a
relationship had ever existed. Nurses su1nitted a major claim in 1962
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which was strongly resisted. The pay pause was followed by a less
overt incomes policy in which the pay of public sector workers was
again to act as an example to others. A period of campaigning and
protests followed by COHSE and the RCN which attracted unofficial
sympathy strikes and widespread public sympathy and began to affect
the government's electoral prospects. COHSE had adopted a policy of
high visibility outside the Whitley mechanisms so that some of the
success would accrue to it. The award of the Industrial Court which
followed was highly favourable to the nurses, and COHSE succeeded in
recruiting thousands of general nurses. Triis period established a
pattern of 'fall behind' and 'catch up' which was to be repeated many
times.
An incomes policy was run by the Labour government from 1964-1970 at
the same time that a number of developnents paved the way for greater
trade union membership and militancy. DOCAS (deduction of
contributions at source) was introduced in 1966, and the General
Whitley Council concluded an agreement on facilities for staff
organisations at local level in 1968. The closure of mental hospitals
initiated earlier by Enoch Powell, without corresponding provision in
the comnunity, and the increasing tendency to starve those that
remained of resources in favour of the acute hi-tec sector began to
feed through into particular problems with mental nurses. Problems
continued with grade dilution and with the tendency to build larger
district general hospitals with more impersonal and functional styles
of management.
Initially, a voluntary prices and incomes policy was negotiated by the
Labour government with the TUC and CBI in 1964, to be supervised by
the NBPI. Although seen at first as a temporary measure, incomes
policies in one form or another remained until 1970. In 1967, a
compulsory freeze followed by a period of severe restraint was imposed
by the government after its failure to secure cooperation with the
trade unions (Carpenter,1988:342). The policy collapsed in 1969, with
many public sector pay claims put forward. Nurses, along with many
other NHS workers, had been particularly badly affected by the form of
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the incomes policies under the Labour government which had been based
on productivity arguments; private sector workers could make
productivity deals with employers to get round the policies, which was
not an option for nurses. The nurses' claim was suhiiitted to the NBPI
in 1967, and the 1968 Report advocated a wide range of pay and non-pay
solutions to shortages it identified. However, the value of the pay
award was very quickly eroded and unrest spread amongst nurses. The
RCN initiated its 'Raise the Roof' publicity campaign of
demonstrations and meetings in 1968, with the main pay aim being to
obtain large pay increases for senior nurses to restore nursing's
attractiveness to career-minded middle class women. As Carp ter has
put it, the campaign 'was therefore an odd combination of pressure
from beloi in the service of a salary demand biased considerably in
favour of those at the top' (1988:355). CURSE joined in rather
belatedly and increases were conceded by the government in awards for
1970 and 1971.
The Conservative government of 1970-1974 headed by Heath at first did
not run an official incomes policy. However, yet again, public sector
pay restraint was used in practice to act as an example to the private
sector. The nurses' award again quickly fell behind, against cost of
living and comparability measures, and a 'revaluation' claim was
submitted for 1972. This claim was for 26-40% and biased towards the
lower end of the nursing scale. Negotiations were halted, however, by
the 1972 statutory pay freeze introduced by the government. The NMC
negotiators actually settled under Phase Three of the policy but
resentment at effective cuts in real pay at a time of high inflation
had built up and exploded with the election of a Labour government in
early 1974. The RCN, NALGO and CURSE all campaigned for an
independent review of nurses' pay with COHSE members taking limited
industrial action and RCN threatening a mass resignation of nurses
from the NHS. A review was duly promised by Barbara Castle.
This review took the form of an independent Corrmittee of Inquiry into
pay and conditions under Lord Haisbury (chair of the Doctors and
Dentists Standing Review Body) and outside the Whitley Council system.
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The Elaisbury Report of September 1974 was to prove a high point in
nursing pay for many years to come. The award amounted to some 30%
overall. COHSE recruited many general nurses during the campaign and
it appeared that militancy had been a key to the successful pay award.
The Labour government from 1974 to 1979 ran what may, with hindsight,
appear to be a number of contradictory policies. Legislation on equal
pay, sex and race discrimination, and health and safety was enacted,
and the Employment Protection Act (EPA) and Trade Union and Labour
Relations Act (TULRA) also gave further impetus to the spread of shop
stewards and local bargaining. Recognition and an extension of
bargaining rights at local level over a wide range of issues also took
place in the public sector, with the possibility of appeal to ACAS
beginning to put local management on the defensive. COHSE's outlook
and composition changed and the RON was forced in many ways to
compete. As COHSE became increasingly occupied with 'professional'
issues, the RON, to gain access to the newly established bargaining
rights, finally registered as a trade union in 1977 and began to
develop local organisation, although it still remained unaffiliated to
the TUC or Labour party.
However, against the background of improved employment legislation and
trade union strength, wage restraint was again to be a policy feature
and to cause problems. A crisis in public expenditure planning and
control took place in 1974-5 and led to the introduction of explicit
cash limits in 1976 (Thomson and Beaumont,1978:122-6) and public
sector expenditure cuts. From 1976 onwards, the loan agreement with
the IMF led to a revision in the actual perception of the public
sector, which was now seen as a 'drag' on the economy. The 1975
Social Contract agreement with the TUC at first favoured low paid
workers with a flat rate £6 a week pay limit, but their position began
to deteriorate in the second year of restraint. By the third year a
10% limit had been imposed without the agreement of the TUC, and cuts
in the planned growth of the NHS led to non-replacement of staff waen
they left and cut backs in nurse training. The 1974 gains began to be
eroded by inflation and, by 1978, big claims for pay increases and
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reduction in hours were su1itted. Callaghan finally offered 8.87
(against the limit of 57) but, in January 1979, COHSE drew up
guidelines for industrial action and took a full part in the 'Winter
of Discontent'. The Labour government duly appointed the Clegg
Comparability Cocrinission to look at public sector pay and make
recomiiendations, with 97 and a payment on account being made to NHS
workers.
Labour lost the General Election, but the incoming Conservative
government honoured the Corrrnission's findings for nurses. In 1980,
the Cormiission reconinended an additional increase averaging 19.6°h.
The settlement was staged, with the initial increase held to the NHS
cash limit of 147, with the government setting aside funds for a
shorter, 37½ hour working week (67 of the paybill) for 1980-81. This
did not meet the nurses' demand to restore their salaries to their
1974 (Halsbiry) level. The Conservatives had already announced that
the Comparability Cocrrnission was to be abolished and that ability to
pay rather than comparability should be the main criterion for public
sector pay determination. Cash limits were also to be tightened and
to become an implicit form of incomes policy in the 1980s.
By 1979 COHSE's total membership had grown to 215,000 (reaching
231,000 in 1982 before declining somewhat) and, with a hugely
increased ni.imber of women and general nurses, it had become a serious
rival to the RCN. COHSE and NUPE in 1980 together had over 200,000
nursing members (120,000 and 81,000 respectively) compared with
177,000 for the RCN. However, even after Lord t'tCarthy's review of
the Whitley system (1976), the professional associations were still
dominant on Staff Side and the collective voice of the TUC-unions was
therefore still relatively unheard through official wage determination
procedures. The scene was set for the 1982 dispute.
In the account conducted so far, the existence of relatively poor pay
for nurses has largely been evidenced through the use of historical
episode rather than quantified. There have, in fact, been relatively
few attempts at 'objective' or 'rigorous' evaluation of historical
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nursing pay levels and movements in the U.K., though rather more for
the U.S.A. where pay is mainly locally determined. In part, this
stems from the 'problem-led' nature of much interest in nursing pay
and the concentration on groups or periods where especial difficulties
are perceived (Gray, 1987:9). In part also, this stems from the
intrinsic difficulty in evaluating such outcomes. The most detailed
work has been conducted mainly under the auspices of official
comittees of inquiry such as the NBPI review of 1968, the Flaisbury
review in 1974 and the Clegg report of 1979-1980 or by dedicated
health or nursing orgarlisations (for example, Buchan, 1992).
Nonetheless, two of the very few studies on historical trends in
nursing pay (Gray and Smail, 1982; Smail and Gray, 1982 - followed
more recently by Gray, 1989) enable a broadbrush depiction of levels
and trends, despite a number of unresolved analytical problems. Table
2.2 shows relative nursing pay outcomes between 1913 and 1981. It can
be seen that although the establishment of the NHS did provide a once
and for all uplift in nursing pay in comparison with lower
TABLE 2.2 FFNALE NURSES' GROSS PAY RELATIVE TO OERER GROUPS 1913-1981
Female nurses' pay
as a 7 of:	 1913/14 1922/24 1935/36 1955/56 1960 1970 1978
Lower professional
women
	 62	 50
	
63	 83
	
70 78 76
Lower professional
men
	 35	 33
	
43	 59
	
50 51 56
All females average
	
110	 103
	
128
	
113 102 116 112
National average
	
68	 68
	
82
	
68	 60 69 76
SOURCE: Adapted from Routh 1980 in Smail & Gray,1982:5
professional men and women, and an improvement in hours and conditions
which were to continue, nurses continued to fare badly against the
national average and all lower professional comparators. Nurses'
relative pay since the Second World War deteriorated in the 1950s and
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1949
1953
1958
1963
1968
1973
1974
1978
1979
1981
275
247.2
247.5
267.3
261.9
307.3
373.0
408.5
370.0
325.8
475
418.7
418.3
503.3
481.7
535.7
630.5
587.3
552.5
518.3
210
191.4
184.9
204.2
210.0
261.2
343.8
385.2
355.3
321.0
100
125.4
148.7
166.5
202.4
292.4
343 .2
618.4
720.3
929.7
1960s, improved in ttie early half of the 1970s, with a slight
regression in the later part of the 1970s.
With respect to real pay, Table 2.3 shows that nurses' pay between
1949 and the late 1960s barely rose at all and fell through all broad
grades for substantial periods between these dates. The early 1970s
witnessed a sharp increase in real pay and the effects of the Haisbury
awards can be seen here in contributing to a high point for trained
nurses, as can the effects of awards in the narrowing of differentials
in trie second half of the 1970s between trained staff and student and
unqualified nurses. The post-Halsbury decline in real pay of all
nursing grades up to 1981 is also evident, and the Clegg awards of
1979-80 did little to halt this decline.
TABLE 2.3 PRICE INFLATION AND NURSES' PAY AT CONSTANT 1949 PRICES
1949-1981
YEAR	 RPI
(Sept)	 1949=100
NURSES' PAY ( per annum)
Trained	 In- training	 Unqualified
SOURCE: Adapted from Smail & Gray,1982:22.
The findings on real pay are thus quite consistent with the findings
on relative pay and pay levels, although of course it would be
possible for nurses to fare badly relative to other occupations while
maintaining significant rises in real pay. Thus, and despite the
unprecedented economic growth in the UK economy since WW2, it appears
that on only rare occasions have nurses benefitted greatly from it,
the main occasions being in the early 1970s when they received the pay
increases reconinended in 1968 and 1974.
	
Other major awards and
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routine increments have not maintained their position in the national
pay structure. Smail & Gray concluded that the establishment of the
NHS and Whitley machinery had not significantly altered the pattern of
fluctuating fortunes for nurses.
It should perhaps come as no surprise that the evidence on nurses' pay
outcomes up to the 1980's, notwithstanding problems of methodology arid
objectivity, supports the more intuitive accounts in much of the
literature in suggesting that nurses have fared poorly within the
national wage hierarchy. Causation is, however, much more
contentious. Smail & Gray, for example, concluded that, despite the
long run narrowing of male-female pay differentials as elsewhere in
the economy,:
an occupation such as nursing has distinctive characteristics
which, irrespective of the institutional framework within which
they work, will influence pay patterns and relativities. These
characteristics may include high turnover, weak collective
organisation and reluctance or inability to take industrial
action, factors noted in this context by the Hals1iry Coarnittee
of 1974...it is usually only when a special review cocrnittee is
formed...that nurses and midwives witness a marked change in the
level of their pay. The present negotiating machinery...has only
been able to survive as a consequence of its occasional
suspension. Problems of deciding upon an acceptable position in
the national pay structure...are present in an acute form in this
large occupational group and show every sign of worsening'
(1982:7-8,25).
This chapter has, in contrast to some of these findings, emphasised
the importance of the institutional framework and of power
disproportionalities within and between the Sides, along the lines
suggested by Clegg and Chester (1957) and nursing historians.
GRADING AND TRAINIING
A final part of the history of nursing and nursing pay determination
pertains to ttie interconnected role played by important changes in
grading and training. As already noted, untrained or unqualified
staff had always been used in the health system, so what was really at
issue here was a change in emphasis; the new systems recognised that
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sucr staff were engaged on 'nursing' duties. This point has been
badly missed in much of the nursing literature. The line between
'nursing' work arid domestic work has always been fluid. At different
times and to a different extent, trained nurses, student nurses,
assistant nurses/enrolled nurses, and nursing auxiliaries undertook
'domestic' activities. Ancillary staff numbers fluctuate partly in
response to the extent that such activities are incorporated in the
definition of nursing. The delineation and formalisation of 'grades'
did not resolve this fluidity of tasks actually performed which is
further underpinned by the level of public provision and the nursing
care undertaken at home by untrained women.
A new grade of nurse was introduced in the War years. The 1943 Nurses
Act gave assistant nurses statutory recognition through absorption of
existing staff, with examination and subsequent admission to a 'Roll'
of the General Nursing Council of new staff after two years' training
(the first tests were conducted in 1949). The recocrinendations of the
1905 Cocrinittee were thus finally enacted. These nurses were not to
have access to higher posts, however.
As with the 1919 Act, a wide variety of interests were involved. The
creation of a Civil Nursing Reserve, in an attempt to resolve
shortages, had produced a de facto three-tiered nursing hierarchy:
trained nurses, assistant nurses and nursing auxiliaries. The
Rushcliffe Coninittee established a scale for them and 'it became
obvious that the ministry was conmnitted to a long-term role for such
personnel' (Dingwall,1988:115). The TUC- unions' support for the Bill
was no doubt motivated by their desire to obtain proper recognition
and pay for assistants. The RCN had initially followed its long
history of resistence to this change, because it was perceived as
lowering standards and providing the possibility of nursing
substitution. However, de facto substitution had already taken place,
and the RCN was finally moved to accept enrolment to gain 'control' of
this grade. The fear that such unregistered 'nurses' might be
recognised as a valid nursing alternative and thus undermine the main
reason for a lengthy training and professional qualification may also
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have been a powerful incentive. Employers had effectively been
providing the training they felt was needed for assistants and,
sometimes, auxiliaries, and the nursing hierarchy was becoming
blurred, with assistant nurses hired through cooperatives or agencies
frequently gaining higher salaries than registered nurses. Employers
initially resisted the formalisation of assistant nurses, which would
require training controls and possibly increased pay but then began to
see advantages. Employers' actions and Ministry of Health pressure
eventually decided the issue. The RN set up the Horder Coffrnittee in
1941, which reconrnended that:
The Assistant Nurse of the future should become one of the most
stable elements in our national nursing service - an integral
part of the profession, and a person whose status offers the key
to trie improved training and employment of her senior partner,
the State Registered Nurse. Moreover it is only when the
services of the Assistant Nurse have been defined and regulated
that matters affecting the State Registered Nurse can be brought
into line - her student status assured when in training and her
skill used to the best advantage when she is trained (Horder
Report in Abel-Smith,1960:170-171).
As can be seen, the above was largely post-hoc rationalisation. The
1943 Bill was, as had been the 1919 debate, dominated by questions of
experience versus training for admission to the Roll and by questions
concerning the standards which should be set. In 1947, the Wood
Coninittee recon-inended a shorter training, as had COHSE, and from 1950
the GNC introduced a system whereby there was to be one year's
training followed by one year's supervision for qualification (Abel-
Smith,1960:231). Untrained staff were again pushed to the periphery
of attention.
The vast majority of those originally assimilated to the Roll did so
through the 'experience' mechanism. However, as they retired, new
'trainees' failed to keep pace. The limited pay and prospects of
enrolled nursing were not particularly attractive to prospective
recruits against the training requirement. Two state policies,
however, led to the dramatic expansion of this grade. Firstly, from
1948 the recruitment of trainees from ex-colonial or British
Comonwealth countries began and was pursued vigorously from the early
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1950's. These irrrnigrants were disproportionately channelled into EN
training, and for unpopular specialities, and were less likely to be
employed and have their visas renewed after training. This trend
peaked in the early 1970's and has been declining since (see
Salvage,1985:37-41). Recruitment from Eire, begun earlier, was also
continued. This undoubtedly caused divisions amongst staff and COHSE,
for example, did not actively seek to recruit overseas health workers
until the 1960's. Secondly, in its 'Codes of Working Conditions' in
the mid-1940's, the government encouraged the recruitment of married
women and part-timers, amongst other measures designed to improve the
attractiveness of hospital work and resolve shortages
(Carpenter,1988:254). This had also been reconinended in the Wood
CoaTnittee Report (1946) and 4th Horder Report (1949) (Abel-
Smith,1960:188-9). Such women had been largely excluded from nursing
by the high requirements for registration and of full-time nursing
itself. Through these measures, enrolled nurses grew to account for a
third of qualified nurses by the end of the 1970's.
Faster grade dilution was achieved in the 1950's, before the expansion
of EN grades, through the increase in numbers of unqualified staff.
As Abel-Smith put it 'after the sudden departure of nursing
auxiliaries at the end of the war, hospitals found they could not
manage without them and started recruiting unqualified women again'
(1960:234). These women were largely employed on domestic tasks in
the acute sector, but also for nursing duties in the chronic sector,
which experienced the worst shortages of qualified nurses. Such
untrained nurses were thus employed to fill gaps left by the shortage
of trained staff, or as a cheaper alternative, rather than to create a
balanced nursing team. The recognition in 1955 of the Nursing
Auxiliary (NA) role owed much to the fact that these staff were
previously paid on ancillary rates which offered higher overtime and
weekend rates, reflecting the conditions of male orderlies. It was
thus cheaper to redefine this grade and set a payscale for it - the
Ministry was indeed keen to do so. By 1958, there were more untrained
staff working in the hospitals than there had been before the war
(Dingwall,1988:116). The increase in numbers of NAs was achieved
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alonside a decrease in the number of nursing students. The A grade
was again disproportionately occupied by women working part-time or
ethnic minorites. From 157 of total numbers of nurses in England and
Wales in 1949, part-timers grew to account for nearly 4O7 in 1977
(calculated from Gray and Smail,1982;6). NAs were concentrated in
unpopular specialities, especially those for the chronic sick. This
grade dilution was in large part set in motion by state policy, both
through circulars (e.g. the 'dilution' Circular RHB (53) in mental
nursing - see Carpenter,1988:286) and through employer behaviour under
conditions of resource squeeze.
Patterns of stratification in the nursing hierarchy, existing prior to
WW2, were thus built upon and reinforced with formal grades and
qualification barriers. A marginal increase in the proportion of
qualified nurses by the early 1980's, despite a decrease in the
proportion of registered nurses, was achieved through the continuing
growth of the E14 role, as a relatively cheap form of qualified nurse
with very little chance of advancement up the pay ladder. Likewise,
training as a whole decreased substantially and cheap student labour
was substituted for by NAs, who again offered cost advantages through
lower pay and limited promotion opportunities. Grade dilution has
thus been an important part of cost-minirnisation strategy, alongside
the operation of pay determination mechanisms [3].
There are a number of possible reasons why this situation could not be
considered a 'steady state' and to have expected some shifts in the
trends for the 1980's. Firstly, this process has been characterised
here as 'grade' rather than 'skill' dilution. The discussion of
initial absorption onto the Register and Roll has shown that
experience rather than training played a strong role. The length and
[3] Its significance was noted in passing in a further paper by Gray &
Smail (1982) on reasons for the increase in the Scottish nursing
paybill between 1948 and 1979, which showed that changes in nursing
composition, especially those arising from grade dilution, were an
important downward influence on pay.
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content of 'necessary' training has also been a point of issue both
within and amongst nurses and employers. Secondly, grade dilution
could be seen as a cheap alternative to adequate funding of the health
service and allowance for competitive pay rates and training
expenditure. However, grade dilution in turn lowers the
attractiveness of all grades, as none is adequately compensated
through this solution. Low pay is institutionalised and may lower
morale, particularly as low pay becomes associated with pear
conditions in unpopular specialities. Shortages may therefore not be
resolved.
Shortages did indeed continue in the post-war era and periodically
emerged as points of major concern. If, as has been suggested above,
related resentment on the part of nurses was not handled within the
Whitley machinery, it could be expected that it would surface outside
this mechanism in the form of militancy. Finally, grade dilution laid
the conditions for the growth of trade unionism. This was particularly
true for NAs who were excluded from RCN membership. In theory,
incorporation of ENs could have worked either way, and initially
should have worked to the advantage of the RCN. However, the lower
pay and status of this group, the attitude of the RQ itself, and
trade union efforts to attract ENs along with registered nurses made
their allegiance a contestable area. Some of these effects have been
noted in the earlier examination of pay determination.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has provided an historical context against which changes
in nurses' pay, grading and training will be evaluated for the 1980's.
It was argued that although patriarchal influences long preceded those
of capitalism, the two influences combined to produce a healthcare
system and division of labour within it which reflected and supported
the wider productive system and deeply-rooted inequalities in gender,
class and race.
	 However, despite some semblance of structural
continuity, the 'system' could also be viewed as prone to intermittent
crisis. Capital's interest in health services is more clearly viewed
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as a measure of costs and benefits, which may be neither rationally
calculated nor historically constant. Delivery systems and use of
labour may equally be irrational or inefficient. A major force in
influencing this cost-benefit estimation has been labour, and its
trade union organisation and political activities.
The prior stratification of the labour force could be seen to have had
a constraining impact on the effectiveness of nursing representation
through the competition between 'professional' and 'trade union' aims.
However, although the 'professional' associations were shaped and
supported by the institutions of the wider productive system, the
'balance' between the power of professional associations and of trade
unions could be viewed as a delicate one for government and employers.
Professionalisation can only proceed to the extent where it does not
threaten the existing hierarchy or add substantially to labour costs.
Trade unions on the other hand have both the desire and the potential
to affect both pay and conditions of work and the funding arrangements
necessary to accoainodate them.
The account provided here suggests that the establishment of the NHS
and a new pay determination system did not mark as significant a break
with the past as many believed. Though these represented some gains
for labour, both were again tilted in favour of maintenance of the
status quo. The importance of understanding the particular role and
functioning of institutional mechanisms and of power imbalances could
be seen in the evaluation of pay determination. Governments have
conflicting objectives, however, and the importance of distinguishing
between political administrations could also be seen, despite some
appearance of continuity in treatment of nurses. Thus, ambiguous
policies might be run in tandem. For example, despite the operation
of incomes policies and cash limits, changes in trade union
legislation and organisation were seen to have an important impact on
nursing trade unionism and such develoçents led to changes in the
professional associations.
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The chapter also has suggested that the cost-benefit calculation in
cost-miriimisation strategy may be difficult, given uncertain
feedbacks. It has been argued that an important, and little noted,
influence was the grade dilution that took place in the post-W12
decades, both as part of a strategic desire to reduce labour costs and
with the expansion of 'cindarella' services. Grade dilution had a
number of effects, including loss of morale and the strengthening of
conditions for the growth of trade unionism. The irritant effect of
incomes policies and of continuing low pay also caused feedbacks in
the form of attempts by trade unions to improve nurses' terms and
conditions or the more direct loss of nurses and shortages.
In these respects, an emphasis on continuities in nurses' position
within the wage hierarchy may mask some of the changes taking place
and their causes. The chapters which follow address the controversy
over causation in nursing pay determination and pay movements through
a detailed study of the 1980's. An evaluation of the new pay review
system and of changes in grading, grade-mix and training, against the
wider background of healthcare provision and policy decisions, permits
an illustration and expansion of some of these historical themes.
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THE ORIGINS OF THE NURSES' & MIDWIVES' PAY REVIEW BODY
The previous chapter provided a historical evaluation of nursing and
nursing pay determination. This chapter presents a more detailed
analysis of the structures, processes and outcomes of arbitration and
pay review in nursing pay determination prior to the 1980's, and of
the irrrnediate context in which the PRB was formed. It reviews
consultations for the PRB, the arguments put forward for its
operation, and its original remit. Finally, the analysis extends to
the operation of other Review Bodies and some preliminary conclusions
are drawn on the nature of pay review.
THE ANTECEDENTS OF THE REVIEW BODY
As Chapter Two noted, it has been argued that the Whitley system of
pay determination for nurses and midwives survived largely because of
its periodic augmentation or suspension (Sinail & Gray,1982). The
forms of arbitration brought in to play when the Whitley Council
failed to reach agreement on pay increases differed, but have been a
vital part of wage determination for nurses in the post-World War Two
era, as for other public sector workers (see Winchester,1983:163).
Arbitration was viewed by the Webbs as a system of decision-making on
terms and conditions of employment through the 'fiat of an umpire or
arbitrator'. This system was seen as supplementing rather than
supplanting collective bargaining and as a temporary expedient to
resolve wage disputes (1897:243). In nursing pay determination both
these features have in practice been stretched to their theoretical
limits, but the systems employed can still usefully be defined (albeit
broadly) as forms of arbitration.
The forms that arbitration took in the realm of nursing pay
determination changed over the post-WW2 decades. Paradoxically, this
may point to a more limited role for arbitration as a tool in conflict
resolution than is sometimes assumed. The delays caused by arbitration
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to nursing pay settlements could be viewed as a source of irritation
to nurses themselves, while proving instrumental to the government's
desire to control expenditures. Moreover, arbitration enabled
government to set conflict at one step remove without tackling
underlying problems in nursing pay determination and outcomes. It
would thus be possible to view the changing systems as having more to
do with an on-going response to the growth in nursing trade union
membership and militancy over pay, arising from the failure of nurses'
pay to rise in the national wage hierarchy, than with a more general
policy stance towards arbitration itself.
These points may be seen in the frequency and persistence of the use
of arbitration in nursing pay determination in the NHS. In the
irrrnediate post4M2 years, arbitration was a feature of nursing pay
determination. Subsequently, between December 1952 and 1956, no fewer
ti-ian eight awards relating to nurses' pay were made through
arbitration by the Industrial Court (Gray, 1989). With the blocking
of traditional NHS staff side applications for arbitration in the 1959
Terms and Conditions of Employment Act, arbitration then resurfaced in
different guise. In the 1960's, this tended to be in the form of ad
hoc reviews and inquiries and there were four such 'special reviews'
in the 1960s for nurses (Halsbury,1974).
The late 1960's and 1970's saw a further change in emphasis in the
form of arbitration, with a nunber of non-Whitley, 'independent'
reviews into nurses' pay. The first of these was the National Board
of Price and Incomes (NBPI) review of 1967-8, which was followed in
1970 by another Whitley 'internal' review which recocrniended 'catch up'
pay increases. In 1974, the second independent inquiry was conducted
under the chairmanship of the Earl of Halsbury. The third independent
inquiry was the Standing Coaiiiission on Pay Comparability in 1979-1980,
with Professor Hugh Clegg in the Qiair.
The NBPI was constituted to examine and co-ordinate a wide range of
incomes as part of a broader economic policy. The 1967/8 review took
place in the context of a series of mainly productivity-based incomes
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policies and growing trade union membership and militancy. The
nurses' claim was thus submitted to the NBPI at a time of severe pay
restraint and the NBPI's recomendations emphasised non-pay solutions
such as efficiency improvements through better deployment of staff and
revised staff patterns. The pay recomnendations increased
differentials and were targeted at combatting shortages of specific
grades, such as staff nurses. Outcomes were conservative and a
further review was necessary only two years later. The Haisbury
Report later argued that the recomendations had been 'limited'
because 'the independence of the Board was itself circumscribed by the
need to observe the pay restraint measures then current' (1974:12).
A period of unprecedented pay militancy erupted amongst nurses
following the NBPI award. Nurses' pay fell behind against cost of
living and comparability measures at a time when women were becoming
increasingly vocal in their claims for equal pay with men.
Demonstrations and publicity campaigns took place, fuelled by the
successive overt incomes policies and de facto public sector pay
restraints. The R(, COl-ISE and NAL.CO all campaigned for an independent
review of nurses' pay. With the election of a Labour government in
1974, the Comiiittee of Inquiry chaired by Haisbury was finally set up,
dedicated to a review of nursing pay per se rather than the concerns
of wider economic policy. The resulting remit was one of the broadest
ever granted to a review exercise before or since, 'to examine the pay
structure and the levels of remuneration and related conditions of
service of nurses and midwives', a remit later extended to cover the
professions supplementary to medicine (Haisbury Report,1974:1).
In its structure and process, Halstxiry bore many of the hallmarks of
new pay review bodies constituted in 1971 for key parts of the public
sector, and much of its style was to be carried forward into the new
Nurses' and Midwives' Pay Review Body. 	 The Haisbury Ccxunittee was
appointed by government, and its members were not intended to be
directly representative of any particular interest group, or to have
any special expertise in nursing or health. The Coarnittee consisted
of seven members, for the main part male, and drawn from an elevated
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social background. In this context it is interesting to speculate on
the degree to which the sociology of pay review includes in its
'judicial' elements a degree of pomp and ceremony, in membership and
process, which reflects the deeper structures of hierarchy and
deference embedded in wider society. Given the hierarchical nature of
nursing and its historical roots in obedience and service it would be
interesting to speculate further on the importance this has for the
acceptance of pay determination through such a system.
From the vantage point of pay review in the early 1990s it is notable
that the detailed arguments presented by the Ha1s)iry Cazmittee, 1?
its ninety-page report, possessed a remarkably conciliatory and
sympathetic tone, and adopted an ostensibly radical approach. The
report foreshadowed later developments by disassociating its
recomendations from the effects of previous industrial action: 'We
want to make it clear that the pressure which the industrial action
was designed to create has not influenced our recomendations in any
way' (1974:4). However, it went on to promise the first true
evaluation of the place of nursing in the national pay hierarchy.
Members of the Carniittee who had visited hospitals proved sympathetic
to the plight of nurses, noting the extent to which nurses worked
unpaid overtime, undertook non-nursing duties, had inadequate numbers
of supporting staff, and took second jobs and 'moonlighted' because of
shortage of money.
'Evidence' was provided by Staff Side and Management Side. The Staff
Side claim was for an average 25% increase, and an increase in
differentials. They supported this claim with evidence on absolute
and relative low pay, external comparability, the gendered nature of
the profession, and increased workload and responsibility. Management
Side provided a muted and sympathetic evidence, which reflects the
particular nature of the Halsiry exercise. They had attempted to
find conmon grades or men's rates but 'it was difficult to find close
analogues except between the nursing auxiliary and the ward orderly'.
They noted the grade dilution of previous years and also that 'the
total number of nurses was well below optimum standards' and said
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there was a need to maintain quality. They pointed to specific
shortages and recruitment and retention problems, and they 'welcomed'
the present review. Again in the light of future events, Management
Side were remarkably unforthcoming about the criteria which should be
employed to determine pay, apparently leaving this to the discretion
of the Cocrrnittee (ibid:18-22).
The Coarnittee outlined the results of its own enquiries and surveys,
and noted substantial recruitment and retention problems, with
shortages of some 17% against establishment (a striking figure based
on a study by COHSE). The Comiiittee also conducted its own earnings
comparison using a base year of 1970, despite an acknowledgement that
in this year nurses' settlements 'were low'. Female nurses were
compared with female non-manual workers, male nurses with non-manual
male workers, and nursing as a whole compared with other external
occupations such as teaching and the civil service. Direct
comparisons were also made between nursing pay increases and the rate
of change of prices as measured through the RPI, and earnings as
measured through the AEI. The conclusion was reached that the earnings
opportunities in nursing had become 'relatively unattractive'
(ibid:23-32), and the final reconinendations added some 30% to the
overall paybill, while simplifying the grading structure and widening
differentials between the main grades of nursing staff.
There are several important factors to note in the way the Comittee
reached and reported its conclusions (ibid:33-54). Firstly, the main
basis of the report appeared to be general comparability and, in
recomending some form of job evaluation for the longer term, the
Conrnittee stressed the role of perceived fairness in calculating
nurses' pay through comparability exercises. They felt, however, that
job evaluation could not provide all the answers as: 'in the end, the
pay levels appropriate to a particular section depend on subjective
judgements of acceptability to the comunity as a whole'. In this
important respect, it should come as no surprise that there was no
clear linkage between the Comittee's analytical system and percentage
pay outcomes, although recruitment and retention and differentials
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were also important factors. As Seifert has put it: 'the argments
are...to placate everyone and to allow each relevant group to find
some comfort - the hallmark of the arbitrator' (1992:281).
Secondly, for the Comittee the importance of recruitment and
retention issues, especially shortages, was that they reflected
problems with pay. The solutions were therefore clearly seen to
revolve around improvements in pay as these were acknowledged to
provide important signals in the labour market. The general increase
across the board was intended to improve staff numbers at all levels,
and the vital linkage with comparability is evident. However,
believing that 'the relative decline in nurses' earnings over recent
years has contrihited to the change of balance in the numbers of
qualified and unqualified staff', the Report reconinended the widening
of differentials, to boost the proportion of qualified staff.
Thirdly, despite paying considerable lip service to the view that
nursing should not be undervalued because 'it is predominantly a
woman's profession', the report nonetheless used female-female
comparisons throughout, a point which suggests that rhetoric should be
distinguished from practice in evaluating measures of comparability.
It also suggests a change in form rather than content in responding to
the external pressure of the Women's Liberation Movement and wider
legal reform.
In terms of pay outcomes, the Haisbury award was to remain a high
point. In the following years, nursing pay again fell behind and
differentials also narrowed, with auxiliaries and student nurses again
improving their position vis-a-vis qualified nurses (see Srnail and
Gray, 1982:10). The latter point undoubtedly reflected the growing
strength of nursing trade unions. Pressures again built up from the
nursing unions and associations, spurred by incomes policies and cuts
in the planned growth of the NFIS with the associated non-replacement
of staff and cutbacks in nurse training. By 1978, large claims for
pay increases were suhaitted and nurses took part in the 'winter of
discontent' in early 1979.
	 This militancy culminated in the
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appointment of the Standing Comnission on Pay Comparability by the
Labour Prime Minister in March 1979 to examine the terms and
conditions of employment of some 19 different groups of workers. It
was to report in each case on the 'possibility of establishing
acceptable bases of comparison with terms and conditions for other
comparable work and of maintaining appropriate internal relativities'
(1980:iii). Report Number Three on Nurses and Midwives appeared in
January 1980.
As far as nurses were concerned, the perceived need for some longer-
term method of pay determination had long been growing in importance
on the political agenda, augmented by the ever-more vocal criticisms
of the Whitley system itself (for a detailed review, see
Seifert,1992:214-220), expressed formally through the report published
in 1976 by Lord McCarthy, 'Making Whitley Work'. The aspirations for
the Comission therefore extended to finding a more 'rational' and
'long-term' basis for determining the levels of nursing pay. This,
however, proved to be an extremely difficult exercise, as can be seen
in the Comission's process and evidence of problems with what might
be termed 'refined comparability' (Kessler,1983:85).
The Comission initially argued that job-for-job comparisons were
better than any form of indexation but saw little potential for
actually conducting these given the lack of similar jobs. A form of
factor analysis, or job evaluation, was therefore undertaken, as had
been suggested in the longer-term reconinendations of Halst*.iry. The
exercise was conducted by coninissioned external consultants, and
factors were based mainly on know-how, problem-solving and
accountability.	 Otherwise the review process proceeded much as
Haisbury, with evidence, visits, surveys and comparisons. Staff Side
said that their pay was low compared with similar occupations and
wanted salaries to be set so that their average earnings would not be
less than those of average male non-manual employees. In their choice
of comparators, Staff Side were clearly attempting, yet again, to
establish a linkage with male comparators. They criticised the
methodology of the comparability study which they saw as undervaluing
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the nursing profession, and asked the Ccxrrnission to take other
evidence into account. Some of the concerns with the methodology
focused on the fact that only 134 jobs were studied for half a million
workers in 60 distinct jobs and that the consultants' data bank
covered only those organisations that used their services. Staff
Side, for example, queried if those organisations were 'good
employers'. Management were again muted in their evidence, claiming
that they wanted nurses to be 'justly remunerated' and to have some
machinery which enabled their pay to be kept 'up to date' (1980:7-11).
The study produced scores in terms of job units. As an example, a
Regional Nursing Officer scored 1418 (median) and a nursing auxiliary
only 98. Under this scheme, students were rated more highly than
auxiliaries. The Corrmission reported that it thought that 'the job of
the nursing auxiliary, who is unqualified, is much more closely akin
to the jobs of ancillary staff than to the job of the qualified nurse'
(ibid:16). Thus, in practice, the scores were broadly consistent with
the existing hierarchy and a desire to broaden differentials and
maintain a link between ancillary workers and auxiliaries. The scores
were then used to produce reconmended increases required to bring
nurses' pay in line with consultant market median base pay, adjusted
for various differences in terms and conditions.
The final reconinendations, however, differed somewhat from the
consultants' reccarnended percentages for the main grades and
substantially for the minority grades. As the Comission put it, 'job
evaluation cannot be an infallible guide...It is a method of
rationalising judgements about relative pay and reconciling
differences between them' (ibid:19). Thus, in the end, despite the
attempt to provide some systematic basis for pay awards, the review
process had to provide a measure of judgement and the final percentage
awards remained unexplained.
	 The Coninission itself noted the
'experimental' nature of the exercise and the need to produce
reconinendations quickly for the year in question. In all, an increase
of some 19.37 of the paybill was recomended, payable in two equal
parts. However, as can be seen in Table 2.3 above, this did not
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restore nurses' pay against cost of living increases, and nurses did
not regain the position achieved against comparators with the
dedicated review undertaken by Haisbury.
In 1979, the Conservative government came to power. The Clegg
reconinendations were honoured but the Standing Comission was soon
abandoned and the gains eroded. Nonetheless, the seeds of a pay
review system which would be not only 'independent' but also of a less
'temporary' nature can be seen in this account. Many of the main
features of pay review, along with some of those from the prior
operation of Pay Review Bodies for other groups of workers, were
carried forward in the new review process. However, the differences
were to prove important.
In the Autumn of 1981 health service workers decided to combine forces
in a campaign to gain increases in pay which for two years had been
below the rate of inflation. The campaign was facilitated by the new
comon settlement date for all major NHS pay groups of 1 April 1982
and coordinated by the TUC Health Services ConTnittee (HSC), with a
'coirnion core' claim of 127g. The Government responded with an offer of
only 6%. An appeal by the TUC HSC to the Secretary of State for
Health and Social Services received a negative response, and
subsequent industrial unrest lasted through most of 1982. The scale
of this unrest remains notable - on one account, thousands of health
workers took industrial action, reducing 1,500 hospitals to an
emergencies-only service whilst public support magnified along with
the support of trade unionists. A national day of action took place
on 22 September 1982, with sympathy action by many workers and 'one of
the largest trade union demonstrations ever seen' in London
(Carpenter,1988:378). On another account, this was the 'most
sustained and severe disruption ever seen in the service (nearly a
million days were lost)' (Salvage,1985:140). The campaign revealed
the political vulnerability of a government which, at this time, was
at a peak of unpopularity. On 18 January 1983, Mr Ray Powell in Oral
Answers in Parliament asked Mr Norman Fowler, with reference to the
wider industrial action, 'Is the Secretary of State aware that 3
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million working days were lost, compared with the 600,000 that were
lost during the winter of discontent, directly as a result of his
inability to settle the dispute sooner?' (Hansard).
The Pay Review Body emerged as a potential solution in the middle of
this long and costly dispute, during which the RCT twice turned down
government offers and some general nurses, including RQ members, had
for the first time protested, picketed, worked to rule and even
withdrawn their labour. Talks had been taking place between the
Government, management and Staff Side since 1980 on possible
arrangements to prevent nurses' pay falling behind other groups, with
little success. However, in the end:
the promise proved to be the government's trump card. Fed up
with disruptions to the service, anxious for more money in their
pockets and hopeful that a new arrangement could be reached,
nurses finally settled for a 12.3% rise spread over two years,
and the promise of a new pay review body (Salvage,1985:142).
The offer of a review body has been viewed as an attempt by the
Government 'to divide the unity of health staffs' on one of the
notable occasions when higher pay offers to certain groups had
previously been rejected in favour of a comrrnon claim (Carpenter,
1988:379), and the dispute indeed 'limped to an end' after R members
accepted this third offer (Salvage,1985:141).
The importance of the RCN's no-strike policy and the traditional
reluctance of most nurses to take industrial action has been stressed
in some accounts as part of the rationale for separating this group
from the other NHS workers (ibid), and this was enshrined in the terms
under which the PRB was established. Norman Fowler stated that 'the
review body recognises the special position of nurses, who do not take
industrial action' (Hansard, January,1983). There was, however, a
certain irony in this position after a bitter dispute in which some
nurses had taken industrial action for the first time. If this
represented a learning curve, then Government clearly did not wish the
learning to continue, as far as this vital group of workers was
concerned.
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RE1IT AND CONSULTATION
Early in 1983, following the statement of 9 November 1982 in the House
of Cocanons announcing the proposed establishment of a Pay Review Body
(PRB) for nurses and midwives, the government issued a Consultation
Document. If the PRB was seen as a means of conflict resolution, the
document and the initial responses to it swiftly revealed a number of
doubts and concerns about the new review body, and the manner of its
operation. Although some of these were undoubtedly expressed as part
of the political manoeuvring that tends to surround changes in
industrial relations, some were rooted in deeper concerns which
continue to be of significance.
In the Consultation Document, the government proposed that the new
review body should follow the same general pattern as the Doctors' and
Dentists Review Body (DDRB). In this respect, the Royal Comission
(Pilkington) which reported in 1960 had identified three broad
objectives: to avoid disputes over remuneration; to provide an
assurance to staff that their pay would be determined on a fair basis;
and to provide fair treatment for the taxpayer. The new review body
for nurses and midwives was to be an 'independent body' and to report
to the Prime Minister, with a secretariat provided by the Office of
Manpower Economics (OME). It would be 'free' to determine its own
method of working, obtain any information required and take evidence
from interested parties, and was to deal only with remuneration,
leaving other terms and conditions of service to be negotiated
elsewhere. The 'important links between pay and terms of service'
were early recognised and it was suggested that the PRB would need to
be kept informed of changes so that it could 'express a view to the
negotiators about the changes proposed in respect of their
implications for pay' (DHSS:1983). With regard to coverage, the
consultation document proposed the inclusion of all qualified and
unqualified staff currently in the Nursing & Midwifery and
Professional and Technical 'A' Whitley councils. Perhaps most
importantly, the consultation document set the initial agenda for the
process which would follow and sent a strong signal that the
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comparability ethos in Pilkington had been dropped:
the Government will look to the review body to give due weight to
economic and financial considerations, as well as to the
recruitment, retention and motivation of the staff concerned
(DHss,1983).
The TUC unions initially took a sceptical position about the
replacement of a 'free collective bargaining' system with that of the
PRB. The reasons they did so, however, remain highly pertinent for
the current discussion of arbitration and review. COHSE's response to
the consultation document noted that:
A new system of pay determination will not of itself avoid
disputes in the NHS. It is when the Government interferes in
collective bargaining procedures that disputes occur...the
disputes that have taken place have been far less about the
particular system adopted and far more about the actual level of
remuneration offered...the existence of the Doctors & Dentists
Review Body (DDRB), referred to several times in positive terms
in the consultation document, has not avoided disputes arising
over doctors' and dentists' pay (March,1983:1)
It was further pointed out that they did not see the PRB 'as in any
way limiting staffs' right to take industrial action', and that it was
hoped that the Review Body would establish and maintain fair levels of
pay for nurses and midwives 'so that the taking of industrial action
becomes unnecessary' (ibid). The advisory role of the PRB was also
criticised from the outset and anticipated as problematic: 'the
proposal that the Review Body report directly to the Prime Minister
who will then decide to what extent the Report is implemented stands
not only in contradiction to the comitment to the independence of the
Review Body but in potential conflict with ensuring fair pay for
nurses...' (COHSE,1983:2).
Trade union officers in interviews amplified their view that 'free
collective bargaining' through the Whitley system had always been a
chimera. They felt that, in practice, government had disproportionate
influence on the 'management' side and it was in the last resort
always up to the government to decide on pay awards. Nonetheless, the
TUG-unions were wary of seeing the principle of negotiation abandoned,
and argued for its retention in some form. For example, concerning
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the proposed terms of reference, CO[-iSE noted its preference for an
arrangement whereby the respective Whitley councils would be presented
with the Review Body's respective reports for discussion, debate and
negotiation, with the results then continuing to be referred to the
Secretary of State. The trade unions were, in fact, unanimous in
favour of retaining the Whitley negotiation machinery (Financial
Tirnes,8.4.83, GMB Journal, Augj'Sept,1983). It is interesting to note
that the actual structure and membership of the PRB drew little
coninent and this reflects the extent to which the unions had become
accustomed to this form of arbitration and review.
The crucial question of the occupational coverage of the PRB was a
controversial point and Dyson (1983) noted that 'there are strong
voices within the Royal College of Nursing who will disapprove of the
proposed inclusion of auxiliaries and assistants'. COHSE and the other
'RJC unions who also anticipated problems were very anxious to ensure
that unqualified staff were included:
For nursing assistants and auxiliaries to be excluded would be a
severe blow to staff morale [and] would cut right across the
reality and continuing need for a strong and unified nursing team
in the hospitals. Nursing assistants and auxiliaries work is
nursing work; their duties, nursing duties. Given the very close
inter-relation and interdependence of qualified and unqualified
nurses in the therapeutic team, such a step would only succeed in
dividing staff against each other through arousing a sense of
bitterness and fermenting of grievances.. There is considerable
evidence showing that without unqualified staff the vast majority
of psychiatric, geriatric, and mental handicap hospitals simply
would not function... (COHSE,1983:3-4).
The issue of coverage indeed resurfaced in July 1983, following a
statement on the review body by the Prime Minister in the House of
Corrrnons. Margaret Thatcher announced that the review body would 'deal
separately' with unqualified and qualified staff following 'concern'
expressed by the nursing and allied professions about being combined
in a single review body, and also that the government would 'reserve
the right to exclude...any groups that do resort to industrial action'
(see Hansard V.46, 28.7.1983 - Written Answer). The RCN had wanted to
restrict the operation of the review body to qualified staff and
feared that it might be difficult to hold unqualified staff to a no-
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strike coninitment. The Glasgow Herald noted that the RCN already had
a no-strike coninitment and regarded the review body as a sort of quid
pro quo (30.6.1983). The RCN informed Mrs Thatcher that it wanted:
to see the NilS moving towards the provision of a whoiiy qualified
nursing service. To include nursing auxiliaries within the PRB
would give them a credibility as nurses that would not serve this
objective (ibid).
The Prime Minister's statement was greeted with outrage and some very
colourful language by the TUC unions. David Williams (then General
Secretary of COHSE) said that 'it means that without any debate in
Parliament and without any discussion with the Trade Unions involved,
the Government is to deny the right to take industrial action to more
than half a million people'. He added that '...the Government's plans
to deal separately with qualified and unqualified nursing staffs could
easily cause bitter and unacceptable divisions between the two groups'
(cOHSE News Release,28.7.1983). John Edinonds (then National Industrial
Officer for Public Services, GMB) also 'slanined Tory proposals for a
no-strike clause as the price for the new N&M review body' calling the
proposal 'the nastiest little political trick imaginable'. The GMB
saw this as an 'unequal bargain', with health service staff having to
give up their right to strike, whilst the Government remained
uncont-titted to accepting the decisions of the proposed review body
(GMB Journal, Aug/Sept,1983).
In the event, the Prime Minister informed the RCN on 29th June 1983
that the Government would not go back on its pledge to include all
staff currently within the purview of the NMC in the new review body.
The paragraphs on industrial action, and the intention to deal
separately with qualified/unqualified staff and abolish the N&M
Whitley Council remained and can be seen in the First Pay Review
Body's Terms of Reference (1984:Appendix A:18)
With respect to the criteria to be used by the FRB in forming its
recoirinendations, these were similarly subject to much debate as might
have been expected from the prior process of arbitration and review.
The Government's explicit attempt to skew the criteria towards
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'ability to pay', however, was unsubtle compared with these prior
processes. COHSE expressed its 'strong exception to the letter and
spirit' of the proposals, which it felt indicated 'simply an
alternative expression of primacy being given to market factors and
affordability':
[This] bluntly amounts to saying that we cannot expect the strong
case of the concerned groups to be considered and judged on its
merits. Instead, the fate of the case will be determined on how
it fits in or does not fit in to the vagaries of Government
economic policies. Experience has shown how these can shift,
creating rather than overcoming instability in pay
determination...We note the considerable extent to which both
market factors and affordability are Government influenced and
determined, and cannot therefore be seen as neutral criteria in
pay determination. (1983:6).
This concern was echoed by NIJPE, who argued that there was no clear
correlation between market forces, the ability to recruit and retain,
and pay levels. It was felt that the impact of the market would be
reflected in job comparisons, and that, in any case, the monopoly
position of the NHS in relation to nurses would make such market
forces factors 'meaningless'. NUPE further suggested that the PRB
should consider job comparisons based on nurses' actual work rather
than their job descriptions, that it sriould not pay undue regard to
internal NHS relativit.ies, and that a special value should be
determined for nurses' responsibility for human lives and health [1]
(Financial Times, 8.4.1983. Further problems were raised with the
reference to motivation and the absence of reference to low pay.
COL-ISE pointed out that 'motivation' was open to the interpretation
that the only thing driving health staffs was financial reward, and
was 'deeply offensive to the caring role of the staff and their
considerable contribution to the coninunity' and saw the absence of
reference to tackle absolute and relative low pay among nurses as
'both a disturbing omission and a critical weakness' (1983:6). NUPE
suggested that the Review Body should Set minimum rates of pay to deal
with the problems of low pay in the NHS (Financial Tirnes,ibid).
[1] See also 'X' factor in the AFPRB, below.
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The offending paragraph on criteria did not appear in the Terms of
Reference and was replaced by: 'The Government will, as proposed in
the consultative document, submit evidence on economic and financial
considerations, and on such factors as recruitment, retention and
motivation of the staff concerned' (Fiansard V.46, 1983: PRB1, 1984,
Appendix A:18). Whether this was a moral or material victory is
reviewed in the next two chapters, but this opening volley between
government and trade unions shows that a number of important points of
potential conflict were apparent from the start. There can be little
doubt that a number of the above concerns were expressed 'colourfully'
by the TLJC-trade unions, partly through political expedient, partly as
a bargaining stance, and partly through the need to maintain 'image'
as far as membership was concerned. However, many of the points
raised were, and continue to be, of abiding importance in the
determination of nursing pay.
THE REVIEW BODY SYSTE'I
The precedents for the specific form for the Nurses and Midwives PRB,
alongside the particular history of arbitration and review in nursing
pay determination, were the Pay Review Bodies set up under the Edward
Heath government. These were the Review Body on Armed Forces Pay
(AFPRB), the Review Body on Top Salaries (TSRB) and the reconstituted
Review Body on Doctors' and Dentists' Remuneration (DDRB). The
structure and processes of these PRBs were very similar to that of
Halslxiry. In addition these PRBs were given comon terms of reference
and an interlocking membership, argued to reflect key overlaps in the
characteristics of the occupations covered by the Bodies, such as
skills and levels of responsibility. 'It was also perhaps assumed that
none of the groups concerned would be likely to strike (where
permitted), a mistaken assumption' (Bailey & Trinder, 1989:28).
If there was a 'model' in trie mind of the RN with regard to pay
review, the DDRB must have been the prime candidate. Doctors had long
been viewed as having successfully professionalised their occupation
and pay review may have been regarded by nurses as one of the rewards
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for this success.	 However, the operation of the DDRB has been
controversial. The DDRB was originally established in the early
1960's by the Conservative government after a period of industrial
unrest over pay. It was subsequently notable for the resignation en
masse of its members following the reference in part of their 1970
recomendations to the NBPI. The DDRB was reconstituted in 1971.
During the 1970's the DDRB largely recorrznended increases in line wIth
incomes policy in those years for which this operated. With respect
to any suggestion that the earnings of the two professions were be.ing,
used as an economic regulator, however, the DDRB was ad&at that t
would apply judgements only If it was convinced that iucone.s lIs
was being fairly applied to doctors and dentists and that their
earnings were not falling behind comparator groups. In 1977, the DDRB
decided that a deterioration had occurred as a direct result of the
unf air application of incomes policy, and went on to rectify the
position in the 1978 award, which was staged over three years. The
relatively limited use of 'refined' comparability in practice is
evident in the coments made by a research officer for the BMA, to the
effect that the lack of detailed information which was available for
comparisons, and the need for this 'rectification' in the first place,
'demonstrated the extent to which the DDRB's methodology had departed
from the Royal Coninission's original guidelines', which had stressed
external comparison, and the fact that doctors and dentists should not
be used as an economic regulator (Ford,Health Services Manpower
Review:7). The last time the exercise of comparison had been
conducted was in 1972 when movement over the whole period since 1955
had been examined.
In the 1980's there was a general shift itt the rhetoric of the DDRB's
process to an explicit emphasis on the 'ability to pay' criterion,
probably not unconnected to the Health Departments' insistence that
pay comparisons should not be used as the major factor determining pay
levels. By 1991, economic considerations (or ability to pay) were
placed at the forefront of the DDRB's report, followed by recruitment
and retention, morale and motivation, job security, comparisons,
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workload and productivity, pensions and internal relativities.
However, although tne DDRB frequently reiterated its view that there
should be no fixed linkage of doctors' and dentists' earnings to any
particular measure of other remuneration levels, the DDRB often took
broader measures of comparability into account, such as the RPI and
general levels of earnings elsewhere. It was also loathe to suggest
that it no longer regarded comparability as a relevant factor although
the significance it attributed to comparability tended to vary
periodically and with political expedient. In 1987, external
comparisons were viewed as not 'irrelevant to our work' (DDRB,
1987:5); in 1991, comparability was elevated to 'one of a number of
important factors with respect to the decline with the private sector'
(DDiB, 1991: 7)
In terms of outcomes or government implementation, the staging of
awards was a cocrinon occurrence. Most of the 1980 awards were staged,
as was the 1990 award. Regret at such staging and its adverse effects
upon tne credibility and stability of pay review has been expressed in
most of the PRB reports. The 1987 report, for example, noted that:
deferment of pay increases has adverse effects on the credibility
of the Review Body...It seems to us that the Government has in
practice abandoned the traditional principle that our
reconmendations should be accepted unless there are clear and
compelling reasons to the contrary. The Government's actions
since 1980 imply that our role is to distribute a pre-deterrained
allocation of funds, and we cannot believe it was ever intended
that the Review Body should be thus confined. (1987:1)
Significantly, industrial action was not always avoided. Moreover, it
is almost certainly the case that the process and outcomes of
individual awards were influenced by the relative intensity of the
professions' feelings and the degree of electoral vulnerability of
government, even when direct action was not proposed or taken,
although these factors are harder to quantify. Most recently, the
DORB declined to produce a Report after the government's announcement
of a 1.57 pay limit for the public sector.
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The review body for the Armed Forces (AFPRB) by comparison, has what
rnignt be viewed as a quite different group of staff under its remit.
Unlike doctors, the armed forces are not uriionised and offer quite
different strategic considerations. These differences may in some
respects be reflected in the relative strength of the comparability
criterion, and the inclusion of a special 'X' factor designed to take
account of the special nature of the armed forces' work (a
cost/benefit calculation vis-a-vis civilian occupations which includes
an adjustment f or 'danger and turbulence'). Comparability, through
factor analysis, has, in contrast to the DDRB, remained the 'basis of
its approach' (AFPRB,1991:1). Other criteria considered have included
recruitment and retention, the Defence budget and the ubiquitous
'ability to pay' criterion in the form of 'general economic
background'.	 However, in coarnon with the experience of the DDRB,
staging or delays have taken place several times.
The Top Salaries Review Body (TSRB) addresses yet another politically
and elec.torally sensitive group of staff, as was witnessed by the
Government's desire to avoid high increases in the review exercise
ininediately prior to the General Election of 1992. The Reports
generally contain far less detail on criteria than the other Review
body reports, perhaps reflecting the small number and high status of
this group and its relative proximity to government. However, like
the DDfB it has been ambivalent on the comparability criterion. In
its 25th Report, the TSRB expressed 'serious doubts as to the extent
to which the rise in earnings for outside groups should influence our
judgement' (1987:9). However, a comprehensive review of salary
structures and levels was undertaken in 1985, and there are
indications that comparability re-emerges periodically after periods
of fall-behind in pay. The 1991 TSRB, for example, announced plans
for a 'fundamental review' due to 'erosion of relativities' with
comparable groups elsewhere. This was to be by means of a job
evaluation, along with comparability exercises with the private sector
and international comparisons (1991:3). Scaling down and staging has
also taken place for the TSRB.
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According to Bailey & Trinder, the Review Body concept was developed
because 'it was assumed that this would resolve acrimonious
negotiating relationships, inject stability into pay determination and
allow account to be taken of financial constraints' (1989:28). On the
evidence from this brief history of the practical operation of review
bodies, it is not clear that the conceptual basis for pay review
elaborated by Bailey and Trinder has been fully met. Firstly, it is
difficult to judge whether industrial unrest is avoided, channelled or
merely suppressed by the operation of a PRB, given the highly
particular nature and background of these groups. The indications are
that, at least in the case of doctors, industrial action has not been
prevented at all times. Profound dissatisfaction is expressed at
times in evidence by the other staff groups. The particular nature of
other groups, especially judges, senior army officers and civil
servants, means that dissatisfaction may, in any case, be expressed
through less formal channels and pressure applied behind the scenes.
Secondly, there has been an ambiguous treatment of the 'ability to
pay' and 'comparability' criteria within and across the Review Bodies
and even where ability to pay has been made an explicit emphasis in
process, comparability still comes intermittently to the fore again as
wages fall behind, staff groups feel aggrieved, and there is a need to
demonstrate 'fairness'. More pertinently, it is difficult to separate
out rhetoric from reconniendations given the general claim of RBs not
to be bound to any 'mechanistic formula'. Thus, and despite some
increasing emphasis placed on the ability to pay criterion, along the
lines advocated by government and Management Sides, the precise effect
remains unclear: another form and content problem. However, the same
problem, in terms of interpreting process and outcomes, was argued for
other systems of arbitration and review and could be seen in the case
of the DDB to apply in the 1970's where the evidence suggested that
attempts were made to fit into explicit incomes policies.
In practice, outcomes for the 1980's may also be viewed as exhibiting
a degree of compliance with implicit incomes policies (via the cash
limits mechanism). None of the Review Bodies has been allowed to
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operate in such a way that 'fall-behind' and 'catch-up' periods have
been averted in favour of long-term consistency and stability of pay
awards, which was part of the rationale for PRBs in the first place.
This is an important point for nurses and midwives, who as we have
seen have had a long history of such pay cycles since the
establishment of the NHS. It has not been the case that Pay Review
Bodies produce recomendations which are unproblematically accepted by
the government. Reconinendations may be scaled down, staged, and
partially, rather than fully, implemented. Furthermore, funding in
full or in part may be provided above the amount the government
'allows for' in previously Set cash limits. Government decisions on
implementation and funding have, in part, helped to produce outcomes
which have tended to reflect ability to pay, or perhaps more
appropriately, willingness to pay. Bailey & Trinder have argued that
'few settlements have been excessive relative to others in the public
sector in a given year' (1989:29), although they go on to suggest that
nurses form the main exception to this rule. However, yet again, it
is not easy to distinguish between the role of process and
implementation in producing this effect. In conclusion, it is
debatable whether 'acrimonious relationships' have been resolved and
'stability' injected into pay determination although there is some
evidence that 'account' has been 'taken of financial constraints' both
in the process and outcomes of the Pay Review Bodies.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has traced the origins of the Nurses' and Midwives' Pay
Review Body in the twin strands of prior arbitration and review in
nursing pay determination and the establishment of Pay Review Bodies
for other groups in the public sector. The analysis of structures,
processes and outcomes of these forms of review, and the arguments
raised in the initial consultations on the establishment of the N&M
PRB, now allow some preliminary theoretical conclusions to be drawn on
the rationale for, and role, of pay review. This will lead in to the
detailed examination of the process and outcomes of the Pay Review
Body for nurses in Qiapter Four.
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With the recent establishment of a Review Body for 450,000 teachers, a
million and a half workers, some quarter of public sector employees,
now have their pay determined within the Review Body system, the
largest group of staff covered being nurses (Guardian, 25 October
1992). Yet there has been relatively little academic coninent on the
rationale for such a system of pay review, either in general or for
the particular case of nurses. This stems, at least in part, from the
apparently ad hoc and pragmatic nature of the establishment of pay
review mechanisms in general and pay review bodies in particular. Yet
the above discussion has suggested that some cofrmonalities in the
operation of pay review and pay review bodies can be found and should
have some relevance for wider theory.
Ostensibly, pay review is a liberal concept. Taking the rationale for
pay review bodies firstly at face value, it will be recalled that the
Pilkington Cocrmission identified three main objectives for pay review
bodies: to avoid disputes over remuneration; to provide an assurance
to staff that their pay would be determined on a fair basis; and to
provide fair treatment for the taxpayer, the latter generally
construed as 'economic and financial considerations' (see Bailey and
Trinder, 1989:28). However, a number of problems arise with this
concept. Firstly, the objectives in the statement are conflated with
the means to, and constraints on, achieving them: fairness to staff is
a means to achieving tt-ie avoidance of disputes, and fairness for ttie
taxpayer the constraint on these means. It is by no means clear what
a compromise position in material terms between the latter two points
might entail or how it might be attained. The achievement of the
primary objective of avoidance of disputes could therefore be seen to
be more an article of faith than a 'rationale' for review bodies.
Secondly, it is notable that the industrial relations imperative is
placed in primary position and this, indeed, appears to accord with
the historical facts around the establishment of review bodies.
However, the notion that overt expressions of conflict are undesirable
and avoidable, whilst symptomatic of liberal pluralist analysis, begs
the question of wny conflict arises in the first place. In this case,
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pay review addresses the symptoms - the apparent failure of collective
bargaining - without addressing the root cause of why it fails.
Finally, problems also arise with the liberal, pluralist view of the
role of pay review bodies. Here the potential is seen for a
'neutral' third party to intervene to channel conflict into manageable
compromise whilst simultaneously effecting a 'rational' balance
between differing material interests. However, the problem here lies
with the argument for 'neutrality'. It is by no means clear why the
review body should assume in this respect the role that government, in
pluralist political theory, should have been able to take on itself.
There is an implicit recognition that government has been unable to
perform the role of impartial arbiter where it is also employer and
must thus create an 'independent' arbiter from itself to do this.
Again, however, it is by no means clear why this body should be
impartial whilst government could not be, particularly given its
direct appointment by government and lack of representativeness and
accountability. In all these respects, the neglect of power and power
disproportionalities and the neglect of a deeper evaluation of the
role of the state and of industrial conflict cast doubt upon the
analytical power of this perspective to convince of the rationality
and viability of pay review bodies.
Recourse to either pluralist theory or arguments of 'pragmatism'
provides little explanation for why government has proceeded to set up
a de facto 'institutional blockage' to the free working of the market,
whilst simultaneously professing a deep ideological attachment to
radical versions of neoclassical 'market forces' theory. There is,
therefore,	 much to reconi-nend an alternative, and more radical,
approach, where power disproportionalities and conflict over terms and
conditions of work are viewed as endemic to the productive system and
a primary point of analysis. It has been seen that nursing pay
determination has long been characterised by conflict and power
disparities. The post-World War Two history of arbitration and pay
review has witnessed ever more complex mechanisms of pay
determination, tending eventually to the 'supplanting' end of the
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'supplementing-supplanting' spectrum of arbitration and, in theory,
replacing 'free collective bargaining'. Broadly viewed, arbitration
and pay review have appeared to temporarily paper over the cracks in
the Whitley system. These cracks need, however, to be located in
context. It was seen in this chapter that nursing trade unions have
long argued that the problem lies not in having a collective
bargaining system but in the disproportionate influence of government
and poor material outcomes in pay determination. Under these
circumstances, the ability of a permanent form of pay review to
resolve basic conflict would remain at doubt.
This point is further elaborated in the analysis of Pay Review Bodies
for other public sector workers. There is little evidence that
'conflict' has been resolved, even given the unusual nature of these
groups, or that pay 'stability' has been achieved. Moreover, a
certain correspondence emerges between process and outcomes and the
government's ability to pay. The institution of pay review must here
be seen as playing a mediating and material role. All the PRBs were
set up under Conservative administrations and have been conservative
in their operation and outcomes. Their structure is that of an
unelected, unrepresentative, unaccountable body. The PREs as a whole,
with their interlocking memberships and terms of reference, span
groups of staff with considerable inequalities in pay. For example,
wages in 1991 ranged from £6,050 (a young nursing auxiliary) to the
top salary of £104,750 in the civil service and armed forces (basic,
full-time per annum, Reports, 1991). Differentials in the 1980s have
tended to widen, both within and between PRBs and arbitration and pay
review exercises for nurses also saw widening differentials and a re-
establishment of the traditional wage hierarchy after erosions by tne
nursing trade unions.	 The system thus appears to support
inequalities.
It has been argued by Bailey and Trinder that there is a 'relatively
tenuous degree of cohesion' between the groups covered by pay review
(1989:29), and the attempt to explain coverage by 'professionalism' or
'likelihood to strike' is problematic. In practice, however, it could
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be argued that these groups share a history of deeply hierarchical
systems of work organisation which may make them more susceptible to a
system of pay determination based on deference and derogation. The
groups also share a high degree of political and electoral sensitivity
and, in this respect, the system shares a strong hint of political
expediency with its antecedents in arbitration and special review
exercises. The PRBs may thus avoid head-on confrontation with
government and key groups of employees and set disagreement at one
step remove, enabling both 'sweetener' awards when necessary and the
longer run and more general attempts at cost-minimisation. At an.
equally strategic level, the establishment of PRBs also dicrides staff
in times of wider dispute and may further facilitate cost-
minimisation.
In the above form of analysis, and from the history of pay review and
the persistence of expressions of conflict, the particular role of and
relationship between structure, process and outcomes, the extent to
which accomodations are made through the pay review system, and the
extent to which conflict is suppressed, channelled or diverted still
remain empirical points. This is not least because of shifts in the
power balance between government and public sector employees. Thus,
although this chapter has lent some credence to the a priori
expectation that review bodies are instrumental in maintaining the
status quo, the extent to which this is achieved in practice becomes
an empirical matter, which is now explored.
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Gi&FE FOUR
ThE STRUGI1JRE AND PROCESS OF ThE NURSES AND MI[MIVFS PAY R1BJ BODY
This chapter analyses the structure and process of the Nurses' and
Midwives' Pay Review Body, from its inception through to the present
date. In doing so the theoretical perspectives of the study are
developed to show some of the complexities of nurses' wage
determination through the PRB, while at the same time deepening the
analysis of the functions of the review body itself. The underlying
issues are then examined in further detail through subsequent
chapters, following an exploration of pay outcomes in Chapter Five.
COMPOSITIOi'
As Chapter Three notes, the Prime Minister appoints members to the N&M
PRB. In this respect the new Review Body has followed the structured
format of the Haisbury Conittee and the other PRB's. Members are
appointed for their 'individual qualities' and are intended to be
'completely independent' (Consultation Document, 1983). None should
belong to, or be closely connected with, the professions whose pay is
being reviewed. Members should generally serve for a period of four
years but may then be reappointed for further terms.
It is not intended that the composition of the N&M PRB should directly
reflect the composition of interests concerned in the process of wage
determination, as would be the case in a tri-partite structure, and as
was intended to be the case under the previous Whitley Council. The
members are chosen exclusively and in a highly centralised fashion by
one of the Sides to the process, the government. Throughout the period
of its existence a substantial number of the Review Body members
(particularly Chairmen) have been senior industrialists, with
additional members drawn from academia, law and the church. A number
have held high honours. Despite the gendered nature of nursing
members have been predominantly male. Only in the ninth Review Body
did the membership include more women than men.
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Members selected in this way - drawn from the 'ranks of the great arid
the good', as one trade union official put it - are expected to rise
above the partisan source of their appointment, putting personal
backgrounds and experience to one side while overcoming any previous
ignorance of the NHS and its nursing professions, and of public sector
finance and macroeconomic constraints, in order to balance the scales
of equity between taxpayer and public employee. In these
circumstances what is perhaps remarkable is the degree to which
members appear to be regarded as acceptable - at least by Staff Side.
Despite some discordant notes in the nursing press (Nursing
Times,1991:26), interviews with trade union officials revealed a
cannon belief that PRB members become 'client-oriented' through time
(see also in this context Bailey & Trinder,1989:29). It was widely
held that members' sympathies for nursing staff increased through
successive hospital visits and Staff-Side representations at the Oral
Evidence stage of the Review Body proceedings. It was also noted that
this tendency towards client-orientation appeared resistent to changes
in membership, and in this respect at least few signs of government
pressure in the PRB's actual decisions could be detected.
EVIDENCE AND RERSENTATION
Written evidence is subnitted to the FRB by all interested parties,
and the PRB may request additional information or clarification in
Oral Evidence. For instance, in the 1991 Report the organisatioris
subidtting written evidence were the Health Departments, Regional
Authority Qiairmen, and the Management and Staff Sides of the Nursing
and Midwifery Staffs Negotiating Council, with the Staff Side's
evidence being supplemented by subnissions from COHSE, HVA, NUPE, RCM,
RCN and SHVA. Evidence was also received from the National
Association of Theatre Nurses and the Prison Officers' Association
Central Comittee for the State and Special hospitals, as well as from
a number of individuals (PRB8,1991:43). In the 1992 Report the list
of contributors expanded to include the NHS Trust Qiief Executives.
However, the evidenct surrinarised in the PRE reports consists almost
exclusively of arguments presented by government and Staff Side.
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Following the Pilkington trationalel, the government could be expected
to represent the interests of taxpayers in forwarding evidence (see
also N&M PRB,1992:9-lO) [1]. However, it is by no means clear what tne
interests of taxpayers should be, even if the government were assumed
to act without self interest. At the same time the government may
indeed have its own party political interests and a self-interested
economic agenda. As Staff Side have noted in the Consultation
exercise, this may or may not include managing' ti'e economy well.
Moreover, different parts of government might pursue conflicting
interests. The different tiers of NFIS management - at senior, district
and local levels - might also have sectional interests. A similar
distinction could likewise be made for the varying interests of the
Staff Side professional associations and unions. Finally, the PRB
members themselves could have collective or individual interests which
conflict with those of the other parties.
The PRB process largely consists of a dialogue between the government,
or 'Management Side', and Staff Side. In this context it is not clear
whether internal cohesion on each side - for instance, RHA Chairmen
and Health Departments presenting a united front - should be
interpreted as a strength or a weakness of the pay review system. At
the very least it can be noted that the agenda upon which decision-
making is based is limited from the outset by the groups involved and
may be skewed by the particular composition of the sides and weighted
in favour of the most powerful interests. Some interests may be
excluded entirely from the process, and lower levels of management may
be found in this category along with nursing and midwifery staff who
have relatively weak influence on Staff Side's Joint representations.
A substantial amount of evidence is produced for the PRB process.
Staff Side and the Health Departments may each present Evidence
amounting to one hundred pages and containing a great deal of
[1] It is strange that the PRB makes a distinction between 'taxpayers'
and 'patients' in what is, in principle, a universally-provided
healthcare system (PRB,1992:9-1O).
-96-
statistical data. Additional evidence may also be lengthy and contain
highly detailed information on change occurring in the various staff
occupations and the results of special surveys conducted for the
revieci exercise. A trade union officer, involved in this process for
many years, suggested that the various nursing representative
orgarlisations competed for the prestige generated by such surveys.
These surveys were also seen to carry additional benefits in their
potential to engage memberships in the pay process while demonstrating
the work conducted on their behalf. The production of evidence casts
doubt on the proposition that the scope for trade union activity has
been reduced in the new system. However, the the actual effects of
such evidence on the conduct of the review process and its outcomes
remains an empirical question.
CLASSIFYING PAY CRIThRIA AND ARGUMENIS
Following the presentation of written evidence Oral Evidence is taken.
The evidence as a whole is then surrinarised in the PRB's Report, albeit
with a high degree of discretion on the part of the Review Body as to
what is included or excluded. Recomiendations then appear at the end
of the Report. However, the manner of adjudication has caused much
difficulty in evaluating the PRB's role in the pay determination
process. In its first report the PRB stated that:
The problems which need to be resolved in order to produce a
stable system of pay determination are complex and wide-ranging,
and we are convinced that there is no simple, mechanistic
approach which we can apply (1984:15).
Correspondingly, the Review Body's reports contain no explicit
rationale or methodology by which to appraise its normative decisions.
The debate conducted within the forum of the PRB itself has centred
around a number of criteria. Firstly, there are what may be termed
'core' criteria, which address the issues of basic pay, special duty
payments and allowances. Secondly, there are what may be described as
tad hoc' criteria, encompassing issues arising from recent change,
such as the restructuring of grading systems or the introduction of
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flexibility initiatives. Develofxnents in the type and choice of
criteria employed in the process demonstrate some marked similarities
with conventional negotiations, in as much as each Side has developed
its own agenda and introduced new items in an attempt to gain the
higher ground. The material contained under these criteria has
therefore been organised to reflect this, and to illustrate the
differing positions held by the Sides and the manner of the PRB's own
involvement [2].
It was seen that in the Consultation exercise the government attempted
to set the actual agenda for criteria to be considered by the PRB,
later moderated in the PRB's Terms of Reference, to note that the
government would itself:
sutxnit evidence on economic and financial considerations, and on
such factors as recruitment, retention and motivation of the
staff concerned (Appendix A, PRB1, 1984 from House of Comons
Written Answer, 27 July 1983).
Altriough this left a relatively clear role for the new PRB in setting
its own agenda, it can be seen that the government's priorities in
wage determination criteria had moved substantially away from the
rhetoric, if not the reality, of the Pilkington objectives. These had
very explicitly included the notion of fairness to staff as well as to
taxpayer and therefore, implicitly, the importance of comparability.
This point has been used in some of the more recent literature as an
illustration of the government's retreat from its traditional role as
'model employer' (see Fredmari & Morris, 1989a, 1989b). However, it is
unlikely that the government had a serious strategy to establish an
operating PRB which would deny the use of the comparability criterion
while still gaining acceptance from nurses' organisations. Rather the
[2] Basic pay has remained fairly constant at around 85.57 of the
overall paybill, with special duty payments declining in relative
importance (from 127 of the paybill in 1984 to 1O.57 in 1989) and
allowances growing in importance.
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TABLE 4.1 GOVERNMENT AND STAFF SIDE AGENDAS FOR PAY REVIEW CRITE1UA
GOVERNMENT AGENDA
Macroeconomic policy
PSBR - cash limits
Staff recruitment/retention
Staff morale
Efficiency/productivity
STAFF SIDE AGENDA
Comparability
Equal pay
Low pay
Differentials
Productivity
UNDERLYING ISSUES
Demand/employment	 Demand/employment
Grading, Training,	 Grading, Training
Skills, Flexibility	 Skills, Flexibility
view could be taken that this was a tactical device to 'skew the
agenda', ostensibly towards orthodox economic. concerns and objectives,
thereby signalling government toughness while leaving the PRB some
scope to express sympathy with staff aims.
In any event in the PRB's first report (under 'Views of Main
Principles') the Healtn Departments (HDs) stressed recruitment and
retention and how much trie Health Authorities (HAs) could afford to
pay as being of primary importance. By contrast, Staff Side (Ss)
stressed four key principles which they thought should guide the
Review Body in establishing fair levels of pay: fair relativities or
comparability; fair internal differentials, with staff being 'properly
rewarded for their qualifications, responsibilities and experience';
pay not to be less than a minimum level which would provide an
adequate standard of living - the low pay issue; and pay not to be
depressed by the fact that the majority of nursing staff are women -
the equal pay issue (PRB1,1984:8). These polarised initial 'agendas'
for criteria to be considered are illustrated in Table 4.1, together
with the additional 'neutral' criterion of Productivity which was
introduced in the first Report's deliberations.
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In both cases there are important underlying issues which do not enter
directly into these criteria, but which affect both core criteria and
the emergence of ad hoc criteria, for example, grading and training.
Such issues overlap with wage determination, but have been largely
negotiated or decided outside the PRB process.
Salamon suggests that wage determination criteria can be interpreted
as representations of equity when seen from the individual
perspectives of different interest groups (1987:458). However, this
presupposes the existence of coherent interest groups with well-
defined views of equity. At the same time it also ignores intrinsic
limits to the representation process for the Sides involved in pay
review. Each Side might be expected to advance a set of consistent
arguments in order to win well-defined material outcomes. However, in
practice arguments are advanced in order to win tactical advantage for
an underlying agenda and as a general bargaining tool. The form these
arguments take will then reflect institutional settings and existing
power disparities and should not simply be taken at face value.
Given the complexity of public sector wage determination and the
problems this raises for economic tneory and the analysis of equity,
the develonent of a consistent set of arguments to be advanced by a
Side in trie pay review process is a considerable undertaking. With
the 'skewing' of the agenda towards 'economjstjc' criteria Staff Side
have exhibited a steadily-increasing sophistication in posing the
issues of economy and equity. Contrary to the expectations generated
by the standard literature on wage determination, this has not in
practice entailed a simple contrast between economy and equity, but
rather a systematic attempt to reveal basic complementarities.
The debate has gradually focused on recruitment and retention as the
key criterion in pay review. This debate subsumes both the tactical
ploys of each Side and Staff Side's historical concern with the
progress of nurses' comparability with other groups. Although the
argument is still broadly dominated by considerations of tactical
advantage and political expediency, it is possible to identify within
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the pay review proceedings the effects of underlying conflict arising
from perceptions of pay arid conditions of employment.
The Review Body reports contain no explicit rationale or methodology
by which to appraise normative decisions on pay. This can be viewed
as a strength or a weakness of the PRB itself in performing its
functions. On the one hand, criticism of the route whereby the Review
Body arrives at its decisions is necessarily muted. At the same tiaze
there is no need for the Review Body to maintain the projection of a
normative 'ideal' in settling wages, thereby providing increased scope
for the accoirnodation of interest group pressures. On the other anà1
there remains the attendant risk that the review process itself
becomes discredited, or that the PRB loses status as an 'independent'
body mediating conflict between the Sides.
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS
The 'affordability' criterion has appeared in all the PRB reports,
with the sole exception of the fifth report, an omission which may
have been tactical as PRB5 was dominated by the impact of the clinical
grading review.
The Healtri Departments initially saw 'how much Health Authorities
could afford to pay' as the second most important criterion after
recruitment arid retention (1984:8), their basic premise being that
neither justified substantial increases in pay. However by the 3rd
Report, 'affordability' had been elevated to the 'overriding
constraint of affordability' and they pointed to a 'direct and
inescapable trade-off between increases in pay and the amount and
quality of health care provided' (1986:5). An argument has been made
throughout for an explicit cash limit on incomes. For example, in the
6th report, the HDs, under questioning, admitted that the percentage
allowance for inflation provided for in HA's budgets was what they had
in mind wrien saying that the real value of salaries should be
maintained. Their agenda has become even more explicit in later
years. In PRB7 (1990:6), trie HDs said that:
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The Government's objective was to keep the rate of growth of
public spending below the rate of growth of the economy as a
whole, and thus to reduce public spending as a proportion of
national income.
The Minister for Health told the PRB in oral evidence that:
Modest pay increases in the public sector were essential if
inflation was to be brought under control, and nursing staff
would suffer like everyone else from rapidly rising inflation
(ibid).
These remarks indicate the degree of government's influence over the
Management Side, while providing an unusually explicit statement of a
prevailing attitude towards the public sector in the macroeconomy.
Tnis has inmense implications for the debate over the 'government as
model employer' (for instance, see E'redman & Morris,1989a,1989b).
Staff Side have responded to 'affordability' arguments throughout by
stressing comparability, since in their view external pay comparisons
subsume the wider economic situation. In other words, what the nation
can afford to pay other workers should be the guide for nursing staff
pay determination. This was trie first of many occasions when Staff
Side followed the government's agenda and expressed their arguments in
'economic' terms. It is noteworthy that Staff Side have appeared to
receive a more sympathetic hearing from the PRB when presenting
evidence in these terms, perhaps because the PRB itself has an
'economistic' bent. Staff Side have further pointed out that the
government's Autumn Statement cash limits allowance for inflation is
frequently based on forecasts which underestimate subsequent price
increases (PRB6,1989:5-7). The affordability criterion has also been
used to criticise the staging of awards and funding arrangements made
on an historical basis rather than by establishment.
The PRB in early years responded in fairly strong terms to the
government's emphasis on affordability:
We recognise that the implementation of our recorrineridations may
cause resource problems...but it is the Government's
responsibility to consider the implications for funding and the
level of service that can be afforded, given adequate rewards for
staff.
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In particular it has stressed its view that:
the the coffmunity cannot expect to sustain and improve the
quality of health care at the expense of those providing it...in
view of the heavy dependence of the NHS on the ability to attract
and retain suitable and well-motivated staff, such an approach
would be self-defeating (1986:14).
The PRB has also remained unimpressed by the argument that nurses' pay
can cause wage inflation; 'over the years we have had little if any
evidence to demonstrate that our recormiendations have directly
affected others' settlements' (1992:10).
In recent years this approach has become more muted. The PRB has
noted that econorriic and financial considerations are 'important
factors' but that 'they do not override all others' (1990:6). The
PRB's 'adjudications' do in fact tend to vary with time and this may
be an important indicator of underlying pressures.
The ability to pay argument is not a new one; similar arguments have
been made from the establishment of the NHS (see Abel-Smith, 1960;
Clegg & Chester, 1957). What is possibly different is the degree to
which this criterion has been pre-ernpted by tight cash limits,
explicitly stressed as a priority in the pay determination process -
even to the extent of a non-funding threat - and followed through in
implementation and funding activity. As the PRB note, the 'economic'
argument is, in its own terms, weak. If the government were to stress
macroeconomic aims above all else, then it is not clear how it could
meet its recruitment and retention objective. However, the more
explicit use of this argument may best be interpreted as tactical
manoeuvring. By stressing macroeconomic objectives, the government
has attempted to pull the agenda over to the point at which it might
'legitimately' argue for low pay increases and assert an income-
employment trade-off. It also sets the debate in 'economistic' terms.
That the PRB has felt compelled to counter this argument could be
evaluated as reflecting its own interpretation of its remit as being
primarily concerned with ensuring adequate supplies of staff rather
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than macroeconomic equilibrium. Perhaps more importantly, it could
reasonably be expected that an overt preoccupation with cash limits or
attempts to use the public sector to control the private sector arid
economy more generally would have put the continuation of the PRB
system in some doubt.
EXTERNAL COMPARABILITY
In response to the affordability criterion, Staff Side have taken up a
'proactive' position on the issue of comparability. Coirrparability is
usually defined in narrow terms to denote the comparison of a group of
staff which is 'internal' to an organisation with other distinct
groups of staff external to the organisation (see Salamon,1987:465-6).
In practice, a much wider range of issues has entered under this
criterion in the PRB process, and correspondingly the definition of
comparability is broadened to encompass a wider set of comparisons
(including Kessler's notion of 'general comparability' ,1983:93).
Staff Side Arguments
In their evidence for the first report Staff Side identified
comparability as one of the four key principles which stiould be used
to establish 'fair' levels of pay, and sutmitted statistical
comparisons in support of the argument that the pay of nursing staff
had fallen behind that of selected non-manual occupations or non
manual earnings as a whole (1984:8-9).
In subsequent reports, Staff Side have similarly presented a range of
evidence and arguments to establish the relative deterioration of
nurses' pay. They have compared current pay levels with the levels
established by a particular past pay exercise (for example, Haisbury,
in PRB3, and the initial real levels set for the clinical grades, in
PRB7,8). They have also argued that the RPI might underestimate the
impact of inflation on householders' budgets of rises in housing costs
and food prices, which would particularly affect households with low
incomes (PRB8). Comparisons have also been produced from NES data
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with the pay of policemen, firemen, teachers, social workers and
laboratory technicians (PRB5, 1988:12, PRB7, 1990:6), with the proviso
that as the pay of some of these professions had been held down in
certain years, the PRB should also look at the salaries of graduates
in industry. Staff Side have also produced a number of surveys,
suggesting the need for pay increases. For example, COHSE's survey
in PRB8 showed that 627 of respondents believed that pay was neither
'fair' nor 'adequate'.
Staff Side have also attempted to establish the importance of
comparability and stressed that recruitment and retention cannot be
considered separately from comparability, particularly with the need
to recruit more men and more school leavers. They have consistently
argued that it is contradictory for the HDs to be averse to external
pay comparisons while holding fast to recruitment and retention
criteria. An example of this argument can be seen in the 8th report.
where Staff Side argued that, particularly in the face of increasing
workloads and the need for more staff, recruitment and retention
would suffer if pay was allowed to fall back relative to that of other
groups.
In this respect they have criticised the government for being 'short-
sighted' in staging pay awards and rejected the HD's view that pay
levels recocmiended by review' bodies should Set a trend for the rest of
the economy. They have also countered the Departments' assertion that
nurses recent pay performance has been better than other groups,
suggesting that:
over the long term...pay levels had in general done no more than
move in line with the labour market. Since the RB was
established, pay levels were first stabilised and then raised (in
1988) to an appropriate level. Subsequent recomendatioris were
intended to maintain relativities in broad terms, but they had
not entirely succeeded because of the increase in inflation and
the staging of the 1990 pay increases (1991:8).
From the point of view of future stability in pay arrangements, Staff
Side have consistently argued for the establishment of a system of
comparability and a pay data bank (PRB3). At the same time, they have
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argued that they do not necessarily wish to see a fixed link between
nursing pay and that of external comparators, nor to see other factors
disregarded (PRB5). In this respect it should be clear that
comparability is one of a range of bargaining tools and Staff Side
would not wish to lose the ability to bring in other arguments.
Healtn Departments and RHA Chairmen Arguments
In the first report, the HDs took 'the view that comparability should
not be trie main element in pay determination but that it has some part
to play' (PRB1). The meaning of 'some part to play' was clarified
somewhat in the second report where it was s
	 at%c that t
play 'a relatively small part in determining pay levels', and that
evidence on comparability should be 'treated with caution' in judging
pay levels as 'other factors need to be taken into account in
assessing the quality and weight of jobs' (PRB2, 1985:8). In the
fifth report, the Health Departments drew attention to the need to
contain costs within the public expenditure provision for the NHS and
noted that comparisons were in any event highly subjective - 'the
Staff Side in their evidence used those which best suited their case'
(1988:12-13). By the 6th report, the HDs had decided that 'they did
not regard external pay comparisons as particularly relevant to the
interests of the NHS' and suggested that 'recruitment and retention
should be the major determinants of pay levels' (1989:8). They
accepted that market comparisons could be an indicator but that such
comparisons should be local, with reference to competing employers
rather than to jobs determined as similar.
Their own priorities have been exhibited in their view that 'review
body groups should not receive excessive pay increases, because of the
influence they had on other groups in the public sector and elsewhere'
(1989:8). The RHA supported this evidence, saying that 'the public
sector should set a good example to others by not giving excessive pay
increases'. These views were again strongly expressed in the 8th
report. In the 9th report, Staff Side's production of comparisons on
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a range of external occupations were deemed 'irrelevant' by the HDs
(1992:9).
The HDs and RHA have thus largely responded to the comparability
criterion by denying its importance and attempting to reassert their
own 'ability to pay' criterion as the primary priority. They have
further suggested that local 'market forces' should be allowed to work
themselves out through the activities of local employers, emphasising
demand-side solutions to any nurse shortages. The HDs have been very
resistent to comparisons with Halsbery and pointed out a number of
weaknesses in the Halsbury Report's recomendations on relativities,
as well as arguing that historical comparisons depended entirely on
the choice of base date (1984:9-10). However, and despite these
criticisms, the HDs have also produced comparisons in support of their
own view that nurses pay is adequate. These have mainly compared the
movements rather than levels in nurses' earnings (for example,
increases in real pay) and used gender specific comparisons (1985:9).
In their comparisons with other NHS staff, the HDs have shown
particular concern that differentials should not widen between
ancillary staff and nursing auxiliaries (PRB3).
The PRB's Discussion of Comparability
The PRB appears to have taken a cautious and incremental approach to
the comparability criterion and their first step was to coninission a
number of surveys to illuminate particular questions. These included
comparisons conducted by the OME, based on entry qualifications and
training requirements, which showed average salaries for nursing
students and staff nurses to be lower than comparators (PRB2), and
surveys of pay and conditions in the private sector (covering
occupational health nurses in industry and nursing staff in private
hospitals), which did not show a wide discrepancy between the two
sectors. It may be noted in passing that comparisons with the private
health sector fail to take account of training costs borne by the NHS,
given that the private sector largely 'poaches' from existing stocks
of qualified and experienced Ni-IS nursing staff.
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The PRE has generally responded to Staff Side's proposals for a system
of comparability by suggesting there would be problems with
methodology arid that a study of internal job relativities should
precede any study of external comparisons. The clinical grading
review, for example, would provide a detailed study of jobs within
nursing which would have to be an integral part of any study of
external comparisons (PRB3, 1986:16, PRB4,1987:15)). In this respect,
it was initially suggested that any full measure of comparability
would have to await internal review. In the 6th report, following
suggestions by Staff Side that the external cparabtUt'j tte
could now be undertaken, the PRB concluded that there was no evLdence
that an agreement by the Sides would be forthcoming to undertake a
full comparability study (1989:8).
However, the PRB has appeared to take some note of Staff Side
arguments. For example, by the fourth report, the PRB stated that it
had taken comparability into account because:
this year a changing picture has emerged. We have already
indicated our view that, if the developing manpower problems are
to be tackled successfully, it is necessary for pay to be
adequately competitive. The comparisons we have made tend to
confirm us in the conclusion that this is not at present the
case.
In the 5th report, the PRB concluded that their impression was that
'levels of remuneration for most nurses are still relatively
modest...the evidence available to us does not lead us to think that
adequate competitiveness has yet been achieved' (1988:13). In the 7th
report, the PRB gave the clearest expression of its position. It did:
not consider that external comparisons are the main factor that
we should take into account in making our reconiriendations, but
neither do we think that they can be ignored. We believe that
general information about external pay levels and movements is
helpful in providing an indication of levels and trends in
remuneration in relevant labour markets. Competition for staff
from other employers is increasing...We conclude that there would
be unfortunate consequences for the delivery of health care were
the NHS to fail to be sufficiently competitive (1990:7).
Despite its rather ambiguous stance on the significance it attaches to
comparability, the PRB has been fairly critical of the HDs' general
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arguments on the 'comparability' criterion. It has also been critical
of some of their more specific points. The PRE has occasionally
queried the selection of the base year made in the HD's own
comparisons, which may appear somne'..ihat ironic in the context of the
HD's remarks on Staff Side comparisons. It has also appeared to
reject the HDs concern with the widening of the gap between ancillary
workers and WAs, arguing that:
the gap between the two groups is not significant nor nearly as
wide as the Health Departments have suggested. In any event, the
pay of THS staff outside our remit is not our responsibility. We
do not ignore what is happening elsewhere in the NHS bet it would
be wrong for us to recoaTnend what we might consider to be
inappropriate salary levels for nursing staff because of
anxieties about possible knock-on effects elsewhere (1986:19)
It can be noted that this view contrasts strongly with opinions
expressed in interview by some union officials. These officials felt
that the PRB's concern with such relativities had been one of the
primary motivating factors in the PRB's deliberations, and this begs
the question of the PRB's methodology in reaching its actual decisions
as opposed to the views it expresses in reports.
General Comparisons
Cost of living, despite its high significance as a criterion in wage
determination in the economy more generally (see Miliward et
al,1992:238), has received relatively cursory treatment in the pay
review process for nurses, appearing mainly under comparability
arguments, although this should not suggest it is unimportant. Its
practical usage in the review process raises questions about its
treatment in academic literature where 'real wage' arguments are often
listed	 as	 distinct	 from	 'comparability'	 arguments	 (see
Salamon,1987:463-8). Although certainly conceptually distinct, the
linknge between cost of living and comparability is a strong one -
unless workers are viewed as having little or no perception of
settlements elsewhere in the economy. If, for example, a group were
to obtain a 27 real wage increase whilst real wage settlements in the
rest of the economy were running at 2OO7, then a comparability
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argument evidently pertains. Similarly, the average earnings index is
usually used to establish how one group is doing compared to workers
more generally. Cost of living and comparability may certainly be
argued separately for tactical reasons and the argument that a staff
group should not have spending power reduced because of inflation,
which may be beyond their control, may make a strong 'moral' argument.
However, it may again depend for its force on what is happening
elsewhere - the 'acceptability' of the 1993 public sector pay freeze
may be an interesting example.
In the first report, Staff Side presented data to show nurses' real
pay had fallen since 1975 and claimed substantial increases to restore
the real pay levels awarded by the Halsbury Inquiry and the Standing
Comission on Pay Comparability. The HDs thought 'it would be
mistaken to determine current pay levels by selecting a particular
past level of pay and updating this by some form of indexation'
(1984:9), although as was demonstrated above, they have conducted such
exercises themselves. In the second report, the PRB used the retail
prices index, along with the index of average earnings and New
Earnings Survey, to 'throw light on broad long-term relativities'
(1985:16). This formed the pattern for subsequent reports though
indices have been discussed under various criteria: the expected
inflation rate was included under Economic and Financial
Considerations in PRBG and, in PRB7 and PRB8, price indices were
directly subsumed under 'pay levels and movements, and pay
comparisons9.
Taking the scope of comparisons one step further, the feasibility of
international comparisons on pay levels was raised by the PRB (PRB1)
and comparisons were made with Europe and the USA. Their relevance was
found by the PRB to be 'limited' owing to dissimilarities between
countries, particularly in the structure of nursing. It was also felt
that 'meaningful comparisons' would require collection of information
on a range of other factors in the countries concerned (PRB2, 1985:11-
12). There has generally been a consensus that this is a problematic
exercise (1986:13). However, the growing numbers of nursing staff
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leaving to work abroad (reported in PRB5 under Recruitment) and the
labour mobility implications of 1992 and the EC suggest that this
issue is likely to come up again in the future.
Finally, non-pay issues have also been used for general comparison.
The HDs argued in the first and second reports that job security
should be evaluated as an offsetting factor to external pay
comparisons (1984:10). Staff Side countered this by suggesting that
by undertaking professional and relatively unmarketable training,
staff made a long-term comitment and that job security was a
necessity for a service which expended valuable resources on training
and needed to develop skilled manpower resources in the light of
growing demand (1985:11). The discussion raised the point of whether
nursing skills can be regarded as 'general' or 'specific'. If, as
Staff Side argued, they tend mainly towards the latter, then, in
orthodox economic theory (see Becker, 1964), nursing students should
not be expected to contribute disproportionately towards their
training costs. The implications for students' pay are interesting.
Pensions have also emerged as points for general comparison (PRB2)
but, following the PRB's specially conrriissioned survey, nurses'
pensions were found to be worth only a little more than the average
private sector arrangement. The PRB did not appear to regard either
comparison as particular significant for its deliberations.
General Comparability: Low Pay and Equal Pay
It was noted earlier that Staff Side made low pay and equal pay two of
their main principles for the pay review process. Low pay and equal
pay are almost invariably used in a relative sense and as such can be
classified as special cases of general comparability. Staff Side have
mainly used the force of moral or equitable argi.niients under these
criterion but have sometimes used economic arguments, or criticisms of
these, where feasible.
Staff Side in PRE1 stated that 'pay should not be less than a minimum
level which would provide an adequate standard of living' as one of
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their four key principles (1984:8). Although this is an argument
about aDsolute low pay, their evidence has usually drawn from
statistics on relative low pay or has contained a strong implicit
element of comparison. In the first report, the Staff Side noted that
more than a third of full-time nursing staff earned less than £100 per
week (from April 1983 figures in the NES). COHSE and NUPE
subsequently put forward proposals which would give proportionately
greater benefit to lower paid staff (1984:10). The Council of Europe
Decency Threshold has also frequently been used as a measure.
Arguments on the existence of low pay have been supplemented by
attempts to demonstrate the scale and significance of the low pay
issue in other terms. For example, Staff Side have highlighted the
prevalence of second jobs, following the INS survey for the Staff Side
which found that 167. of all nursing staff respondents had these -
frequently as agency staff in the same hospital or district (PRB4).
In the fifth report, Staff Side drew attention to the most serious low
pay problems which were were argued to be found among NAs, pupil and
student nurses, and Es, and to reflect the undervaluation of the
nature of the work and responsibilities of these groups. Job
descriptions collected for the clinical grading review showed that NAs
made a significant contribution in most areas of work and had a large
responsibility for basic nursing tasks. In the case of 50% of the NAs
interviewed all or most of their work related to the care and
treatment of patients. The review also found that many ENs had
considerable responsibility with 30% being regularly or routinely in
charge of wards. Staff Side argued that NAs and ENs provided
stability on wards throughout Britain but that this stability should
not be used as an argument that their pay was adequate. Staff Side
felt rather that the experience and service of these nurses should be
rewarded.
Staff Side have also drawn attention to measures to help the low paid
in other areas of the public sector and have argued that the weight
given to recruitment and retention in determining pay bad worked
against unqualified staff in the past as their mobility was more
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theoretical than real. They have also suggested that the concept of a
Low pay threshold is not irrelevant and that wider comparisons are
needed for these lower grades than differentials. Otherwise, such
grades would be locked in to low pay because of the gender-specific
nature of nursing and the fact that equal pay for work of equal value
has not been achieved. The links between low pay and equal pay are
here evident. In PRB6, PRB8 and PRB9, the section 'Low Pay' was
notable by its absence, but. Staff Side subsumed this under 'Clinical
Grading' or fairness and comparability.
The HDs have generally failed to respond on this issue 1
 which has
largely consisted of dialogue between Staff Side and the PRB. When
they have comented, they have stressed that pay should be at the
level needed to recruit, retain and motivate staff, 'bit no higher'
and that the evidence on recruitment does not suggest that NHS pay
rates are 'out of line' with rates elsewhere in the labour market
(1986 :12-13)
The PRB has expressed concern over specific examples drawn to its
attention by Staff Side evidence. For example, in the 4th report, it
reported that:
it is a matter of concern to us that, at a time of increasing
workload and stress, such a high proportion of nurses,
particularly but not solely in London, should apparently need to
seek income from a second job (1987:18).
On the more general issue of low pay, the PRB has been more
ambivalent. On the one hand the PRB appears to have 'fully accepted
responsibility for lower paid workers who were within [itsil remit' but
still rejected any suggestion that it should be involved in helping to
establish a minimum pay threshold for all workers (various reports).
In 1992, the PRB stated that: 'we are not persuaded by arguments such
as an appeal to the "Council of Europe decency threshold" (1992:12).
Staff Side have achieved a degree of unity by the later years of the
PRB on this issue which could be regarded as quite remarkable given
the historical tensions between the unions and professional
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associations and the effect that 'low pay settlements' could have on
differentials. Their arguments have also evolved to include arguments
which are more obviously 'economic' in nature and these appear to
enhance their acceptability to the PRB. However, Staff Side have
received relatively little response on this potentially important
issue from either the HDs or the PRB.
In the first report, Staff Side stated that 'pay should not be
depressed by the fact that the majority of nursing staff are women' as
one of four key principles (1984:8). This was a broadly phrased
argument for general comparability between nurses and external male
wage levels. However, inevitably, choice of comparative measures are
important and give different degrees of tactical advantage. Staff
Side made a special push on this issue in the fifth report, arguing
that the skills involved in nursing were undervalued because of their
association with what had been regarded traditionally as women's work.
The Staff Side then raised the question of equal pay for work of equal
value and suggested that the 1984 extension of the equal pay
legislation provided a basis for specific comparisons to be made
between jobs done by different grades of nurse and other jobs in the
NHS mainly done by men. They described comparisons they had made with
jobs amongst craftworkers, ambulance staff and computer staff in the
NHS and urged the PRB to undertake its own assessments of equal pay,
failing which individual claims might have to be brought which would
'produce chaos in the grading structure'. NUPE also supplemented the
evidence with a report coninissioned from a specialist at Ruskin
College which showed that the scope for equal value claims was wide.
The Health Departments believed that the Staff Side's examples 'showed
claims under the category of comparisons with atypical jobs' and said
that they would be more concerned if they believed that the pay system
for nursing staff was 'vulnerable to internal claims for equal pay,
against which they had tried to ensure'. The PRB concluded that if
there were questions of equal pay to be resolved, the responsibility
lay with the two Sides of the Negotiating Council and, with respect to
clinical grades, with those responsible for placing staff on tae new
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grading structure (1988:13-14). In PRB6, PRB8, and PRB9, the issue of
equal pay did not feature. In PRB7, Staff Side subsumed equal pay
under 'low pay'.
That Staff Side's claims for equal pay were referred to 'negotiation'
by the PRB perhaps again illustrates the real limits of the PRB pay
process and the difficulty of getting 'equitable' issues taken
seriously. Along with low pay, this was a potentially important
criterion on which Staff Side have failed to make much progress, even
though nurses constitute a clear case of both horizontal and vertical
segregation. It is hard to resist the conclusion that the tremendous
cost implications of both these measures must be as influential today
in the relative failure of these criteria to get attention in the pay
process, and in particular to encourage the government to take a more
proactive role as 'model employer', as they have long appeared to be
(see especially Wootton,1955:130,153).
Some Conclusions on Comparability
The great variety of comparisons employed in the pay review process
shows how important this issue is and how difficult it would be to
imagine a process that did not involve such a criterion. The
practical example from the nursing pay process illustrates that
comparability arguments may stress either 'economic' or 'equitable'
aspects as a matter of bargaining technique rather than as an
expression of some underlying principle. Comparability may carry
intuitive appeal for workers in that it appears to call for 'natural
justice' or 'fairness'. However, the equitable aspects of this
argument appear to have carried relatively little weight in the pay
review process, though some issues have received 'sympathetic'
treatment by the PRB. Staff Side have responded with tactical
adeptness and explored the linkages with economic efficiency, showing
that comparability is important for labour supply decisions. On this
basis, the PRB itself has largely validated some usefulness for
comparability.
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The HDs have generally adopted what must be seen as a tactical stance
of resistence to the use of comparability but have, nonetheless,
produced evidence on comparability themselves where this is supportive
of their own arguments. As with prior arbitration and pay review
exercises for nurses, the HDs and the PRB have mainly undertaken
gender-specific comparisons. The rationale for this has not been made
explicit and is by no means clear although its implications are
important for nurses. A more systematic appraisal of external
comparability can be seen to have been subordinated to and delayed by
the clinical grading exercise with an apparent subsequent
unwillingness on the part of Management Side to agree to terms for
tnis in negotiation or for the PRB to insist on it.
RECRUTINENT AND REfENTION
Given the polarised nature of the ability to pay and comparability
criteria, and the historical significance of nursing shortages, it is
perhaps not surprising that the debate shifted quickly and
substantially to the recruitment and retention criterion. This has
subsumed a wide range of 'economic' arguments and has in many ways
clearly delineated the very limited usefulness of neoclassical theory
for nurses' wage determination - and the NHS more generally.
The choice of recruitment and retention as one of three main criteria
by the government was, with hindsight, possibly an ill-advised one.
It may have been explained by their initial stance that there were no
problems with recruitment and retention and that therefore no
particular uplift in pay was warranted (1984:8). Little indication
was given in the first report of the furore which was to follow and
which has largely dominated the PRB process since. Despite all the
problems of defining supply and demand in the area of healthcare, the
Side which could establish a labour surplus or deficiency could
legitimately claim an adjustment of pay on 'efficiency' grounds,
within the scope of the 'economistic' agenda followed in the pay
review process. Staff Side were quick to appreciate the potential
tactical benefits.
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From the outset, the problem of providing statistical evidence was
raised. In particular, there did not appear to be any generally
accepted way of determining what a nursing establishment ought to be.
Recruitment is determined by the resources available to individual
Health Authorities and therefore only recruitment and retention data
for funded posts can realistically be determined. In this respect,
the issue of recruitment and retention has raised wider questions
about funding and volume in health service provision. Secondly, and
quite apart from the issue of measuring 'demand' and 'provision', the
criterion demonstrated severe data deficiencies in the NIIS. The
subsequent collection of data, though still widely regarded as
limited, has been perhaps one of the most remarkable and little
noticed effects of ttie PRB process. As data was collected, firstly by
RHA Chairmen and subsequently by the ONE, London regions and Staff
Side, shortages were quickly established. For most of the period,
shortages of qualified nurses were shown to be rising. As more
precise measures were obtained, shortages of unqualified nurses were
also established.
Health Departments Arguments
The Health Departments stated in the first report that recruitment and
retention was the 'primary consideration'. Their view that
'recruitment and retention currently presented no major difficulty'
was endorsed by representatives of NHS management (1984:8). By only
the following year the HIDs had revised this criterion to a secondary
cons ideration (1985:5).
The Health Departments have subsequently been forced to moderate their
arguments to take account of such shortages as have been established,
and they have done this in a variety of ways. Firstly, they have tried
to show that such shortages are not widespread or generalised. This
argument has developed historically. In early reports, they attempted
to show that vacancies were in specialisations or particular grades
and that there were no shortages of unqualified staff (1985:7-12). In
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later reports, there was an attempt to show geographic.at differences,
particularly for London (1987:14-45).
Secondly, they have remained largely nonconinittal about reasons for
such vacancies and have consistently countered the proposition that
generalised pay increases could be the solution. In this respect non-
pay reasons and solutions have been emphasised, such as changing
public attitudes to traditionally unpopular specialities (ibid). An
extremely interesting part of the whole PRB process has been the
nature and diversity of the so-called non-pay solutions s?gges.ted i'
'Management Side'. These have included Skillmix changes and flexible
rostering, Project 2000, pilot schemes for the use of the 'ITS as an
entry route into nurse training, NVQs and support workers, provision
of ch.ildcare, transport schemes, help with accorrinodation, various
education and training initiatives, and measures to improve the
management of nursing resources. Clinical grading was also seen as a
measure which would aid recruitment and retention through the
provision of proper career paths and the recognition of increasing
levels of skill and responsibility. However, the evidence for pay-
related reasons for shortages continued to accumulate and to gain some
acceptance - at one stage RHA Chairmen admitted that pay could be an
important determinant (1985:6). The HD's arguments then changed
emphasis and it was suggested that shortages should be solved by
targeted pay supplements, in particular through speciality and
geographical supplements which were subsequently called 'flexible' pay
supplements.
Thirdly, in response to a Staff Side emphasis on the longer-term
problem of the 'demographic timebomb', the HDs came to acknowledge
that this was a problem, but constantly repeated that they would
prefer skill and geographical supplements to solve shortages rather
than general pay increases. Finally, the Health Departments have
attempted to demonstrate increases or adequacy in overall numbers of
nursing staff, presumably to downplay the significance of such
shortages as have been established. This has taken an interesting
turn with the re9uirement to balance budgets prior to NHS Trusts and
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subsequent events connected with the Trusts. In PRB8 this led the HDs
in Oral Evidence, comenting on reports that some newly-qualified
nurses had been unable to find jobs, to say that 'some health
authorities had had temporarily to postpone recruitment and the
opening of new wards in order to keep within their budgets'. This was
an interesting admission, given the political sensitivity of this
issue, but may actually have underestimated the closure of existing
wards because of the cost of staff (see Chapter Six).
Numerous surveys have been conducted on recruitment and retention
problems, and an interesting example of their interpretation by the
HDs can be found in the fifth report. Here, an exceptional appearance
was made by Regional Personnel Directors in the Thames regions, who
suggested a variety of national and local reasons for shortages which
included: demographic changes; pay and conditions; increasing
workloads; apparent lack of incentives to return to nursing after a
career break; high housing and travel costs; increased fears for
personal safety; and loss of nurses to private hospitals, nursing
riomes and overseas (1988:3-5). One district bad interviewed leavers,
two-thirds of whom were Staff Nurses and forty per cent of whom were
leaving the NHS altogether. The deciding factor for two thirds of
those leaving the NHS was low pay (1988:5).
Whilst acknowledging that:
nursing and midwifery could no longer expect to satisfy the
demand for staff solely by recruiting female school leavers with
a minimum of 5 0 levels [given that] the number with between 5 0
levels and 1 A level was projected to decline by 25% by 1992-3
and there was no prospect of significant improvement before 2000.
The Health Departments nonetheless concluded that:
large across-the-board increases in pay would not be the most
cost-effective way of responding to problems found in only some
areas or specialities (1988:5)
The E-lDs instead stated that they would prefer a better-targeted
approach using selective pay supplements (ibid) and emphasised non-pay
solutions such as encouraging older people to re-enter nursing. Here,
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the HDs pointed to the substantial numbers of qualified nurses and
midwives not working in the NHS (1988:6).
The RHA's survey into factors affecting recruitment and retention,
conducted by Price Waterhouse, found that pay was the main concern of
all groups in the survey. Nonetheless, the RHA Chairmen drew the
conclusion from the survey that the issues of pay were 'inter-relatedt
with those of workload and management approach (1988:6). Most
recently, the liDs have suggested that plans for improving standards of
care do 'not necessarily demand more nurses and much could be achieved
by improving productivity' 92).
Staff Side's Arguments
Staff Side have put forward counter arguments to each of the arguments
made by the Health Departments. They have pointed to the limitations
of market forces theory for nurses yet, as shortages came to be
established, have used 'economic' arguments where these are
favourable. Staff Side have also conducted numerous surveys and have
attempted, with some notable success, to put forward their own agenda
on pay and non-pay solutions.
In response to the HD's assertion at that time that there were no
shortages, Staff Side in the first report suggested that recruitment
and retention needed to be considered alongside other factors such as
morale, conTnitment and effectiveness, and noted that the current
situation was affected both by the recession and by the fact that the
Government could decide how many posts to fund in the NHS and had made
manpower cuts (1984:9). They contended that the 'market forces'
approach was inappropriate to the determination of general levels of
pay for NHS nursing staff, since the majority of staff had made a
long-term corrrnitment and the NHS was a near-monopoly employer. In
their view, both demand and supply for nursing staff were determined
by political considerations. 	 The level of demand was determined
largely by the budget allowed by the Government and the supply of
newly-trained nurses determined largely by the number of places
-120-
provided in schools of nursing. Moreover, market forces as such did
not seem to play much part in determining pay in the private sector
which continued to give significant pay increases even where there
were no recruitment difficulties.
Staff Side also questioned the availability and reliability of
statistics on shortages. With respect to the early surveys conducted
by the RHA, they suggested that:
any apparent improvement in recruitment had resulted from
artificially low demand, particularly in the case of unqualified
staff, who had been most hard hit by cuts in establishments.
They were also unconvinced by calculations of nursing staff increases
and suggested that greater workloads had been experienced.
However, as shortages were established and the significance of
demographic change realised, Staff Side's tactics changed. In marked
contrast to some of their earlier arguments, supply and demand factors
were now asserted to have some importance. In 1986 they argued that
demographic factors would make fair and appropriate pay levels even
more important (p8) for qualified staff and that recruitment
difficulties were likely to extend to posts for unqualified staff,
many of which were filled by women returning to work after child
rearing. Other employers would in future compete for this group to
make up for the fall in the number of school leavers and,
consequently, the pay and conditions available to them elsewhere would
improve. Staff Side claimed the NHS was lagging behind other
employers and felt that:
the best way to deal effectively with the situation was by a
significant improvement in the pay and conditions of all nursing
staff and in particular those on the lower scales (1990:4).
Staff Side also queried whether the HD's had adequately demonstrated
that shortages were limited to London and the South East or to certain
specialities elsewhere and provided their own regional breakdowns,
compiled from newspapers, of wards closed and beds lost as a result of
shortages of nursing staff. For example, in 1987, these indicated
that there were shortages in all regions. Similarly, a survey carried
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out in the same year by an Opposition health spokesman indicated 100
of the 120 responding health districts reporting difficulties in
recruiting nursing staff, arid RCN, RCM arid HVA surveys confirmed such
shortages. Staff Side also noted increases in nunthers seeking
verification of qualifications to work abroad (1988:9).
Staff Side have consistently pointed to low pay as a primary cause of
shortages, arid claimed that general pay increases are necessary to
resolve them. They have been broadly in agreement with the idea that
non-pay initiatives should also be developed but extremely sceptical
about where the funding would come from as these type of initiatives
are not without cost. Staff Side have sought meetings with Management
to discuss how a number of proposals could be put into practice, and
have tended to put forward their own agenda for non-pay and
'flexibility' initiatives. This has included increased childc.are
facilities, improved opportunities for part-time working, increased
flexibility of hours, and retraining for returners (1989:5). The
agenda has also been extended to include requests for the
implementation of an equal opportunities policy, job sharing and
improvements in maternity leave. However, they have pointed to the
fact that surveys demonstrate that little has been done in practice in
the area of non-pay related initiatives with fewer than 2,000 places
in NHS workplace nurseries and only just over 200 job sharers in
nursing posts in the NHS. With respect to non-pay initiatives
involving training changes, Staff Side have argued that these would
actually necessitate more staff, both qualified and unqualified, in
the future:
to compensate for the changes in nurse education which would
result in student nurses spending less time working on the wards
during their training...The demand for more nursing staff would
grow, simply in order to maintain the current level of service
(1991:4).
In later years, Staff Side have expressed dissatisfaction with the
results of the Clinical Grading exercise in terms of recruitment and
retention and produced the RCN's Grade Expectations, a sample survey
of RcN members, (1145,1988) to conclude that the clinical grading
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review at that date appeared to encourage nurses to remain in clinical
nursing rather than to move to management or education or to stay in,
or return to, the NHS. COl-ISE's surveys (various years), have also
been used to show the serious number of potential leavers, with low
morale, the level of pay and stress being most frequently given as
reasons.
PRB'S Adjudication
The PRB's adjudications have developed alongside the arguments made by
both Sides, especially with respect to the growing evidence on
shortages, and by the fourth report the PRB suggested that the
successful tackling of staff shortages would need more competitive pay
(1987:14-15). In 1988, the PRB concluded that recruitment and
retention difficulties were worse than previously believed, were not
confined to London, and added up to a significant and widespread
problem. Concern was expressed at the lack of statistical evidence
from the HDs in support of their statement that there was no
generalised recruitment and retention problem (1988:9). Most recently,
a small improvement has occurred in vacancy rates but the PRB has
explained that this improvement could have arisen:
'partly by the impact of the recession on the supply of nursing
staff and partly as a result of NHS management apparently having
taken vacant posts for qualified staff out of the funded
establishment' (1992:7).
Throughout the period, the PRB has shown some ambivalence on the
market forces concept and has produced some contradictory arguments.
In several reports, the PRB noted that market forces were a relevant
consideration at entry points into nursing (student and NAs) where
staff need little formal training and can move freely across various
occupations, but that tney did not play such a role for qualified
nurses where there is only a small effective market elsewhere. In
this situation, they felt that:
The logic of the argument about market forces would...suggest
that pay levels need be set only marginally above the point at
which significant losses would occur from nurses abandoning their
profession altogetner and seeking other forms of employment.
Those who conruit themselves to a professional career such as
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nursing, and eschew industrial action, may reasonably expect that
wider considerations than this will be taken into account in
settling their pay (1985:14).
However, later in the same report the PRB pointed to the importance of
experience gained by nursing auxiliaries suggesting that this made
them 'more significant contributors to the work of the nursing team,
particularly in the difficult areas of mental illness and mental
handicap' (1985:20). This argtniient would suggest that nursing
auxiliaries also make a 'comiitment' to the NHS and rather contradicts
their earlier statement on the significance of market forces at these
'entry points'. In 1991, the PRB re-asserted the reservations they
had expressed in 1985 on the extent to which 'evidence on recruitment
and retention can be regarded as decisive' (1991:6).
The PRB has also acknowledged demographic factors suggesting that
demand would outs trip supply in the future and particularly noted the
Coninittee of Public Accounts' corrinents in its report on Control of
Nursing Manpower, to the effect that the 'prospect of a future
shortage of nurses, both qualified and in training, is a most serious
matter of direct importance to the patients' (paragraph 22, Fourteenth
Report, 3 February 1986). In recent years, the PRB has noted there is
'no cause for complacency' in the face of demographic facts and
increasing competition in the labour market (1989:5).
Since the clinical grading exercise and a subsequent pilot for
flexible pay, the FRB has been wary of statistics on recruitment and
retention, noting that they bear a time lag in showing the effects of
these special exercises and are therefore of 'limited value'. In 1991,
it expressed concern about the deterioration in the position for
Grades A and B but noted that there was still 'as yet no conclusive
evidence about the effect on recruitment and retention of the clinical
grading structure introduced in 1988' and that it would be difficult
'to identify or measure these effects with any precision, not least
because they cannot be insulated from the many other developnents
currently taking place in the NI1S' (1991:5). It again saw 'no cause
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for alarm' but equally no 'reason for complacency' and pointed again
to the need for competitive pay (1991:6)
Finally, although a pilot was introduced, the PRB has been sceptical
about flexible pay supplements as a solution to shortages, appearing
on tne whole to be in favour of general pay increases. The concept of
non-pay initiatives has been supported but the PRB has also noted
variable response by individual HAs. Evidence on non-pay initiatives
has been requested (1991:6) and the PRB has stressed that sufficient
priority and identified resources are needed. It hoped that that some
of NUPE's proposals, including those on childcare provision, would be
put to negotiation. (1990:5).
Conclusions on Recruitment and Retention
The criterion of recruitment and retention has been a pivotal one in
the pay review process and the growing evidence of shortages alongside
the developoent of data collection adds some weight to some of the
more descriptive historical accounts of shortages in thapter Two.
That this part of the process has taken up so much time and effort on
all sides could be viewed in a number of ways. Firstly, it may simply
reflect the traditional importance of this issue and the interests of
both the Sides and the PRB in it. Secondly, it could be viewed as a
mark of the success achieved through tactic.al agility and strong
argument by Staff Side. Staff Side have produced a number of
arguments and substantial evidence to counter HD's arguments and the
PRB has in many ways appeared sympathetic to the Staff Side's views.
Thirdly, it could viewed as a mark of the success that can be achieved
in setting the original agenda. Although government was forced to
cede ground, the issue has drawn attention from some of the equally
long-standing issues such as low pay and equal pay.
what is very clear, however, is that the approaches of the Sides
illustrates many points of conflict even when the agenda is set so as
to apparently address an 'objective' economic criterion as opposed to
a more 'subjective' or equitable goal. The diversity of possible
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measures of the extent arid type of shortages, causal explanations arid
potential solutions leave scope for considerable differences of
opinion and tactical strategies.
Perriaps most importantly, the criterion of recruitment and retention
has subsumed the majority of economic and equitable arguments
contained in other criteria in the pay review process, in both 'core'
and 'ad hoc' categories. In particular, it illustrates what may be
viewed as more genuine and fundamental conflict over the 'underlying
issues' of grading and hierarchy, training and skills, nployrnent and
resourcing, and even notions of flexibility. Much of this conflict is
expressed only indirectly through the pay review process and
negotiation or decisions on many of these issues have taken place
elsewhere. This puts the extent to which the PRB has been able to
'resolve' conflict over this criterion at some doubt.
UfIVATION AND tIJRALE
Motivation, as the third of the government's core criteria, appears to
be a strange choice from the point of view of both economic theory,
where low motivation could be argued to feed through into lowered
productivity or less willingness to supply labour, and from the point
of view of tactics. The tactics may be more explicable given nurses'
general reputation of being a very highly motivated group of workers
as far as their patients are concerned. However, the PRB quickly
established that a distinction should be made between motivation and
morale in that staff might be 'totally coninitted to meeting the needs
of patients and yet feel aggrieved to a greater or lesser extent with
their pay and conditions' (1985:15). By the fifth report, these
remarks were fully reflected in the redefinition of this criterion to
considerations of morale.
A very rare deviation between the arguments of parties to the
Management Side occurred over this issue but there was little
consistency in their positions. In the first report, the HDs stated
there was no evidence to suggest any excessive problems. However, by
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the second report the RHA Chairmen thought a survey might be in order
and the [-lBs acknowledged that attitude surveys could be of some use
after general management changes had been fully operationalised. At
this stage, the RHA Chairmen noted that they did not think competitive
pay rates were the most important factor influencing motivation and
morale. By the fifth report, the FIBs had admitted morale was 'not
good in substantial areas of the NHS' but that they had high hopes of
the clinical grading review and improvements in corrinunication and
management. In the 6th report, the RHA Chairmen said in oral
evidence that 'they did not believe that morale was fundamentally
bad'. They suggested that a 'dissatisfied minority of staff had had a
disproportionate influence'. However, the HDs said in oral evidence
that they 'acknowledged that many nurses were currently anxious and
unsettled' (1989:9) and that the proposals in Project 2000 and
possible changes in management structure added to the uncertainties.
In the 7th report, the HDs did not appear to pursue the issue of
morale.
In the first report, and in direct contradiction to the HDs, Staff
Side said tney thought that morale was very low (1984:9) and this has
remained their position throughout the period. They have backed up
this position with their own surveys. In assessing the reasons for
such low morale, Staff side have variously reported financial
cutbacks, inadequate staffing and increased workloads, uncertainties
resulting from NHS management or other reorganisation (PRB2,3,7,9),
staging of awards, disappointment with pay increases, and the
government's handling of the clinical regradirig review 'which had
reinforced the belief among staff that they were undervalued' (PRB6).
With respect to solutions, Staff Side have recognised that pay is 'not
the only influence on morale' but have argued that 'improvements in
pay could help offset the effect of other influences' (1986:12).
From the outset, the PRB acknowledged that there were indications that
morale was falling (PRB2). Clinical grading and poor management have
consistently been seen as being important factors in low morale. For
example, despite remaining optimistic about the positive effects of
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clinical grading on morale in the long term, the PRB noted that:
in view of the number of appeals against grading decisions that
remain to be heard, it is not surprising that there is as yet no
evidence of any noticeable improvement. Our attention has been
drawri...to variations in grading judgements by health
authorities, not all of which are apparently explicable by
reference to differing local circunistances...unless these
anomalies are resolved quickly through the appeals machinery,
they will leave a sense of unfairness which will inevitably have
a detrimental effect on morale (1990:8).
Workloads have also been viewed as a problem and the PRB has cocrinented
that there is 'no reason to believe that they have diminished' or that
the work of many nursing and midwifery staff 'has become less
stressful' (1990:8). The PRB has also agreed with many of Staff
Side's arguments on the sources of problems, particularly the NHS
ref orms and flexible pay supplements. The latter were seen to have
'given rise to feelings of resentment amongst some staff' (1990:8)
With respect to solutions, the PRB has been rather more ambiguous and
contradictory. In the second report, it felt that the importance of
pay 'must not be under-estimated' (PRB2,1986:16-17). In the fifth
report, the PRB appear to have been much influenced by their visits
and took the 'view that pay levels have a bearing on morale and that
this relationship cannot be ignored' (1988:11-12). Later, the PRB
stressed the role that improved management could play, but recognised
that 'pay levels also have a significant effect on morale, not least
because they indicate to staff the value that is placed on their work
and responsibilities' (1990:9). Interestingly, given its more general
views on low pay, the PRB here asserted that 'the NHS must not allow
itself to become again a low-wage employer relative to its appropriate
labour markets' (1989:9-10). However, there was a sea change in the
9th report, where the PRB argued that:
Pay was not a big issue: most of the points raised were really
concerned with management rather than pay...many of the issues
raised by staff...can be addressed more effectively by management
action than by increases in pay (1992:8).
In conclusion, Staff Side have until very recently had some success in
raising the profile of this criterion and in using it to bring wider
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issues concerning tfle tTHS funding and reorganisation into trte forum of
the PRB process. However, the pace of the reforms and managerial
change may currently be obscuring underlying problems with pay. Staff
Side have been substantially blocked in their attempts to link this
criterion into the labour supply question, not least because under the
Recruitment and Retention criterion a short-run emphasis on irrrnediate
supply and demand outcomes has prevailed, whereas motivation and
morale has much more to say about the long-term expected impact on
supply and demand. Although this criterion allowed an expression of
Staff dissatisfaction with current change and equally enabled the PRB
to express its sympathies, the criterion seems to have held little
tactical advantage to government otherwise and the HDs arid RHA
Q-iairmen showed a rare lack of cohesion.
PRODUCTI VII? AND WORKLOAD
This criterion appeared to be a mainly neutral issue. However, it
offers an interesting example of the government's failure to use the
logic of economic arguments based on marginal productivity theory,
where these are not tactically favourable. It also points to some
potentially significant problems with the government's public
coniiiitment to link pay more directly to performance.
The Healtri Departments have offered contradictory evidence on
productivity in terms of theory and evidence and, in particular, to
whom gains should accrue. In general, the emphasis of their argument
has been that there is no case for a general pay increase for staff on
grounds of productivity. In the first report, the HDs stated that
'patient services must have first call on any efficiency gains' rather
than nurses' pay. They also claimed that productivity in the NHS had
not increased to any significant extent during the last decade, though
the nature of jobs had changed as a result of advances in technology
and medical knowledge (1984:11). They subsequently suggested that
'not all increases in productivity resulted from an increased level of
skill or effort on the part of individual staff' and that there was no
evidence of increased workloads (1985:11). Productivity was defined
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as output compared with total staff numbers and considered to be less
in trie NHS than in the economy generally.
In the 3rd report the HDs shifted emphasis and pointed to a number of
problems with measurement of productivity. In particular, they argued
that there is a lack of evidence on the contribution by staff group,
grade or service sector, and that the index of clinical activity takes
no account of quality. Further, productivity growth was argued to be
less than in the economy generally because the NHS, unlike the
conercial sector, can not drop disproportionately costly activities
(1986:11). In particular, the HDs saw 'considerable difficulties in
relating pay to productivity where health care was provided by teams
whose members had different qualifications and skills' (1986:11), and
improvements in productivity might have been made by the substitution
of qualified for unqualified staff which would already be reflected in
higher earnings (1986:11).
The Staff Side in PRB1 pointed to the need for extensive discussions
on the criteria to be used in measuring productivity (1984:11), and
subsequently pointed out that measures of throughput were normally
quantitative and said little about the quality or effectiveness of
nursing (PRB2). Their view throughout the period has been that
workload in tne sense of demands on staff has increased in both
quantitative and qualitative terms because of higher turnover,
increased use of technology, and pressures on staff resulting from
financial constraints. Surveys were again used to back up their case
with evidence. COHSE's survey reported that 78% of respondents
thought their workload had increased over the previous year (1986:11-
12). The R presented findings from the INS survey of 1987 which
found that almost half of the respondents had worked unpaid overtime
averaging 3 hours in the previous week, and had lost an average of 1.6
hours in the week by working through meal breaks, particularly nurses
in the higher grades. The RCN contended that nursing staff needed to
work overtime to maintain adequate levels of patient care, because
workloads were increasing at a time of staff shortages.
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Staff Side have remained resistent to performance pay 'in a service
where teamwork was essential' but have felt that increasing workloads
of staff generally should be reflected in their pay (PRB5). They have
stressed that the root cause - inadequate staffing levels - should be
addressed, but have noted that recruitment and retention difficulties
may prevent this.
From the outset, the PRB has consistently judged that there have been
productivity and workload increases and has reported evidence from ti-ia
NUS Itself, one such being that the 'main thrust of the 1984 Annual
Report on the Health Service in England, published by DFISS, is that
the NHS and its staff are continuing to improve their performance to
the benefit of their patients' (1985:17). However, the PRB has
equally consistently argued that measurement difficulties for
productivity mean that it has not been able to take productivity into
account (1986:16,1987). It expressed a desire to take it into account
after the clinical grading review which it expected to help to retain
staff in key areas and reduce stress caused by excessive workloads
(1988:10-11). In the 7th report, workload was covered briefly under
'morale'. In the 8th, productivity did not appear.
Of all the criteria in the PRB process, productivity has probably had
the most bizarre and confused treatment. Within the four criteria
covered here, it was ostensibly attractive from a market forces
theoretical perspective.	 Yet in so being, it was also the most
attractive for Staff Side in a tactical sense. There is a
particularly clear link between productivity and pay in such a labour-
intensive sector and it would generally be regarded as politically
inexpedient for government to claim that performance has in fact been
poor in the public sector. Staff Side could thus be viewed as having
achieved some success in assuming this criterion under their own
agenda. However, it is interesting to note that tne PRB has appeared
unwilling to follow the logic of 'increased workloads', which provides
a certain 'economistic' rationale for productivity pay increases, and
has favoured sympathising with 'stress' levels. As with 'motivation
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and morale' this offers a rather alternative view of this part of the
review process and its possible effect on dampening conflict.
DIFFERENTIALS
Staff Side in the first report stated that there should be 'fair
internal differentials, with staff being properly rewarded for their
qualifications, responsibilities and experience' as one of their four
key principles (1984;8). The meaning of 'fairness', however, might
have been expected to be a major point of conflict, as could have the
relationship between reward and qualifications, responsibfLItes and
experience. Differentials normally refer to the. di e.t.ea is'. raj
between groups of staff 'internal' to an organisation. In practice,
the term has been used quite loosely within the PRB process and
sometimes interchangeably with relativities. The practical linkages
are so great between differentials, relativities and comparability
that it is misleading for some purposes to try and view them as
conceptually distinct. However, the concept of differentials allows
the exploration of deeper considerations on 'internal' wage
hierarchies and sources of conflict arising from 'underlying issues'.
Differentials were discussed in PRB1 under 'Pay Structure' and 'Pay
Differentials'. Both Sides pointed to the need for certain changes in
the pay structure to be negotiated, with especial regard to clinical
grades to reward experience and responsibility and provide a career
path. Staff Side were less cohesive on this criterion, as might have
been expected. Although Staff Side in the first and second reports
argued that unqualified staff merited higher pay on the basis of
substantial responsibilities for patient care (see for
exarnple,1985:12), separate suhnissions were made in these early
reports by the RCN and professional associations. In the first
report, the RCN proposed increases in differentials between student
and qualified nurses (1984:10). When in the third report it was noted
that the clinical grading review was to be undertaken, the HVA, RCM
and RCN all put forward special proposals, whilst Staff Side - and the
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Health Departaients - generally were more cautious about makthg too
many changes before the review was completed (1986:10-11)
The Health Departments have usually taken the position that pay
increases geared to change differentials are not warranted. However,
if any differentials are to be changed, the change should be in favour
of qualified staff (1985:10). The HDs have expressed particular
concern over any widening of the differential between nursing
auxiliaries and ancillary staff, suggesting in the second report that
'any further widening would be undesirable and unjustifiable by
reference to managerial or market considerations' (1985:12).
Despite the relatively modest amount of evidence under this criterion,
the effects have been very important. In these early reports, prior
to the clinical grading review, the FRB very much followed the example
of earlier arbitration and review and increased differentials in
favour of qualified staff. After the fourth report, no separate
section appeared for the criterion of differentials, or 'internal
relativities' as the PRB frequently called them, and the criterion was
subsumed under the special sections in the reports on clinical
grading.
The progress of this criterion again raises a number of questions
about the nature of the review process, representation on the Sides
and the role of the P1W itself. Relatively little pressure is visible
through evidence for the recomendations which follow on differentials
and this suggests that much wider, and less visible, external
influences and sources of power are involved. One union official
suggested that all the important representations take place 'behind
closed doors' and that the professional associations have strong
informal methods for applying pressure. At another level, the
sociological composition of the P1W could be argued to bias it in
'conserative' directions. At a rather different level, it could be
argued that the pay review system was set up to head off trade union
pressure and increased differentials may be seen as the natural logic
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of this system, whatever the causation behind the processes and
recofrillendations.
One of the notable parts of this process has been the fact that the
PRB did not consider that questions concerning pay structure fell
within its remit (1984:10), despite the high degree of interlinkage
between pay structures (or hierarchies), differentials and
comparability, and this further illustrates its limits. The wider
debate had, in fact, to be conducted outside the PRB in national
negotiations, and then in the assimilation and appeals process at
lower levels. Some of this process, however, is visib.Le in the E'f
reports through the debate on Clinical Grading where it is also
possible to see trie vital role that the FRB itself played.
SPECIAL DUlY PAYMENTS, LEADS AND ALLOWANCES
The core criteria addressed so far have been concerned with basic pay.
However, pay supplements in the form of special duty payments and
leads and London Weighting have also formed part of the PRB process.
Substantial negotiations have taken place outside the pay review
process over these issues and the role of the PRB has frequently been
to urge the Sides to negotiate further.
Allowances designed to remunerate rather than reimborse fall into two
categories; those expressed in terms of a percentage addition to basic
pay and which therefore increase automatically in line with pay
increases (special duty and excess hours payments) and those which are
fixed sums (psychiatric, and geriatric leads). The HDs and RHA
thairmen have generally argued that present levels of special duty
payments are 'a disincentive to the flexible deployment of nursing
staff', as are the psychiatric and geriatric leads which are 'divisive
and complicated to administer' (1984:11). The RHA Qiairrnen in
particular argued for abolition of both in the first report (ibid).
Staff Side have generally remained unconvinced by tne inflexibility
arguments and particularly unconvinced that the abolition of such
payments would be used to enhance basic pay (1986:22-23).
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Negotiations between the Sides in the NMNC have taken place for most
of the pay review body period, with the PRB meanwhile making interim
reconuiendations, and the HDs have recently been attempting to
negotiate the complete replacement of national leads and allowances
with a comprehensive system of pay flexibility at local level (PRB9,
1992:15).
CLINICAL GRADING
Apart from the core criteria discussed above, two special exercises
have been conducted during the period of the pay review body which
have introduced different considerations arid, although overlapping
with other criteria, have generally been reviewed in the PRB process
in their own right. The first of these was Clinical Grading.
In the fifth report, a special section was devoted to the Clinical
Grading Review. The review took the form of a negotiated agreement on
grading criteria (skills, responsibilities and qualifications) and
grading definitions for nine distinct grades of post, which were
designed to replace the previous gradings in the range from NA to
senior nurse level seven and include clinical teachers and tutors.
The PRB was then asked by the Negotiating Council to reconinend rates
of pay for the new grades, in the form of a pay spine to be backdated
to 1 April 1988 once the new structure had been introduced.
Assimilation was to be on the basis that staff would move to the
incremental point on the new scale corresponding to the incremental
point reached on the old scale.
The Health Departments stressed that the new career structure would
recognise the various levels of skills and responsibility exercised by
'individual' nursing staff and would establish appropriate
relativities between different jobs and aid recruitment and retention.
Differences of opinion arose very quickly on the nature of the
exercise and on the role of skills, experience and responsibility.
Whilst [-IDs wanted wider overlaps in scales to 'reflect the value of
skill and experience gained over a period of years in the same grade',
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Staff Side wanted minimal overlap, arguing that the whole purpose of
the exercise and the new structure was to reward different levels of
skill and responsibility and that this should be reflected in the
grading itself rather than through increments alone.
The PRB in the fifth report was prescient in its anticipation of
problems arising from the assimilation of staff to the new grades. It
noted that 'if the new structure is to meet the needs of nursing and
midwifery staff over the next decade, it is important that it should
clearly be seen to value the work done by these staff and should gain
their confidence from the outset' (1988:17). The PRB's own objectives
included minimal overlap and 'consistent and reasonable' differentials
between successive scale maxima. The PRB pointed out that 'it is for
the management of the NHS to ensure implementation of the new
structure...with urgency...a prolonged period of uncertainty will
inevitably distract staff and cannot help to build up their morale'.
It also pointed to the dangers if the HIJs did not give sufficient and
timely guidance for implementation, in particular that 'it would be
difficult for local managers to insulate their judgements about
grading from their preoccupation with budgetary constraints'
(1988:18). Finally the PRB feared that the prospect of improving the
attractions of a nursing career would be 'put at risk if it is
accompanied by increasing pressure on the resources available for
patient care or for the provision of post-basic training'.
In the event, a nu-nber of problems arose from the outset. The Sides
failed to agree the interpretation of the grading criteria and
therefore the point-to-point method of assimilation (1989:1). The PRE
also noted that the HDs were unable to issue any comprehensive
guidance to health authorities on regradirig and assimilation until
May, 'nearly six months after the grading definitions had been agreed
by the Sides'. The PRB's visits had confirmed its belief that local
managers were inadequately prepared for the exercise (ibid).
Data on regrading outcomes were extremely poor and Staff Side felt
that management had frequently behaved insensitively and
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inconsistently, with many anomalies arising in assimilation, not least
because of the 'cash limited' nature of the exercise which had led to
the 'imposition of quotas of staff to be assimilated to each grade.
They suggested that many NM and Es had been placed 'automatically in
the lowest grades for which they were eligible, without any attempt
having been made to assess the work they were doing'. Particular
problems had arisen over 'continuing responsibility'. Here, the HDs
had ruled that continuing responsibility for a ward could not be
shared and that only one post in a ward could be graded G. Problems
also arose over the notion of 'prime care provider' and the grading of
midwives, some of whom were placed in grade D and over whose
assimilation many anomalies and inconsistencies arose regionally (see
especially 1990:10-12). This threatened a split in Staff Side as the
RCt'i called for a separate grading and salary structure for midwives,
though Staff Side achieved some success in rallying to the midwives'
cause collectively.
Most of these points have arisen each year since the review. The PRB
has generally made it clear that it was for the 'Sides to deal with
the problems through negotiation' (1989:6), yet again emphasising the
limitations of the pay review process and the potential importance of
negotiation and consultation at national and, for this exercise, local
level. However, the PRB has been a vocal critic of tne exercise
throughout and has frequently appeared sympathetic to Staff Side but
unable to act. For example, in the seventh report, the PRE noted
'with regret' that 'there are still differences of opinion between the
Sides about certain of the grading criteria and that this appears to
have caused particular difficulty and distress in midwifery' but also
that 'it would not be right for us to intervene', claiming that
responsibility for the implementation of the grading structure must
rest with NI-IS management (1990:12). It has shown particular concern
for anomalies arising over the assimilation of midwives, feeling there
were 'financial implications' over and above issues of 'equity' which
suggested the inconsistent grading in different areas was a result of
poor management.
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The clinical grading process has also allowed Staff Side a very public
airing of grievances. They have been consistently concerned about the
effects on NAs and ENs. In particular, Staff Side have been concerned
about the low pay and lower grading of staff working part-time and
night duty. They have claimed, with respect to appeals arising from
the review, that the major anomalies which remained were those
introduced by the HD's guidance on the interpretation of the terms
'supervision', 'continuing responsibility' and 'prime care provider'.
They have further claimed that it was 'the refusal by Management Side
to discuss these issues' which had led to an unprecedented number of
appeals which had high financial costs and lowered morale (1991:12).
The most surprising outcome of the clinical grading review and its
coverage in the PRB process, in the context of the historical
divisions in nursing discussed in Chapter Two, has been the degree of
unity achieved by Staff Side in appealing for lower paid staff to
receive more. They have made such appeals consistently since the
grading review and have even said in oral evidence that their concern
for staff in the lower grades had led them to put forward these
proposals, 'even though the effect of them would be to narrow
differentials and to increase the extent to which scales overlapped'
(1990:10). Even if a 'ratcheting' strategy could be perceived, this
would still represent a very cohesive approach. Their arguments could
be interpreted as having persuaded the PRB in several years to change
differentials in favour of lower grades. However, the FRB may equally
have been influenced by trie growing evidence of shortages of
unqualified staff in these later years (see 1991:13 in particular).
Despite criticisms from the PRB, the HDs have maintained an impassive
air, but part of their strategy has become visible through their
coninents. The HDs have argued throughout that the new clinical
grading structure should assist health authorities to recruit and
retain staff but that 'it would be some time before its full impact
would be reflected in the manpower figures' (1990:11). The review
appears to have been used partly as a 'stalling operation' against
more general pay increases.
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The [-iDs have argued, as under the 'differentials' criterion more
generally, that the PRB should not change differentials. They have
also maintained that some regional recruitment and retention problems,
notably in London and the South East, would be best dealt with by
flexible pay as the labour market for unqualified staff was very
'local'. With regard to Staff Side's suggestions for increases for
grades A and B (NAs), the liDs have stated that:
any significant alteration could cause problems later as the role
of the health care assistant evolved with the introduction of
national vocational qualifications for occupations in the care
sector (1992:12)
and later suggested that the introduction of national vocational
qualifications and of a more general flexible pay system 'should have
a beneficial effect [on motivation] for staff in the lower grades'
(ibid). On the grading of midwives, the liDs have argued that their
guidance was 'not a distortion of the Sides' agreement' and that
'midwives had gained more from the clinical grading structure than had
nursing staff generally'. With respect to regional variations in such
grading, the HDs have asserted that grading depended on such factors
as 'local management arrangements, the geographical layout of
services, and deployment and skillmix'. Although the majority of
midwives are trained as nurses and then receive extra training, the
liDs argued that:
it was not inappropriate to say that only one registerable
qualification was needed to practise as a midwife, especially as
the ROl supported direct entry training courses...although until
recently only eight people a year had been able to qualify in
this way, a second direct entry course was now available (ibid).
The FRB has frequently appeared to concur with the HD's view that
clinical grading must be given time to work in its recoffnendations.
For example, even in 1992, it argued that, until the appeals have
finally been settled, 'we will not be in a position to evaluate
nursing and midwifery staff's pay levels and relativities as
tnoroughly as we would wish' (1992:12). The promised wider exercise
in comparability has trius been held up substantially.
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Clinical grading in some respects stifled the previous orderly
presentation of arguments, and raises substantial questions about the
interlinkages between, pay and 'non-pay' issues. The promise of
clinical grading appeared to act as a 'holding' mechanism,
particularly with respect to a wider overhaul of comparability
measures or of the normative criteria which should be applied to
determining nurses' pay. The exercise also acted a a form of 'review
within a review', ostensibly resembling the traditional forms of pay
review such as Halst*iry and Clegg, in that it occurred on an electoral
cusp and offered the means for a 'catch up' award. Outcomes following
the clinical grading exercise reflected not only PRB awards, bat also
prior negotiation, and external pressures and funding constraints. The
latter were reflected in the grades in which nurses were initially
placed and their subsequent appeals. The HDs appeared, from the
evidence in process, to attempt to use the clinical grading exercise
to keep down the pay of lower grades in readiness for grademix
changes, and more generally to decentralise pay through devolved
decisions on grading. The role of the PRB thus became somewhat
indeterminate along with its role in the 'resolution' of conflict.
LONDON AND SELECTIVE PAY SUPPLE1ENI'S
Further impetus is given to the above conclusions by the process
around the second 'ad hoc' criterion, flexible pay supplements. From
tne fifth report onwards, there have been incremental attempts on the
part of HDs to introduce so-called 'flexible pay'. This concept was
first raised when the HDs argued for geographical payments and the RFJA
for London and selective (flexible) pay supplements. The PRB was
initially sympathetic. Despite its view that shortages were
widespread, it also acknowledged that there were significant
geographical and functional shortages (1988:22). As with clinical
grading, however, the PRB has had a rather ambiguous role, both as
facilitator and critic.
The HDs initially proposed extra points on the pay scales, in addition
to London weighting. Staff Side imediately expressed their opposition
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to pay variations on a regional or any other basis, stressing their
view that national pay rates were 'important in the promotion of
teamwork and the maintenance of a unified and professional workforce'
and that 'morale would be eroded' (1988:22). They argued that. the
solution to tne London problem, the existence of which tt-iey
acknowledged, was to increase London Weighting. They also opposed any
discretionary pay. The PRB took the view that London Weighting was a
matter for negotiation in the General Whitley Council, that it did not
come within its remit, and that in any case the London problem should
be dealt with wholly in one forum, either Whitley or the pay review
process. However, and despite these reservations, It went on to
recoemend supplements (rather than additions), on a percentage basis,
to trie pay-spine, claiming that these could better be monitored, and
that the supplements would remain 'subject to review'. The percentage
supplements were later criticised by Staff Side as 'anomalous',
leading to lower paid staff being 'doubly disadvantaged' (1989:16-17),
but defended by the HDs because 'the recruitment and retention
position did not justify a higher percentage for unqualified staff'
(1990:20). The HDs in the fifth review withdrew their proposal for
'discretionary' supplements, feeling this would be 'premature' and
should be discussed with Staff Side (1988:23-24).
In subsequent years the step-by-step approach followed by the HD5 and
RHA has become clearer. The RHA claimed in the sixth report that the
London supplements had been 'welcomed...as a first step towards a more
flexible pay system' (1989:16-17), and flexible supplements were
introduced in this year. By the seventh report, the issue of London
supplements was made distinct from that of flexible supplements but de
facto overlaps remained. Staff Side agreed to leave the London
Weighting Consortium of the General Whitley Council and join the HDs
in inviting the PRB to recomend appropriate rates. The HIDs then said
that the new arrangements for determining pay in London:
were an important step towards their objective of having the
whole question of London pay treated as a single entity to enable
resources to be directed at specific problem areas, without
regard to artificial geographical boundaries...it would be
appropriate to begin to move away from across the board flat. rate
allowances in London and to replace them with more flexible
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payments targeted to grades, specialities or locations wnere
there were particular recruitment and retention difficulties
(1990:20).
They therefore proposed the extension to London of the pilot scheme of
flexible pay supplements.
The PRB subsequently recomended an extension of flexible pay
supplements to London, again despite noting strong reservations:
the extension to London of what is at this stage no more than an
experimental scheme should not be regarded as a substitute for
improved remuneration for all staff in London...through basic pay
plus whatever adjustments may be necessary to meet the
circumstances of staff working in London insofar as they differ
from those of staff working elsewhere {London allowance -
weighting + London pay supplements] (1990:21).
Selective, or 'flexible', pay supplements were thus introduced the
year after London supplements (FRB6) and, as can be seen above, soon
overlapped substantially with London supplements. These supplements
were apparently intended to be both geographical and by speciality,
but there has been a great deal of confusion over these separate
objectives. Functional variations, for example, are in some ways more
important as trley change differentials and relativities within
georaphic areas. The HDs said in PRB6 that they were anxious:
to introduce more flexible remuneration arrangements which would
enable pay levels to reflect differences in labour markets...and
to see greater scope for geographical variation in pay...the aims
of the scheme would be to help meet a small number of
particularly difficult cases of recruitment and retention and to
pilot criteria for selective pay supplements with a view to
developing them for more general use (1989:20-22).
This view developed further the following year, when HDs, noting that
a flexible pay system had been negotiated for administrative and
clerical staff, said their objective was:
to introduce comprehensive and systematic flexible pay
arrangements within the NI-iS which would include a substantial
element of local management discretion within a framework of
minimum essential central control...[it was their intention]...to
negotiate a fully developed scheme of flexible pay for nursing
and midwifery staff with the Staff Side...such negotiations would
include future arrangements for London pay and the psychiatric
and geriatric leads (1990:17).
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The Minister for Health made an extremely rare appearance in the PRB
process to argue, in oral evidence, that 'a general pay increase to
resolve staffing problems would be too costly' and that it would be
'more efficient and effective to target increases to particular areas
by means of flexible pay initiatives' (ibid).
Staff Side have argued, however, that pay variations would not solve
recruitment and retention problems: at best they would 'simply shift
shortages around the country and between specialities', and 'at worst
they would make the retention of staff more difficult by causing
resentment and by damaging co-operation' (1989:20-22). In their view,
the proper implementation of clinical grading and adequate pay levels
were better ways of addressing problems. They argued that they were
not 'totally opposed' to the principle of local variations in pay but
had strong reservations. Therefore any pay flexibility scheme should
be discussed in advance between the Sides and should make provision
for appeal by individual nurses or their representatives.
The PRB again played an ambiguous role. Against this background of
lack of negotiation or consultation and fundamental disagreement, the
PRB nonetheless said it was 'favourably disposed' to a pilot scheme as
'what constituted competitive pay in one part of the country might not
be competitive in another' and it 'had already acted on this principle
by recorrinending London supplements last year'. The PRB therefore
reconinended the pilot scheme and £5 million for it. However, it also
expressed its own reservations and conditions. It agreed with Staff
Side that non-pay initiatives should have been tried first and pointed
to the dangers of uncontrolled pay drift if good planning of the
system were not made, noting that 'selective pay supplements should
not be allowed to become a soft option for poor management'. The PRB
wanted good systems of monitoring and control and noted its sympathy
with Staff Side's concern that the use of supplements would merely
shift shortages. It further felt that the system sriould not be used
to 'redress any deficiencies in the application of the grading
criteria' and recomended that the Staff Side 'be brought into the
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relevant discussions, both on the proposed implementation of trie pilot
scheme and on the conclusions to be drawn from it' (1989:20-22).
Flexible pay supplements continued and were extended by the PRB in
1990 (fl2 million), but subsequent extensions have awaited negotiation
on a wider system of flexible pay. However, pay supplements have
received some very strong criticism in subsequent years. In PRB7, the
PRB showed great concern about their effect on morale. Staff Side
also reported that Management Side had failed to comply with the PRB's
conditions and safeguards and that triey had not been involved in the
setting up, monitoring or evaluation of the scheme. The PRB
acknowledged these grievances with some sharp reprimands to Management
Side. In particular, it felt such supplements were:
not an adequate means of dealing with operational requirements
nationwide...[and] should not be regarded as a substitute for an
improved level of pay in London or of the psychiatric
lead...offering higher rates of pay to small, carefully targeted,
groups of staff inevitably carries the risk of arousing
resentment amongst other staff...We believe that we are nearing
the limit of the money that can be put into the pilot scheme...in
the meantime we have not yet formed any final view of the
desirability of introducing a general system of flexible pay
nationwide (1990:18-19).
These criticisms were repeated the next year, and the ninth report
then shifted to considerations of pay flexibility and performance
related pay more widely. In 1992, the HDs were asserting that:
it was the Government's objective for the health service as a
whole to introduce greater flexibility, in order to allow local
managers to relate pay rates to local labour market conditions,
to reward individual performance and to devise flexible
employment packages which were most suitable to local
needs... [theyj would not be looking to fund pay flexibilty
outside, or in addition to, any general increases the Review Body
might recoemend for nursing staff (1992:4)
By way of example, the Minister for Health suggested in oral evidence
that the PRB might in future consider reconinending a minimum
percentage increase, together with a target average, so leaving a
margin to enable management to take both local labour markets and
performance into account (1992:4).
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The EIDs in November 1991 sent the Review Body an outline of the
proposals they intended putting to the Staff Side for the introduction
of a general scheme of pay flexibility. Here they proposed that in
future the PRB would be invited to recormiend a 'target average
percentage pay increase (TAPPI)' for nursing staff, of which a
proportion would be recoarnerided as a basic Increase payable
automatically to all staff (this could vary between different groups
of staff) and the balance would be available for local flexibility,
including performance pay. The PRB would also be asked in future to
recomend freezing the existing leads and allowances in order to
provide a further sum of money for use flexibly. Health authorities'
funding would be based on the TAPPI and local negotiations would
determine how the flexible part of it would be used. Local management
would be empowered to negotiate agreements to buy out, or to adjust,
the national leads and allowances, and to change annual leave and
possibly other elements of non-pay remuneration. Financial control
would be maintained by requiring HAs to ensure that the overall net
effect of all the changes was an average pay increase for nursing
staff in each of their units in line with the TAPPI figure (ibid).
They added that an adequate proportion of the flexible element would
be needed to reward performance on an individual or group basis.
Importantly, the PRB has suggested that the issues of pay flexibility
and performance pay are conceptually distinct and should be dealt with
as separate issues although the HDs' proposals do not distinguish
between them. The PRB has said it is favourable to 'value for money'
solutions but mentioned a number of potential problems with the
proposals. The issue as at 1992 awaits the outcomes of the Side's
negotiations as far as the FRB is concerned but may yet be overtaken
by develoç*iients in the Trusts, or the scale of the crisis in public
sector borrowing. Nonetheless, the process on flexible pay
illustrates a curious propensity of the PRB - to be both facilitator
and critic of ttie undermining of its own influence in nursing pay
determination.
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CONCLUS IONS
The structure and processes of the N&M PRB in many ways pose the same
problems of interpretation as those raised by structure and process in
prior forms of arbitration and review. The structure of the PRB
itself could be viewed as antipathetic to the idea of 'independent'
review, with members appointed directly by government and remaining
unaccountable to those whose interests they are intended to represent.
Most PRB members, albeit with arguable effect, also have very
different class characteristics from the nurses whose pay is to be
determined and of the majority of 'taxpayers' who represent the other
main 'official interest' in the wage settlements. Whether the PRB as
an institution or collection of individuals thus has interests of its
own could only be inferred from process and outcomes but its
'independence' could be viewed as potentially circumscribed.
The production of evidence may have had some interesting, and
unexpected, effects in its own right. It has certainly been very time
consuming and one interviewee suggested that the associated clinical
grading exercise may have distracted Staff Side attention and
resources from wider reforms taking place in the NHS. On the other
hand, it has helped clarify some arguments and strategies and there is
some evidence that Staff Side have been able to present a publicly
united front over most issues, and notably the issue of low pay in
later years. The need for evidence has also highlighted perennial data
deficiencies in the NHS and a RCN official coninented that some of
these have now been rectified although 'there is a long way to go'.
This may have been an unintended consequence of the process along with
the intense media interest generated by the reports and the fact that
a public forum has now been provided through the formalised
presentation of such evidence in published reports. However, it
remains a moot point whether evidence has generated as much
'engagement' on the part of members as was claimed by some trade union
officials, particularly when compared with the alternative of national
or local collective bargaining.
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Government appear to have had a degree of success in 'skewing the
agenda' towards 'economic' criteria but the PRB has not accepted their
argument that 'ability to pay' should form the main basis for
reccxrrnendations. It is certainly questionable whether this was ever
the government's realistic intention and it is hard to imagine how the
process could have proceeded or been perceived as acceptable without
any discussion of comparability. The diversity and significance of
the comparability arguments put forward and their linkage to economic
criteria contrast with much of the academic treatment which
counterposes 'economic' and 'equitable' arguments. The exercise in
applied orthodox economics that the process includes lends some
credence to the view that these arguments carry little force for the
public sector - and even less for nurses. Staff Side remain very
unconvinced by these arguments and have become increasingly
sophisticated in their refutations. The PRB has frequently had to
counter the more radical neoclassical views, and Management Side has
often offered contradictory evidence or had to make tactical shifts
when the contradiction has become apparent in the 'rational'
discussion.
The polarisation of criteria and arguments suggest that, tactical play
apart, there are many points of material conflict between the Sides
and this is particularly underscored by the underlying 'non-pay'
issues which have surfaced throughout the process and had to be dealt
with through other forms of decision-taking or negotiation. This was
particularly in evidence over the clinical grading exercise which
suggested both that conflict may have been driven to lower levels and
that the pay review process had been, at least in part, contingent
upon the continuation of collective bargaining over non-pay issues.
The polarisation may also suggest that a number of interests which
deserve or need to be represented might be excluded from the process.
More generally, for all the vast effort and expense in collection and
presentation of evidence that the process represents, the effects
remain ambiguous. This is not least because the PRB has maintained
throughout that there is 'no mechanistic formula' to be followed in
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pay determination. The PRB has maintained a largely sympathetic
manner to nurses whilst broadly favouring arguments based on fairly
orthodox economic criteria, which have tended to centre on recruitment
and retention. The issues of low pay and equal pay have thus received
short shrift, despite their high significance in the history of
nursing pay determination and outcomes and Staff Side's equally
traditional argument that the failure to address these links directly
into nurse shortages. In countering the rationality of 'economic'
arguments and working to the government's agenda, it could be argued
that Staff Side have lost the moral force of their own agenda. An
important develo 1 nient in process has been in the 'ad hoc' issues and
the trends towards decentralisation, inherent in both clinical grading
and flexible pay supplements. It could be argued that the PRB has
played an ambiguous role in both facilitating and criticising these
moves. However, the ensuing debate has raised a number of potential
problems with the 'strategy' of decentralisation.
In sni1nary, the role of the PRB in tempering conflict and in
'balancing' the power of the Sides can be seen to be open to debate.
Inasmuch as a forum has been provided and the PRB is seen to
'sympathise' with a number of the Staff Side's arguments, the PRB
system may have channelled conflict to some extent. The pay process is
still, however, dependent on negotiations and decisions taking place
elsewhere and conflict may be driven down to lower levels especially
over 'underlying' issues. The cumulative effect of these issues, and
conflict over their resolution, has been to undermine the scope of the
PRE's remit. The wider reform of the NHS and the introduction of HS
Trusts threatens to exacerbate this effect by removing substantial
numbers of staff from the direct coverage of the PRB and reducing the
force of national pay determination. Interpreting the wider role of
the PRB process and the desirability of pay review, requires an
evaluation of material outcomes.
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QIAFI FIVE
EVAUJATING ThE PAY REVIEW PROCFSS
This chapter focuses on the material effects of the pay review process
in terms of pay outcomes and wage determination more generally. There
are significant methodological issues and problems involved in any
evaluation of wage determination and these apply with particular force
to the case of nurses and the PRB. Q-iapters Three, Four arid Five have
been organised around an analytical separation of context, process and
outcomes. The aim of this separation, namely to provide a more
detailed analysis than would be found in an historical narrative,
nonetheless introduces its own problems. It should be apparent that
context, process and outcomes are not independent of each other either
temporally or analytically. As an example of the temporal effect, a
single year's PRB would be influenced both by the historical and
current context, and experience gleaned from previous review processes
and historical outcomes. That year's PRB process will then influence
subsequent years.	 A flavour of this has been given in the last
chapter.
Equally, context, process and outcomes could be regarded as a single
and continuous flow, particularly if the emphasis is shifted from
macro outcomes to more local outcomes to take resource squeeze and
employment effects into account. As Beaumont has noted 'the
performance of public sector industrial relations tends to be
overwrielmingly seen in terms of wage outcomes' (1992:141). However,
wages may more appropriately be thought of as a significant, but not
the only important, aspect of the employment relationship. The last
chapter illustrated how non-pay issues, such as employment levels and
work intensity, grading, training and wider resource considerations,
enter into wage determination and are, in turn, affected by wage
outcomes.	 Many of these issues are also dealt with at lower levels
of aggregation.
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However, the macro approach chosen for this chapter offers certain
advantages in analytical scope and in the detail allowed. The analysis
is then deepened in subsequent chapters to explore non-pay and local
interlinkages.
EVAJJJATING PAY OUTCOMES
This section explores the ways in which pay outcomes might be
evaluated and the methodological and data problems raised by such an
exercise. The primary methodological issue pertains to what is to be
measured, how it is to be measured and with what it can be compared.
The disputed nature of all these points has been seen in the process
of the PRB and is exacerbated by lack of normative guidelines.
Moreover, any evaluation of the outcomes of the PRB must proceed in a
vacuum of knowledge of what would have happened in the absence of a
review body. Although some indications of historical trends in
nurses' pay were given in Chapter 2, extrapolation of such trends as a
point of comparison would be of only limited value. Further problems
relate to the increasing indeterminancy of the pay review process
itself with respect to outcomes, a point which is discussed throughout
this chapter.
These methodological problems are compounded by data deficiencies.
With the exception of aggregate paybill totals and payscales, no
information is published by the Health Departments on the actual
remuneration of nursing personnel. The other main source of data on
nurses' pay is the annual survey of earnings and hours conducted by
the Department of Employment; the New Earnings Survey (NES). It will
be seen that both these data sources are problematic.
The first part of this section reviews the evidence that can be
gleaned from the paybill and pay scale measures and the problematic
nature of this highly aggregated data. The second part of the section
focuses on the use of comparisons. A wide range of comparator measures
is reviewed including cost-of-living, average earnings, public and
private sector earnings, career structures and other occupations, and
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low pay indices. The varying levels of aggregation and use of
movements or levels in comparisons are evaluated for their strengths
and weaknesses, and specific problems with NES data are also examined.
PAYB ILL AND PAY SCALE MEASURES
The aggregate wages bill and pay scales are measures which are
frequently employed by the media and by academics in reviewing nurses'
pay. Following its deliberations, the PRB issues its recocrrnendations
for consideration by the Prime Minister. These recoainendations
comprise a listing of current and recomiiended salary scales, leads and
allowances and supplements. The PRB then estimates the increase in
the total paybill which would result from implementation of its
recomendations. These aspects of the PRB's reconrnendations tend to be
picked up by the media as 'headline' pay outcomes, and the paybill
increase is generally emphasised. For this reason, the paybill
increase is the most public and visible outcome of the PRB process.
However, it has increasingly become a deeply flawed measure.
Even in the early years of the PRB, this measure could be regarded as
an inadequate indicator of labour cost. It is firstly dependent on
the accurate provision of detailed manpower figures from the HDs. For
example, such figures in 1991 were still only provided for March 1990
- in other words, outdated by a year. Secondly, it is also dependent
on the difference between actual and forecast turnouts for employment
level and mix over the year to which reconinendations apply. In recent
years the measure has become even less determinate, both as a measure
of labour cost and as a measure of pay outcomes for individual nurses.
The clinical grading exercise in particular has introduced additional
elements of uncertainty. For example, the PRB noted in its fifth
report that:
The increases which individual clinical staff receive will depend
on the grades in which they are placed, and on whether they work
in the London area. The increases will vary considerably. Our
estimate of the increase in the total paybill, which would result
from implementation of our recoariendations, should not therefore
be regarded as giving any indication of the increases individuals
will get...Since assimilation of staff to the new clinical scales
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depends upon local decisions based on a process of examining
individual posts, it is impossible to predict with any certainty
the numbers who will be receiving each level of pay (1988:29).
Appeal results, any changes in which must be backdated to 1988, have
exacerbated this effect in every year following the exercise, as has
the introduction of flexible pay supplements, the cost of which has
not usually been included in the aggregate percentage figure.
Moreover, the cost of students undertaking Project 2000 courses,
senior nursing grades (now dealt with separately), employer's national
insurance and superannuation costs and agency staff are also usually
excluded. The last two cost categories were estimated for the first
time in the Ninth Report along with an estimate for flexible pay
supplements (1992:24), but this then rendered the Ninth Report paybiU.
incompatible with previous paybill estimates. The wider reforms have
meant the complete exclusion of health care assistants (HCAs) from the
PRB's remit, and staff in NHS Hospital Trusts may also potentially be
excluded, though the PRB currently estimates the wages bill with
Trusts in mind. These changes obviously increase the problems of
measurement.
The second main problem with the aggregate paybill measure concerns
the government's implementation and funding of recoarnendations and a
distinction must be clearly made here between the effects of such
decisions on implementation and on funding. Staging or delaying
awards produces a net saving for the NHS and a net 'cost' for nurses
in that they simply do not receive the full value of the award
recocffnended by the Pay Review Body in the year to which the
recomiendation pertains. In this respect, the PRB can no longer
consider the effect its award would have had on such issues as morale
or recruitment and retention. However, the practice of not fully
funding nursing pay awards above a previously Set allowance or of
requiring part of the additional funding to be met by cost
improvements prograrrines (CIPs) or income generation schemes (IGSs) has
had a far more insidious effect, which is explored in the next
chapter.
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TABLE 5.1 PRB PAY RECOftIENDATIONS, GOVERNrIENT IMPLFNEI{rATION
AND ACEUAL COST
1
	
2
	
3
	
4
	
5
Year
	
Estimated Distribution	 Full/
	
Estimated
paybill
	 (**)	 Staged actual cost %
increase °h
7.0
8.6
7.8
9.5
15.3
6.8
9.6
9.7
1984/5
1985/6
1986/7
1987/8
1988/9
1989/90
1990/1
1991/2
6.0 - 8.0 (q)
4.0 - 14.7 (q)
7.0 - 9.5 (e)
6.0 - 12.7 (q)
5.1 - 45.3 (*)
6.7 - 6.9 (e)
9.0 - 13.4 (u)
9.5 - 11.0 (u)
full
staged
delayed
full
staged
full
staged
staged
7.5
5.6
5.7
9.5
15.3 (*)
6.8
8.0
8.4
Notes:
(*) the 1988/9 pay award included an interim increase of 4% paid in
April 1988, and substantially higher, and variable, increases paid
later (back-dated to April 1988) following the introduction of the new
grading structure. The actual increase in paybill costs was
substantally higher than 15.3% because of unpredictable grading
decisions. In subsequent years, changes in grade distribution also
result in an under-estimation of actual costs. The final column
offers, therefore, only an indication of the anticipated impact of
staging or delaying awards.
(**) in the column surrinarising the distribution of pay awards:
(q) higher increases for qualified staff;
(u) higher increases for lower grades and unqualified staff;
(e) a relatively even distribution of pay increases.
SOURCES: Thornley & Winchester, ILO (1991/3) from IDS/I-iay Group,
Pay in the Public Sector (1991) and Review Body Reports
Table 5.1 suninarises the PRB reconinendations on nursing staff pay and
government response, and gives some estimates of cost saving made by
the government through its decisions on implementation. This is
mainly an aggregate analysis, although some indication is given in
column 3 of alterations to differentials. It can clearly be seen from
the table that, given its prior decisions on what can be afforded
through its expenditure plans, cash limits, and other financial and
administrative controls on health authorities, the government has
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usually attempted to reduce the paybill cost of implementing the
recornendations of the PRB.
In five of the eight years covered in Table 5.1, the government has
either delayed the implementation of the reconinendation by several
months (as in 1986/7) or, as it has done on four occasions,
implemented the award in two stages, with the second stage paid up to
nine months later. The 9th report reconinendations were also staged by
the government. The delay in paying all or part of the reconinended
award has predictably disappointed Staff Side but has also been
criticised by the PRB itself. In its third report, for example, tie
PRB coninented that:
the Government's decision has delayed a satisfactory outcome for
tie pay of nursing staff, midwives and health visitors and has
meant that the evidence available to us this year has provided no
basis for assessing tie impact of last year's reconrnendations on
recruitment, retention and morale (1986:1).
When implementing the PRB recorrrnendations the government estimates the
anticipated increase in paybill costs, often reaching different
conclusions from other parties' estimates. This then affects its
further decisions on whether to make additional funds available over
the allocation already made, in order to ceet these cost.s in fi^li r
in part. As noted on some occasions the government has specified which
proportion of the additional paybill cost should be met by HAs through
'efficiency savings' or Cost-Improvement Progranines.
For this reason the reconinended paybill increase - despite high
visibility and the publicity of media headlines - is an increasingly
inaccurate measure of pay outcomes. Although PRB recoemendations have
generally been higher than the Government's pay assuriptions, which are
usually based on lower allowances for inflation than calculations made
by other parties to the process, implementation and funding decisions
mean that government can then rein back on expenditure.
A good example of media emphasis on the above measure, and the less
aggregate measure of wage scales, is provided by The Guardian's
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coverage of the (1991) PRB outcomes (1.2.1991). Here it was reported
that the government accepted the main reconinendations of the eighth
report of the PRE in February 1991, and that pay rises of between 9.5%
arid 11% added to trie scales were to be implemented in two stages
(April and December 1991), with slightly higher percentage increases
for the lower grades. The revised pay scales were shown in the figures
reported in the manner of Table 5.2.
TABLE 5.2 PAY SCALES OF NURSES AND 1IDWIVES
Grade	 Oirrent Salary April 1991 December 1991 Increase
£s
Student	 5800 - 6750	 6325-7315 6440 - 7450 10.4 - 11.0
Grade A	 5950 - 7355	 6485-7955 6605 - 8100 10.1 - 11.0
Grade B	 7115 - 8115	 7705-8770 7845 - 8930 10.0 - 10.3
Grade C	 8115 - 9650	 8770-10375 8930 - 10570 9.5 - 10.0
Grade D	 9335 - 10700	 10045-11505 10230 - 11720 9.5 - 9.6
Grade E 10700 - 12390 	 11505-12320 11720 - 13570	 9.5
Grade F 11865 - 14545 	 12755-15635 12995 - 15920
	 9.5
Grade G 13995 - 16195	 15045-17410 15320 - 17735	 9.5
Grade H 15645 - 17860 	 16820-19200 17130 - 19565	 9.5
Grade I 17305 - 19600	 18605-21070 18955 - 21470	 9.5
SOURCE: The Guardian ( 1 February 1991).
This method of presentation emphasises the trend in proposed increases
rattier than the cash increases actually received by nurses over the
year and. As such it neglects the effect of staging and overstates
the cash increase in a given year. However, this qualification apart,
wages scales are possibly the least disputed measure of pay outcomes
on their own terms and do provide some indication of the basic pay
structure and any irrinediate changes in internal differentials.
Nonetheless, the scales exclude additions to basic pay and non-pay
benefits.
Additions to basic pay include unsocial hours and special duty
payments, arising from the need to provide a 24-hour, seven day a week
health service, and excess hours, or overtime payments, made where
extra off-duty time cannot be granted. Additional payments are also
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made to nurses working in care of the elderly, mental illness and
handicap, and nurses employed in London. As was seen in Chapter Four,
following negotiations between the Sides in the NMC, The PRB
recoainends changes in the value of leads and allowances.
TABLE 5.3 BREAKDOWN OF ESTIMATE]) 1991/92 PAYB]IL, GREAT BRITAIN
Cost £m	 % paybill
Basic Pay
Special Duty Payments
Over time
London allowance
Geriatric lead
Psychiatric lead
Secure unit allowance
On-call allowance
Standby allowance
Redundancy & maternity pay
Other non-pay related
Flexible pay pilot scheme
5,601
644
67
129
10
50
2
6
1
38
9
11
84.9
9.7
1.0
1.9
0.2
0.8
0.03
0.1
0.02
0.6
0.1
0.2
SOURCE: Adapted from PRB, 1992:24, Appendix D.
As can be seen in Table 5.3, allowances and benefits comprise just
over 157 of the total nursing paybill. This aggregate figure has
increased only marginally over recent years, and the relative
importance of overtime has declined within the overall figure.
However, allowances are a very important part of the remuneration
package for groups of lower paid staff in some areas of nursing; for
example, unpublished figures supplied by the Department of Health show
estimates that non-basic pay forms 20% of grade A average earnings,
15% of grade D, 10% of grade G and 5% of grade I. Overtime and shift
payments in particular, and psychiatric lead allowances in the two
lowest grades, form an important part of overall pay in the lower
grades in the hierarchy. These payments are even more important for
part-time staff. The data illustrates that the lowest paid nursing
staff have not seen any great proportionate increase in the tranche of
pay which benefits them most directly, and suggest that these elements
should also be considered when assessing nursing pay outcomes.
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The extension of non-pay benefits would make a focus on basic pay
scales and the use of external pay comparisons inherently more
problematic. Non-pay or social benefits provided by the NI-IS are not
particularly generous in comparison with other public and private
sector employers, and the NHS offers few examples of payments
substantially above the statutory minima for maternity, sickness, and
redundancy. However, the extension of non-pay benefits, such as
assistance with accorrinodation, provision of creches, career-breaks and
'keep in touch' schemes, flexible working patterns, and staff
development opportunities, has been viewed as an important means of
enhancing equal opportunities and thereby improving the recruitment
and retention of nursing staff, and may become more significant in the
future. As Chapter Four demonstrates, there is some dispute between
the Sides over the extent and pace of change in this area.
These reservations apart, further problems arise when illustrative
data is drawn from nursing pay scales without considering the
distribution of staff across the pay scale. In fieldwork interviews
some managers mentioned that pay adequacy could be demonstrated by the
fact that nurses can now earn some £20,000 a year. The force of this
argument lies in the idea that this is a realistic ambition for a
nurse and that 'sufficient' numbers of nurses are to be found at the
upper end of the spine as to constitute a 'norm' rather than an
exception. In this respect numbers in each grade and the freedom of
movement up the clinical grade spine become important indicators.
At this point however data delays and deficiencies become very
apparent. The following information has been compiled from a number
of official sources. The distribution of nursing staff across the
main grading structure is in fact very uneven as can be seen from
Table 5.4. Five grades, comprised of student nurses and grades A, D,
E and G, contain around 76% of all nursing staff. Some 72% of staff
are in grade E and below and the majority of staff are actually to be
found in grade D or below (including students) with basic pay ranging
from £6440 to £11720 (Dec 1991 figures). The process of clinical
grading is still continuing, but this data is at least indicative and
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serves to put the much-cited £20,000 in context. It includes some of
the increases accruing toriurses from successful. appeals, particularly
in grades B, D, E and G.
TABLE 5.4	 DISTRIBUTION OF NURSING STAFF BY GRADE
whole-time equivalents in 1990
Pay grade	 Number	 Percentages
Senior nurse 8 +
Grade I
Grade [-I
Grade G
Grade F
Grade E
Grade D
Grade C
Grade B
Grade A
Student Nurse
Pupil Nurse
Teaching staff
Post-registration student
Other nursing staff
2,800
6,600
10,800
64,200
31,300
83,900
73,300
22,300
21,600
92,000
55,100
2,700
6,900
9,800
2,200
0.6
1.4
2.2
13.2
6.4
17.3
15.1
4.6
4.5
19.0
11.3
0.5
1.4
2.0
0.5
0URCE: Pay Review Body (1992:23)
Unpublished data from the DoH also suggested that for a comparable
period at least halt of all nursing staff were on the top of their
scale, with the exception of 1st level registered nurses on grade D
where 26% were at the top. The percentage of staff at the bottoa of
each pay grade was more variable, ranging from 13% at the lower end of
the hierarchy, 42% of 1st level registered nurses on grade D, and
lower than 6% for grades F and above. These figures reveal a certain
grade 'stickiness' and suggest that movements from grade to grade do
not take place in any 'free flow'. There are, in fact, a number of
important reasons for restrictions on freedom of movement up the
clinical scales. These include interpretation of grading criteria,
availability of training, requisite entry qualifications, availability
of promotional posts, and funding constraints at local and national
level.
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Bearing the above problems in mind, pay scales are nonetheless useful
for exploring changes in differentials. Although marginal adjustments
in differentials towards unqualified staff were made in the seventh
and eigtith PRB recorrnendations, these went against the main trend of
the 1980s as could be seen in Table 5.1. On the whole, the Pay Review
Body has recocmiended and presided over a general widening of
differentials internal to nursing. The introduction of Clinical
Grading has made it harder to compare like with like, particularly for
scale maxima. However, some comparisons are possible. For instance,
a nursing auxiliary aged over 18 can be compared with a relatively
newly qualified registered nurse (grade D) for the PRB period. Table
5.5 does this and shows a clear increase in differentials,
particularly between Staff Nurses and the lowest paid auxiliaries,
despite the emphasis in two of the later reports on improving the
position of the low paid. This widening of differentials has been
one of the most notable outcomes of the pay review process.
TABLE 5.5 DIFFERTIALS OVER TINE, GRADES A AND D
Minima
1984 Nursing Auxiliary 3530 Staff Nurse 4998
1992 Nursing Auxiliary 7000 Staff Nurse 10820
Maxima
1984 Nursing Auxiliary 4512 Staff Nurse 6094
1992 Nursing Auxiliary 8570 Staff Nurse 12400
Differential 427.
Differential 557.
Differential 357.
Differential 45%
SOURCE: Calculated from Appendix A in PRB Reports 1 and 9.
USE OF COMPARISONS
Although they are inherently problematic, comparisons between
increases in or levels of paybill, basic pay and average earnings, and
of pay movements over time, are the most coninonly used forms of
indicator on nurses' pay. Trade union and management side negotiators
naturally select the particular comparators, for the particular time
periods that best suit their bargaining arguments, and choice of
comparators varies from year to year according to internal and
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external wage settlements and outcomes. Outside of the negotiation or
pay review process comentators may seek to offer neutral
interpretations, but are again confronted with many of the same
problems found in assessing pay bill and pay scale measures, as well
as some additional problems created by the exercise of comparisons.
Comparisons can be made at an aggregate or disaggregate level and
emphasise either increases or levels. Problams involved with the use
of the highly aggregate measures of the pay bill were emphasised in
the previous section, as were problems with the less aggregated data
on pay scales. The more highly aggregated measures of paybill and of
comparators are usually put forward by Management Side. However, these
measures are sensitive to the choice of base date and they have thus
occasionally been used by Staff Side where a convincing argument can
be made. NES data can also be problematic. This data is also fairly
aggregated, and because the survey takes place at the beginning of
April, the published results often exclude the effects of staging.
Comparisons based on increases in rather than levels of pay tend to
emphasise settlements on an annual basis, usually at a highly
aggregate level. Despite an apparent 'historical' flavour these tend
to take no account of nurses' absolute position vis a vis other groups
of workers in the wage hierarchy over the longer period, or of any
specific and disaggregate factors pertaining to nurses. At the same
time, however, the choice of degree of disaggregation and of
comparators for the evaluation of pay levels can also appear
subjective and contentious. Hence the different types of comparisons
made have particular strengths and weaknesses, which can be evaluated
through a review of evidence on nurses' pay.
Cost-of-living Comparisons
In most years of the PRE the paybill increase has been above the RPI,
even allowing for the effects of staging, and with the strong effect
of clinical grading has averaged out as a fairly unambiguous increase
in real pay. However, because of problems with the paybill measure,
the true extent to which real pay has increased is considerably more
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TABLE 5.6 PAY INCREASES AND fl-1E RPI
iIIJRSING AND MIDWIFERY STAFF: M0VE1ENTS IN PAY RATES 1974-1991 (a)
Pay Round Year Percentage	 Percentage Percentage
	 Percentage
(1 August to
	 Increase in Change In
	 Increase in	 Position
31 July)	 Cash Pay (b) RPI (July) in Real pay (c) 1973/74=100
1974-75
1975-76
1976-77
1977-78
1978-79
CUMUlATIVE 74-79
1979-80 21.0) (f)
14.0)
1980-81
1981-82
1982-83
1983-84
1984-85
1985-86
1986-87
1987-88
1988-89
1989-90
1990-91
	20	 (d)	 26.3
	
8	 12.9
	
5	 17.6
	10	 7.8
	
10	 15.6
64.7	 108.8 (e)
37.9	 16.9
6	 10.9
8.7
12.3 (g)	 4.2
7.5	 4.5
8.6 (h)	 6.9
7.8
	
2.4
9.5	 4.4
17.9	 4.8
6.8
	
8.2
9.6 (i)	 9.8
9.7 (j)	 5.5
- 5.0
- 4.3
- 10.7
+ 2.0
- 4.8
- 21.1
+ 18.0
- 4.4
- 0.9
+ 2.9
+ 1.6
+ 5.3
+ 4.9
^ 12.5
- 1.3
- 0.2
+ 4.0
95.0
90.9
81.2
82.8
78.8
93.0
88.9
88.1
90.7
92.1
97.0
101.8
114.5
113.0
112.8
117.3
CUMULATIVE 79-91 242.5	 130.3	 + 48.7
CUMULATIVE 83-91 108.6	 56.9	 + 33.0
Notes:
(a)Figures reflect the full cost of the appropriate award, not
changes in average earnings
(b) Percentage cash increase reflects full year effect of increase
agreed within the pay round year (1 August to 31 July)
(c) Percentage real increase reflects the percentage cash increase
for the pay round year deflated by the increase in the RPI
throughout the pay round year, that is in the 12 months to July
(d)Excludes pay settlements in Apr 74 =11% & May 74 (Halsbury)=30%
(e) The percentage change in the RPI is that from July of the base
year to July of the latest year
(f)Ciiriulative effect of 2-stage Clegg awards paid 1 Aug 79 & 1 Apr 80
(g) Two-year award paid wholly in 1982-83 pay round year
(h) Payment straddled 2 pay rounds ( 570 from April 85 and 2.5% from Feb
86) but is expressed as 8.6%. The alternative would have been to
count the second stage as part of the 85-86 pay round year
(i)Staged award; 7% paid from 1 April 90, balance from 1 Jan 91
(j)Staged award; 7.5% paid from 1 April 91, remainder from 1 Dec. 91
SOURCE: Based on Management Side Evidence, 1991:15
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Index
110
100
90
80
April 1975 = 100
contentious than Management Side, for example, have sometimes
suggested, as is the significance of such an increase. Different
groups of nursing staff have fared differently with respect to real
pay increases. thapter Four noted that cost-oE-lisring measures are
relatively meaningless unless some information on historical or
comparative contexts is also included. Staff Side have also argued
that the RPI is not suitable for some groups of staff, particularly
'low paid' for whom a low pay price index might be more appropriate.
An example of the different uses made of comparisons employing the RPI
can be seen in Table 5.6 and Figures 5.1 and 5.2. Table 5.6 was
included in Management Side Evidence and has appeared in previous
years (MS E, 1991:15-16). The notes to the Table illustrate the
contentious nature of the exercise, particularly with respect to
the choice of boundaries for time series. For example, the Halsb.iry
award is excluded from the earlier period and the Clegg award is
included in the later period. There is thus a tendency to 'claim'
favourable data for particular political administrations and pick a
low starting point.
FIGURE 5.1 REAL WAGES FOR. NURSING AUX]1IARLES (scALE MINIMUM)
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SOURCE: Staff Side Evidence 1991:4.6
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Triis kind of comparison also tends to neglect the economic and
political context in which wage settlements occur. In particular it
could be argued that it is easier to award wage settlements in excess
of the RH when inflation is 'low'. The strong effect of clinical
grading is also clearly visible.
Figures 5.1 arid 5.2 were included in Staff Side Evidence (Charts 4.6
and 4.76, 1991) and use pay scale minima and maxima for nursing
auxiliaries to show that real wages for this group of staff have
fallen below their 1975 level (which includes the Halsixiry award) for
nearly all of the period to the present, only just catching up in
1991.
FIGURE 5.2 REAL '1AGES FOR NURSING AUXILIARIES (scALE MAxThtUI)
April 1975 = 100
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Comparisons against Average Earnings
The average earnings index gives a rather better indication of
relative increases in pay in that the AEI is directly related to going
settlements elsewhere. Figure 5.3 illustrates 'nursing staff earnings
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increases since 1983 compared with increases in the underlying AEI',
and is notable for being the only graph to be included by the N&LM PRB
in any of their reports (see PRB,1991:42), suggesting that the AEI may
be carry more Liportance in pay review than is evident from the
process. The graph, unfortunately, did not carry any explanatory
notes to say how nursing staff earnings or the underlying AEI had been
calculated for this exercise.
FIGURE 5.3 NURSING STAFF EARNINGS INCREASES COMPARED WIIH AEI
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SOURCE: PRB Report, 1991:42
Once again the measure is a contentious one. Staff Side have noted
that the AEI used for this graph includes manual as well as white
collar earnings increases. As 'non-manual earnings have been
increasing more rapidly than manual earnings for a decade' triey
suggest that this is 'the wrong index to use for nursing staff
providing patient c-are' and that 'closer comparisons with otr
prfessiona1 and white collar employees' are to be preferred (1991:5).
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It is also the case more generally that comparisons with highly
aggregated measures such as average earnings are bound to include
depressed wages elsewhere in the economy and may therefore reinforce
disadvantage, a point noted in interviews with trade union officials,
who stressed the importance of this factor for women. However, taking
it on its own merits, the strong uplift of clinical grading can again
be noted as can the fact that before 1988 'nurses' were not doing very
well against the economy-wide 'going rate'. Nursing staff pay
increases have subsequently fallen behind again. The AEI was made a
primary focus in Staff Side Evidence for 1993, where it was argued
that pay increases had fallen behind AEI increases since 1988
(1992:4).
Other Comparisons of Increases
Finally, comparisons of increases can also be made within nursing,
with other NHS staff, and against other groups in the public and
private sector. The widening of differentials has already been noted,
but this can also be demonstrated using the measures of comparative
increases or comparative levels. A widening of relativities between
nursing and other groups in the NHS has occurred and this has been
used by Management Side to show that review body groups in the NHS
have performed better than non-review body groups, and better than
most other groups in the public sector (1991:13). Using such
measures, Management Side have argued that the average pay settlements
for nursing staff 'have tended to be higher than those elsewhere'
(ibid). Such measures are widely used in academic coarnentaries (see,
for example, Bailey & Trinder, 1989; Harrison et al 1990:98), some of
which suffer from the problems identified with the use of the paybill
increase or basic pay. Studies employing NES earnings data are less
problematic (see NIESR, and Brown & Rowthorn, 1990:5-7), although, as
noted, the NES creates different problems for the evaluation of
nursing pay.
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Aggregate Comparisons of Levels
Comparative measures can also employ comparisons which stress 'levels'
of pay rather than 'increases' in pay and these can be quite useful
measures both at an aggregate and disaggregate level. In recent
evidence, Management Side have made only one comparison using pay
levels rather than pay increases. For the 1991 and 1992 reviews they
expressed average pay for Grade E as a percentage of pay for non-
manual employees in the public and private sectors. The exercise for
1992 is reproduced as Table 5.7.
TABLE 5.7 AVERAGE GROSS WEEKLY EARNINGS (FULL-TIME STAFF)
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
(a)	 (b)
GRADE E Earnings (E): 134.3 141.5 159.7 174.8 218.2 234.9 275.0
NON MANUAL E1PLOYEES (c):
PUBLIC SEC]DR
Earnings ()
	 172.0 181.4 196.5 208.8 229.0 251.6 274.2
Average Grade E
pay as a percentage 78.1 78.0 81.3 83.7 95.3 93.4 100.3
PRIVATE SECIX)R
Earnings ()
Average Grade E
pay as a percentage
ALL SECIDRS
Earnings ()
Average Grade E
pay as a percentage
172.3 187.0 203.9 222.8 247.6 272.3 300.2
77.9	 75.7	 78.3	 78.4	 88.1	 86.3	 91.7
172.2 184.6 200.9 217.4 240.7 24.9 291.2
78.0	 76.6	 79.5	 80.4	 90.7	 88.7	 94.4
Notes:
(a)Before implementation of the clinical grading structure in April
1988, grade E did not exist. The 1984-87 figures therefore refer
to the earnings of staff nurses
(b)Estimated earnings of staff in post, based on returns from
Regional Health Authorities and SHAs (Source: DU-Earnings Related
Base of Data).
(c.) Earnings are for employees on adult rates of pay and whose pay was
not affected by absence (Source: DE New Earnings Survey)
SOURcE: Based on Managcnent Side Evidence, 1991, 1992:Table A4
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FIGURE 5.4 CAREER SALARY PROGRESSION
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It can be seen that this shows Grade E pay pulling up over the period
against public sector, private sector and all sector earnings,
although with the sole exception of the public sector, nurses can be
seen to lie below their comparators so that this is perhaps a strange
choice for Nianagement Side. There are several points to note about
the method employed here. Firstly, the comparison uses Earnings
Related Base of Data (ERBOD) figures against NES figures and this
introduces questions of data compatibility. Secondly, as was seen in
the previous section, only a relatively small percentage of nursing
staff are on grade E, with the majority earning less. In this
respect, even though grade E may appear to be a mid-point on the
clinical grading scale it does not necessarily approximate the
majority experience of nursing staff. In addition, the highly
aggregate comparator groups chosen introduce similar problems as those
for the AEI.
Occupational Comparisons
It is coimion practice to compare specific occupations or groups of
staff with groups or grades of nurses in the evaluation of relative
-*- Nure (Proj. 2000)
-9- Nuxe (Traditional)
- police
—+-- Social Workere
-3E-- Finance Staff (mm)
I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I	 I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 5 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Year of Service (mci training)
SOURGE: Staff Side Evidence, 1992:40
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pay levels and career expectations. For example, in their evidence to
tte 1991 Pay Review Body, the Staff Side chose to link basic pay and
length of service in their comparison,between nurses, police and fire
service staff. A particularly interesting exercise was conducted for
the 1993 pay review exercise (Staff Side Evidence, 1992:39-40). Here
Staff Side compared career salary progressions of nurses with those
for police, social workers and finance staff ('typical bank nployee')
and then presented a form of discounted cash flow analysis for these
different groups. The results are shown in Figures 5.4 and 5.5. This
is an implict form of comparing levels of pay. The choice of
comparator group at this disaggregate level is of obvious
significance, especially with respect to gender.
FIGURE 5.5 CAREER SALARY PROGRESSION
Earnings over 15 years (LK)
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Total Earnings	 Net Present Value
SOURCE: Staff Side Evidence, 1992:40
A more explicit form of comparing occupational levels of pay, by
expressing pay as a direct percentage of comparator pay, can also be
undertaken. Calculations from NES data show that, at the end of the
1980s, qualified nurses (below administrator level) earned
approximately one third of doctors' pay and slightly less than
ambulancemen. A possibly more appropriate comparison, based on Length
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of training and professional status, can be made with teachers.
Qualified nurses earned approximately 80% of female primary teachers'
pay, 75% of female secondary teachers' pay, and approximately 10% less
in both cases, if the comparison is made with male teachers. Nurses,
of course, are more likely to work unsocial hours than teachers.
However, the choice of comparator is again contentious and
historically changeable. Teaching also tends to be a gender
segregated occupation.
In Evidence for the 1992 review, Staff Side conducted one of their
most detailed comparisons of pay levels so far (1991:Section 3), with
the explicit intention of substituting their own exercise for the
long-awaited and unforthcoming comparability exercise promised by the
PRB after clinical grading. It again suffers problems from the
combination of ERI3OD and NES figures and choice of comparators, but
stands as one of the most carefully argued comparisons in the history
of the PRB, and uses a form of job content evaluation. The graphs
show nursing pay in each grade as lower than comparators (even
including shift and bonus pay). Staff Side here made what some might
regard as a very modest claim for each group with a detailed and
compelling argument but the PRB did not appear to attach particular
significance to this exercise in its reconinendations. Staff Side have
in recent years also measured Grade A earnings against Local
government care assistants showing the former to be lower. This has
great ramifications for the developing linkage between NVQs across the
NHS and social services.
Low Pay Levels, Equal Pay and Differentials
The use of comparative levels is particularly appropriate for
establishing the extent of low pay in nursing. Staff Side for many
years have produced graphs comparing nurses' basic weekly pay rates
(maxima and minima) with the Council of Europe decency threshold,
indicating that auxiliaries were below the threshold on both
calculations, and enrolled nurses on Scale C, on one of them (SSEv
1990:21). For 1992, Staff Side used ERBOD data to show that over 62%
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of nursing staff in Grades A, B and C, and nearly 21% of the total
nursing workforce, still earn less than the Council of Europe Decency
Threshold (1991,Section 4:33). Staff Side have also highlighted the
particular problems of part-time staff on lower grades (ibid:36). The
Low Pay Unit recently published data showing that 62% of part-time
auxiliaries, and 12% of enrolled nurses, were paid below its Low Pay
Threshold (66% median adult male earnings) although these findings
compared relatively well with other occupations in which female part-
timers are concentrated (Low Pay Unit, 1991:14).
NES data, albeit problematic, permits some estimate to be made of
progress on low pay during the Pay Review Body period. In 1983, the
year before the PRB was in full operation, between 25% and 35% of
full-time qualified female nurse and midwives, and between 46% and 66%
of nursing auxiliaries, were Low-paid under the Council of Europe
decency threshold definition (less than 68% of full-time mean
earnings). By 1992, between 17% and 25% of qualified female nurses
and midwives, and 65% to 88% of nursing auxiliaries were low-paid
under tnis definition. It is thus likely that qualified nurses have
improved their position, although NES data do not allow a more precise
measurement of the extent of improvement. However, it may clearly be
seen that unqualified nurses have seen little or no improvement and
may actually have seen a deterioration in their position.
It was noted earlier that differentials by qualification have
increased over the PRB period and this change can also be viewed
against NES data on average earnings and dispersion of earnings. In
1983, the differential between qualified nurses (registered and
enrolled) and nursing auxiliaries was some 18%. By 1992, this
differential had widened to 37%, again suggesting that qualified
nurses have fared better than unqualified nurses over the PRB period.
The widening of differentials can also be viewed against the economy-
wide dispersion of earnings and changes in it. Whilst there has been
little change in the number of full-time adult employees earning less
than the full-time mean between 1983 and 1992 (around 60%), in 1983
less than 25% were low-paid under the Council of Europe definition
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whereas in 1992 more than 28% were low-paid. Against the cut-off
point for the lowest-paid quarter of employees, qualified nurses
earned some 118% in 1983 and had improved their position to some 153%
in 1992. By contrast, nursing auxiliaries earned 96% in both years
and had therefore not improved their position amongst the lowest-paid
in the economy.
Judged against the full-time mean for economy-wide earnings a rather
interesting picture emerges. The 'cut off point' for the lowest 25%
of full-time adult employees as a percentage of average earnings was
70% in 1983 and had deteriorated to only 63% in 1992, fully consistent
with the view that the lowest-paid in society have fared very badly in
the 1980s. Consistent with this picture, nursing auxiliaries have
seen their average earnings as a percentage of the economy-wide full-
time mean deteriorate from 68% in 1983 to 61% in 1992. By contrast,
qualified nurses have seen their average earnings improve from 83% of
the economy-wide full-time mean to 96%, although it may be noted that
such nurses still earn less than the mean which is already depressed
by the inclusion of women in its calculation.
In Table 5.8 it can be seen that the average gross weekly earnings of
nursing staff by gender varies despite equal pay legislation. The
figures partly reflect what appears to be increased availability of
paid overtime for male nursing staff and partly are a sign of vertical
segregation and an apparent lack of opportunities (see also EDC,
1992:3-4). It may be seen that there has been some improvement since
1983. However, the differentials may have been widening again in the
early 1990s (NES data is, unfortunately, inconsistent across time in
the categories of staff included).
TABLE 5.8 GENDER DIFFERENCES IN AVERAGE EARNINGS
1983 1990 1992
Differential Nurse Administrators and Executives 14% 12% n.a.
(male/feinale):Registered and Enrolled Nurses
	 15%	 6% 8.5%
Nursing Auxiliaries 	 n.a. n.a. 15%
Source: NES, 1983, 1990, 1992
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Comparisons Showing Increases and Levels Simultaneously
With respect to external comparisons, Figures 5.6 and 5.7 have been
compiled from NES data and are perhaps the best available economy-wide
indicators for nurses in terms of locating their pay historically in
FIGURE 5.6 QUALIFIED FALE NURSES' RELATIVE PAY AS A PCTAGE
OF COMPARATORS, 1980-1990
tc	 ¶.	 '4.
SOURCE: Compiled from NES data, various years.
the wage hierarchy and in evaluating gender inequalities and
differential treatment according to qualified and unqualified status
[ i ] . Figure 5.6 tracks the level and movement of female qualified
nursing staff pay against those of four economy-wide comparators over
the last decade. Figure 5.7 does the same for female unqualified
nursing staff. The graphs indicate clearly the changes in relative pay
of qualified and unqualifed nurses, and the relationship between pay
levels and movements for both groups against those of comparator
groups. En the case of qualified staff, the 'high points' result from
ttie pay award of the Clegg Comparability Coiinission in January 1980
[iii The NES data used in Figures 5.6 and 5.7 have been 'smoothed' to
reflect increases broadly in the year in which they occurred. As this
cannot be done for other groups, the figures tend to overstate nurses'
pay. NES data conversely tends to understate qualified nurses' pay.
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and the award linked to the clinical grading review of 1988. over the
whole decade, ttiey have made little real advance from their position
of around 657 of male non-manual earnings, and have slipped from the
1980 position to approximately 1057 of female non-manual earnings. The
gap between qualified nurses pay and that of male manual workers, and
all, occupations has been closing, although their pay is still below
that of both groups. This is, of course, as much an illustration of
the slippage in the relative pay position of manual workers through
the 1980's as it is of the movement in nurses' pay. In the case of
unqualified nurses (Figure 5.7), there has been a uniform decline from
the position in 1980 against all four comparator groups. In sharp
contrast to the experience of qualified nurses, there appears to have
been no 'clinical grading' uplift.
FIGURE 5.7 UNQUALIFIED FE14ALE NURSES' RATIVE PAY AS A PCI'AGE
OF COMPARATORS, 1980-1990
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SOURCE: Compiled from TES data, various years
Taken together, trie graphs clearly show the effects of horizontal
segregation and widening differentials on nurses' pay. It can also be
noted that nurses' relative pay position against most of these
comparators still had not reacred the Hals1iry level at the time of
the Clegg awards and that nurses in the late 1980s were only beginning
to recapture the relative position they held after the £{alsbury
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reconinendations in 1974, since which time they have experienced
furttier slippage.
Public Service Pay Relative to Private Sector Earnings
A final point of comparison for nurses pay pertains to a broader
argument on influences in wage determination. Figure 5.8 shows the
relativity between public services pay and private sector earnings.
If this graph is compared with Figure 5.6, above, it can be seen that
peak points in nursing pay coincide broadly with peaks in public
sector pay on electoral cusps. The evidence thus suggests that the
impact of the PRB has not yet avoided the 'fall-behind' and 'catch-up'
periods associated with electoral cycles, although very different
reasons have been given in the pay review process for nursing staff
pay uplifts.
FIGURE 5.3 PUBLIC SERVICES PAY AS A PERCTAGE OF PRIVATE SECTOR
EARNINGS
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CONCLUSIONS ON PAY OUTCOMES AND THE REVIEW PROCESS
As Buchan has succinctly noted 'analysis of pay trends is usually an
inexact science, and often a partisan exercise' (1992:10). In
reviewing pay outcomes trie previous section has shown that different
methodological approaches and measurnents have different strengths
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and weaknesses and has also given a flavour of some of the arguments
made by the Sides and the PRB for pay outcomes from the review
process. In particular, it has been stressed that the total paybill
is an increasingly flawed measure by which to evaluate both nursing
pay outcomes and nursing labour costs. The continuing force of
earnings comparisons for evaluating pay outcomes is, however, evident
from the discussion.
Assessment of the performance of nursing pay over the period of the
Pay Review Body remains contentious in terms of the methodology and
data empioyed and the level of aggregation. The study conducted here
suggests that some broad conclusions can nonetheless be reached on the
main pay outcomes. Despite a relative decline in aggregate public
sector pay against the rest of the economy throughout much of the last
decade, nurses (and police) have generally fared better than other
public sector employees, and than the public sector as a whole (Brown
& Walsh, 1991:55, Bailey and Trinder, 1989). Pay review arrangements
have also generally appeared more beneficial to nurses than have
collective bargaining arrangements for other groups of health service
workers; for example, Harrison et al show widening differentials in
salary scale maxima for selected NHS staff groups, and a relatively
favoured position for qualified nursing staff (1990:98).
Within nursing one of the most striking outcomes over the pay review
period has been the widening in differentials and the divergent
experiences of qualified and unqualified nursing staff. Qualified
nursing staff have seen real pay increases for most of the period (see
also Buchan, Nursing Standard, May 20 1989) and for a brief period
with the clinical grading review moved ahead of increases in the AEI.
However, qualified nurses have made few gains in terms of their
position in the national wage hierarchy, particularly against their
closest male comparators, although they have improved their position
against male manual workers and some public sector workers, groups
which in general have fared badly through the 1980s. Comparisons of
pay 'levels' also show that nurses still earn less than many seemingly
'appropriate' comparators.
	 Substantial pockets of low pay remain,
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particularly for ENs and part-time staff. In surrmary, t1-e data with
respect to qualified nurses 'does not reveal any massive pay uplift
engineered by the Review Body' (Buchan, Nursing Standard May 20 1989),
and suggests a number of continuirg, probletus. By coctttast,
unqualified nurses have fared badly against the majority of
comparators during this period, with real income losses, the
persistence of low pay, and poor results overall in the clinical
grading exercise. The most striking outcome during this period has
undoubtedly been the extent to which both groups have shared the
continuation of gender inequalities in levels of pay, within nursing
and the NHS, and against most aggregate and less aggregate external
male comparators, although unqualified nursing staff have fared
disproportionately badly. In this respect, nurses as an
overwheLningly female and segregated workforce have made few gains and
suffered some losses.
The structure, process and outcomes of the Nurses' and Midwives' Pay
Review Body comprise a complex set of relationships and expectations.
Part of the strength of the PRB system lies in the fluidity of
interpretation that can be applied to outcomes and their underlying
causes. It is possible to distinguish at Zeast tcu placisible
interpretive frameworks. On the one hand, it could be argued that
there is a divergence between the apparent priorities of the review
'process' and actual pay outcomes. In Chapter Four, the pay review
process was seen to be heavily dominated by the recruitment and
retention criterion, with very little debate on cost of living,
average earnings or differentials, which might have been considered
more traditional priorities amongst wage determination criteria. By
contrast, and in the light of the history of nursing pay and pay
determination, the most remarkable aspect of pay outcomes is perhaps
that they are unremarkable: widening differentials, while the PRB
appears to make recocrinendations which are skewed in a hierarchical
direction; pitched broadly, for qualified nurses, at rather less than
AEI increases and rather more than inflation, thus showing the
continuing importance of broad measures of comparability; effecting
little change in historical inequalities in gender or in substantial
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areas of low pay; and with clinical grading providing a temporary
uplift, rather like a review within a review. Against the electoral
cycle in public services pay more generally, and for nurses more
specifically, Halsbury remains a large peak, while Clegg and clinical
grading constitute smaller peaks, with the establishment of the PRB
itself something of a blip. Fall-behind and catch-up periods have not
disappeared, although it could be claimed that they have been smoothed
out by the PRB.
Hence, over the period of the PRB nurses' pay outcomes reveal a broad
picture which reflects and, by weight of numbers, reinforces wider
trends in the economy: real increases in average pay for many,
widening differentials in income, concomitant increases in low pay and
ever-present gender inequalities in pay. In all, Barbara Wootton's
observations in 1955, on the relative conservatism and rigidity of the
wage hierarchy, do not seem altogether redundant if applied in the
early 1990s to nurses.
On the other hand, it is possible to paint an altogether different
picture. In this second interpretation of events, there is a mismatch
between intentions and outcomes in pay review. The PRB first adjusted
differentials to match the initially divergent needs of recruitment
and retention. As shortages of unqualified staff appeared,
differentials were re-adjusted. If shortages appear to have persisted,
despite the recession and adjusted establishment figures, then this
reflects in part the effects of government policy towards the
implementation of the PRB recocmiiendations. The PRB itself has issued
annual warnings that this would affect outcomes. Similarly,
'interference' has dampened the effects of pay uplift recorrinendations,
designed to produce consistency arid reduce shortages through provision
of a 'fair' going rate for nursing staff.
From the perspective of a pluralist reading of the role of the state,
the absence of significant uplifts in pay is consistent with 'equity'
for the taxpayer, although the PRB has not allowed the government's
stress on 'ability to pay' to cloud its own judgement. As noted on
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several occasions by the PRB, it is not for the PRB to concern itself
with wider questions of low pay in the economy (or, presumably,
questions of equality for women). In this context, clinical grading
was not an 'electoral' blip - or a review within a review - but a
serious attempt to reward nurses fairly for the job they do while
improving the record on recruitment and retention, negotiated outside
the PRB, but with subsequent recorrrnendations on the pay rates to be
applied. In this view, the PRB has done as well as it could in the
delicate task of balancing the equitable demands of staff and
taxpayer. This picture might be fairly consistent with the system as
described by one of its, long-standing, members:
The pay review bodies have been established to exercise
judgemerit, in order to determine what shall be the pay levels of
groups of workers who find themselves in rather particular market
circumstances. What they must do is exercise that judgement
fairly, taking into account what all the interested parties draw
to their attention but avoiding any slavish acceptance of any one
view or argument. They are not in the business of doing simple
sums or of applying simple formulae and their conclusions must
inevitably be reached as an outcome of long debate and discussion
(Thoniason, 1985)
Through this application of judicial wisdom and fairness, the
Pilkington priority of maintaining industrial peace can be satisfied.
From this perspective, the evidence clearly shows that the PRB has
been successful in reducing conflict over pay. Technically speaking,
its recomendations are not binding, yet the government has generally
accepted them and since the FRB has been in operation there has been
no national industrial action over pay by nursing staff.
In recent years this perspective on the pay review process has
received some support from Staff Side, particularly since the 1992
General Election and the increasing potential for a large-scale shift
to local wage determination with the majority of hospitals scheduled
to become Trusts by 1994. It is now an established part of the
'process' itself that Staff Side should reaffirm their cocirnitment to
the PRB in Evidence. Evidence for 1993 sumarises their formal view
that:
-177-
After the first ten years, we continue to view the Review Body as
an appropriate and fair means of determining the pay of nursing,
midwifery and health visiting staff, and regard its continuation
as essential if the pay position of nursing staff is not to be
undermined (September 1992:3).
The prospects - and now reality - of a public sector pay freeze, and
the experience of a growing incidence of hospital closures and
redundancies, procnpted a Briefing from the trade unions (1992, kindly
provided by COHSE) in which it was argued that the PRB had, 'by any
criteria, whether of management, staff or patients...been a success'.
This Briefing went on to suggest that 'unlike negotiations elsewhere
in the public sector, it is not cash limited, cannot be manipulated by
either side and attempts to resolve the interests of the Department,
staff organisations, managers and the Treasury in a rational way'.
Going further, the Briefing suggested that the PRB has indeed shown
itself 'willing to respond to argiinents on low py• Moreover despite
continuing problems with nursing pay:
compared to the previous pattern of stop go in which periods of
decline led to disputes followed by catching up exercises through
ccxrrnissions of inquiry it is a major advance.
The Briefing also argued that the Review Body has value in providing a
national rate for the job as demonstrated by the experience of nurses
in self-governing trusts (SGTs), the majority of which have preferred
to follow PRB rates, and the private sector which also uses NHS rates
as a benchmark. The PRB has benefited managers by obviating the need
for annual pay campaigns and the threat of disputes which divert staff
attention from service delivery. The associated pay cycle allows
easier financial planning. Staff do not become demoralised quality of
care has been ensured for patients and the public. National wage
determination limits the scope for pay leapfrogging, the poaching of
staff and local pay disputes. The PRB has also benefited Government,
by ensuring industrial peace and minimising the recruitment and
retention problems that might have arisen without such a system. The
PRB has also 'depoliticised the issue of nurses' pay' and:
in recent years...has increasingly favoured government argunents
by awarding lower rises than staff organisations would have
liked...in response to Government calls for restraint and
evidence that staffing problems have eased.
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The Brief ins, importantly, argues that:
The Review Body has worked and won staff support because it
has acted independently. It makes recoarnendations based on
what it believes to be the right salary levels, has taken
action to ensure nurses are in their rightful place in the
pay league and has given a hearing to arguments put forward
by the organisations representing staff. All these
ingredients are essential to its success.
The contents of this Briefing surrrnarise most of the positive arguments
for the review body system. The document, should of course, be
understood in the very particular context in which was produced. It
stands in interesting contrast to the initial responses to the
Consultation document on the establishment of the PRB ((lapter Three),
where some cogent and coherent tactical arguments in defence of the
previous position were maintained. This illustrates the degree of
tactical shift on the part of the unions as well as being a testament
to their adaptability in formulating bargaining strategies.
However, these views can be compared with the findings of a series of
formal and informal interviews conducted with union officers involved
in preparing and presenting Evidence from all the major nursing trade
unions. A range of views emerged from these interviews, some of which
contrast strongly with the formal view expressed by Staff Side and the
individual trade unions. An initial and coainon reaction to the pay
review system was one of cynicism and mirth and the suggestion that,
like the emperor's new clothes, the pomp and ceremony of the pay
review process depends on a universal suspension of disbelief. There
were, however, sharper underlying strands of opinion. bst officers
exhibited, in varying degrees, some belief in the relevance of
particular criteria in the wage determination process and the ability
of the PRB to consider them seriously. Officers at one union seemed
confident that they could predict outcomes by assessing the current
political context and the sensitivity of the nursing 'issue'.
The Pay Review Body could be viewed from a social scientific
perspective. It was constructed as a replacement for national
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negotiation, which Staff Side strongly argued had 'broken down' mainly
because of tne disproportionate influence and power of government in
the process, and in suppressing nurses' pay. The government response
was to set up an independent and separate Review Body. However, the
members of the PRB are appointed by government, the Terms of Reference
are set by government, government provides Evidence, and government
decides on the implementation and funding of recomendations, if it
decides to accept them at all. As Seifert has shrewdly remarked with
respect to the pay review process 'the government has several bites at
the pay cherry' (1992:278).
However, the nurses' and midwives' pay review process, and the central
role of the Pay Review Body, should not be characterised as a simple
and unproblematic extension of the state apparatus, designed to
suppress pay aspirations and limit potential conflict. This does not
capture complexities inherent in the way pay review operates.
If the PRB were to make recomendations privately or directly to the
government, and with no intervening process, then this would appear as
a system of pay imposition, to be badly resented in years where awards
were 'lean'. In the event, the review process, as mediated through
trie Pay Review Body, can successfully engage each Side in the pay
determination process, while leaving a degree of freedom to the wider
play of power both within and without the imediate context of the pay
review exercise. It allows grounds for 'sufficient compromise',
either through the actual concession of pay or the striking of a
particularly sympathetic attitude. It is possible to make different
interpretations of outcomes, and the process allows both Sides to
claim a degree of success; for instance, Staff Side's version of the
outcome for lower paid staff in the seventh and eighth PRB
reconinendations could equally be cast as a simple example of a device
to aid recruitment and retention. The PRB indicates that arguments
are taken seriously while the basis for its reconiitendations as a whole
are left unexplained in detail. However, in the last instance the
government determines pay settlements through its funding decisions on
the non-binding PRB awards. Through mediation and ac.coninodation the
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PRB acts as both arbiter and buffer in negotiating the relation
between government and Staff Side. The balance of its effects can be
seen in the course of empirical pay outcomes and their reflection in
the medium term viability of the pay review system itself.
The debate over pay in the review process and the criteria employed
are better understood in this context. This analysis does not
denigrate the sincerity of the individuals involved, or the validity
of the arguments, but rather suggests that the review mechanism
functions in a way which reflects wider social and political
relations. For instance, it was noted in Chapter Four that the
criteria and arguments have been skewed towards 'economism', both by
the original Terms of Reference and market forces rhetoric of the
government and the response of the PRB.
Even within these skewed terms of reference, however, Staff Side have
had relatively little success in getting 'non-orthodox' economic
arguments taken on board. Staff Side have argued on numerous
occasions that low relative pay for nurses causes problems for
recruitment and retention in the longer term. Taken on their own
merits, such arguments would deserve consideration by the PRB.
However, the PRB has nearly always rejected wider macroeconomic
arguments or the 'longer term' efficiency arguments on comparability
put forward by Staff Side. In contrast, and despite some strong
criticism, it accepts that the 'ability to pay' criterion has some
validity and has recently linked the government with taxpayers'
interests. Staff Side arguments on low pay and equal pay are thus
reduced to ones of 'equity' or placed on the margin of the process.
When Staff Side have challenged the government's notion of resource
financing in the macroeconomy, this too has been rejected. For
instance, Staff Side have frequently put forward Keynesian or post-
Keynsian arguments to the effect that low pay is a cause of
insufficient demand in the economy (for example, see COHSE document,
November 1992:2-5). On this view, unduly suppressing public sector
or nurses pay would not produce 'equity' for the taxpayer because it
is an inefficient macroeconomic policy.
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In this respect, an important material effect of the Process is to
rule certain ttieories or criteria 'out of court' and therefore limit
the force of these arguments in the subsequent media coverage and
internal union discussion of process results and aspirations. This
does not prevent unions pushing more strongly on criteria which have a
similar effect on outcomes or adopting different, and possibly more
successful arguments, but. it sends a strong signal on the limits of
the exercise.
Finally, an important part of the pay review process is in its very
remoteness and in taking nurses as a special case. In this respect, a
number of important external influences on process and outcomes are
obscured. Firstly, the PRB was more or less explicitly offered as a
'sweetener' to nurses. This divided nurses from other NHS staff but
it could be argued that their pay and conditions of work are deeply
inter-dependent. Linked to this are the important effects of
employment levels, grading and training, and wider decisions on
healt.are for nursing pay. These are the 'underlying issues' which,
although they appear in certain parts of the process, are not
evaluated in any integrated way. The importance of negotiation in
the NNSNC nationally and over clinical grading appeals locally and at
higher levels is also an important and largely obscured part of the
pay review process and outcomes. The remoteness and specialisation of
the review process could therefore also produce material outcomes
through attitudinal influence.
The above aspects of the pay review process may have had an important
material influence on trade unions and their activity. Both in the
manner of its establishment and in its bias towards qualified staff,
the PRB may have re-established the status quo in favour of
'professional' unionism. The RQ1 has grown substantially in the
1980's whilst the TUC trade unions' membership has remained roughly
constant. In the industrial relations climate of the 1980s this may
illustrate a measure of success for both the RCN and the I1JC unions,
the latter in particular. However, in the light of nursing history,
it has additional connotations. The reasons for fluctuations in
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nursing union membership remain poorly researched. To some, the no-
strike element of the establishment of the PRB and the RON's adherence
to this was an important factor in the RON's growth
(Beaumont,1992:58). The RON's earlier introduction of indemnity
insurance could also be important (Carpenter,1988) as could its
increasingly 'trade union like' behaviour. However, compositional
changes may also have been an important factor in these developments,
the effect exacerbated by the review process and the widening of
differentials. The remoteness of the exercise and a relative lack of
militancy over pay during this period may also have been significant.
At anotrier level, however, the pay review process may have had some
quite unexpected and contradictory effects on trade union activity.
Carpenter has argued, for example, that:
the PRB system has also compelled unions to prepare their case
much more thoroughly than was the case through over-the-table pay
bargaining...[and has] ...also promoted greater cooperation
between staff side organisations, especially in order to respond
to government interference in their affairs (1988:390).
These points were emphasised in Qiapter Four on process (see
especially low pay) and were also substantiated in interviews with
trade union officers.
At the same time, the RON and TUC unions have had a considerably
heightened level of local activity through the clinical grading
exercise. In fact the TUC unions, with traditionally stronger local
organisation, may have excelled. The grading exercise is so deeply
interlinked with pay as to almost constitute local pay bargaining and
interviews at national and hospital level revealed a corresponding
increase in confidence on the part of trade unionists with respect to
local bargaining. This may also have promoted some cooperation
between the unions through the national negotiation process and
subsequent appeals at lower levels, though differences have still been
apparent. These effects raise some important considerations for
decentralisation of wage determination.
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The PRB is a complex and contradictory institution of government which
reflects, reinforces and, in some respects, alters the balance of
power. Its contradictory nature is clearly seen in one of the most
important and visible outcomes of the process, which has been the
apparent ability of the PRB to generate ambivalence regarding the
boundaries of its role with respect to pay determination, both on the
part of government and Staff Side. This has occurred on three main
issues which, although linked, are often incorrectly conflated as the
'decentralisation' issue;respectively, fragmentation, decentralisation
and individualisation of wage determination. Decentralisation is
explored in more depth in subsequent chapters, but a brief surrinary and
tentative analyis is now given of the role of the PRB in this process.
Fragmentation in wage determination might be defined as the ieo'a3 of
groups of staff from joint methods of determination or procedures.
The establishment of the PRB fragmented the Whitley system and split
nursing staff from ancillaries and other NHS groups. However, within
the review process itself, auxiliaries have been increasingly
polarised from qualified nursing staff and senior nurses have, for
several years, had their pay reconmnended separately by the PRB. Both
of these groups have seen their pay deteriorate relative to the
qualified clinical grades. Somewhat 'externally' to the review
process, the NHS reforms have meant further fragmentation. The new
staff group, health care assistants (HCAs), who overlap greatly with
the auxiliary role, have been excluded from the pay review process
altogether, although Staff Side have argued for them to be included.
New employees in Trusts and transferred staff who change contracts can
also have their pay determined locally and are now in an ambiguous
position with respect to the official remit of the PRB, although PRB
rates are currently still followed in the majority of Trusts.
Dec.entralisation of wage determination refers to the lowering of the
level at which determination takes place. 	 This has occurred
'externally' through the provisions for local bargaining for HCAs and
Trust staff in the NHS reforms. However, and importantly, it has also
occurred throug'n the review process itself in the form of London and
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flexible pay supplements. Here a light is once again cast on the role
of the PRB, which has frequently 'jumped the gun' on negotiations and
enabled these projects to go ahead, despite its own reservations and
criticism. The amount of money involved in these projects is marginal
compared with the total wages bill, but has increased managerial
prerogative to some extent and reduced the force of national level
determination.
Individualisation of wage determination refers to the devolution of
pay determination at national level or staff group level to a more
individual level. The PRB itself has noted the apparent confusion of
the government over flexible and performance-related pay. However,
flexible pay has also enabled pay determination to become increasingly
individualised, particularly in Its functIonal rather than
geograç*uical forms, as there has been little control over the process
and payments accrue in the form of an additional tranche of pay to
individuals. Performance pay has been brought in for senior nurses
and some clinical nurses and enhances this effect. In theory clinical
grading has also enabled a greater degree of individualisation of pay.
Identifying the different conceptxaL e.Leents iMeI i
'decentralisation' clarifies inconsistencies in its logic. The gearing
of pay determination towards local labour markets and individual
performance involves two entirely separate concepts and incompatible
objectives, even if performance pay only acts as a component in pay.
Awarding pay increases related to improvements in productivity at
whatever level does not solve for labour market equilibrium except
under the most stringent assumptions of perfect competition and
general equilibrium.
As was shown in the previous chapter, the PRB process has had an
interesting role in riighlighting policy plans and additional
inconsistencies with respect to decentralisation. The policy proposals
outlined in the ninth PRB report (1992:see especially 3-6) exhibit a
degree of ambiguity on the part of government towards the progress of
decentralisation. The NT-IS reforms have as their logical conclusion
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tne total decentralisatiori of pay in the 1990s. The HDs claim that
over the next few years Trusts will be breaking away from national
rates determined trirough the PRB system and that, meanwhile, Trusts
are 'iric.reasingly using the Review Body recorruiendations as a benchmark
from which to set their own pay rates' (1992:6). The HDs are also
proposing that 'in future the Review Body would be invited to
recormend a "tt average percentage pay increase" (TAPPI) for
nursing staff' (1992:4) of which a proportion would be available for
flexible pay. However, at the same time it is calling for greater
local managerial prerogative in pay determination, argued for in the
Warlow Report and included in the Citizen's Qiarter, the government is
striving to retain centralised control through basing funding on the
TAPPI and 'requiring health authorities to ensure that the overall net
effect of all the changes was an average pay increase for nursing
staff in each of their units in line with the TAPPI figure' (1992:4).
The government's position towards funding arrangements for Trusts when
and if they develop their own pay determination arrangements is
unclear but the above arrangements suggest that de facto financial
controls and formal or informal pay networks may give limited scope
for radical individualisation of pay or relating pay to productivity.
Paradoxically, the PRB process, at a time of increasingly chaotic
policy on the part of government, may have heightened Staff Side's
interests in decentralisation through the collection of pay data and
perception of outcomes and the clinical grading exercise. Interviews
revealed a growing, if private and minority, strand of opinion within
particularly the TUC trade unions that local bargaining may not be
such a bad option, especially if the remoteness of pay determination
has alienated staff from responsibility for their own conditions and
reduced the perceived role of unions. 	 As noted, the amount of
negotiation that still takes place is largely obscured in this
process. Clinical grading, though it had its disappointments, also
gave the unions confidence and increased expertise at local level in
pay-related representation and also demonstrated the degree of overt
and less overt conflict such an exercise could produce. Interviews
with local union officials, in particular, suggested a degree of
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speculative interest in further local bargaining of this type and
officials also reported a growth in membership through this exercise.
Whilst a certain amount of revived interest in local bargaining might
be bravado and there are concerns about weaknesses in some
geographical and functional areas and potentially uneven outcomes (see
also Buchan's results, 1992:21), some part of this interest is
undoubtedly based on a relatively negative appraisal. of nursing pay
outcomes through national wage determination, both prior to and during
tne PRB.
As both Sides consider their position on decentralisation, the pay
review process and future evaluation of its effects is becoming
increasingly indeterminate. As the PRB notes:
For our part, we shall need information on the earnings of
individual grades of staff in D1Us and Trusts, as well as
manpower data, if we are to continue to make reconinendations on
remuneration. We will not be able, for example, to judge the
appropriate size of the flexible element in year two if we do not
know how it was being used, and what were its effects on
performance and productivity, in year one. We will not be able
to interpret, and report on, trends in recruitment and retention
in the Ni-IS as a whole if we do not know what is happening in the
Trusts (1992:6).
The increasingly chaotic state of pay determination for nurses may, in
part, stem from a certain lack of analytical clarity on the
theoretical role and material outcomes of pay review. The variety of
complex interpretations that might be placed on these, and the
unexpected feedbacks to the system, have undoubtedly obscured the
policy costs and benefits of pay review. However, the major effect
of the pay review process may be to suppress wage expectations whilst
nonetheless it fails to tackle material sources of conflict. If
conflict is driven to lower levels or material concerns are reflected
in the traditional problem of shortages, then it could be argued that
the PRB is, in comon with prior systems of review, a flawed
institution. However, decentralisation may not be the solution under
this form of analysis. A final evaluation is made of pay review and
decentralisation after an exploration of local and 'non-pay' issues.
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1AFTER SIX
ThE IMPA OF NATIONAL DFEISIONS ON LOCAL MANAcj24J7ir
The views of local management have usually been excluded from the
process of nursing pay determination. As the direct employers,
however, local management are at the sharp end of decisions taken on
pay and related issues such as funding of pay awards, grading
structures and changes in training. This chapter explores the effects
of national decisions on local management, and highlights the
significance of pay-related or 'underlying' issues and the current
scale of the 'crisis' in nursing demand and supply as seen by local
managers. It reports the results of fieldwork Interviews with
management conducted in eight District Health Authorities (DHAs)
throughout the West Midlands Regional Health Authority (BRA), the
largest BRA of the fourteen existing in England and Wales in the early
1990s.
BACKGROUND TO THE FIELDWORK RESEARQI
As noted in Qiapter I\qo, a nuaber of major changes were made in the
structure and management of the NHS in the 1980's. Firstly, the tier
of Area Health Authorities was abolished in the 1982 NHS reforms, and
DHAs became the main intermediary link between hospitals and BRAs,
with units overseeing particular aspects of the district's work, such
as acute care. Secondly, in 1983, the Health Secretary asked Sir Roy
Griffiths of J. Sainsbury plc to appraise the NHS management style.
His findings 'highlighted the absence of identifiable leaders within
management, the fact that it was often difficult to establish who was
in charge in a particular locality and the woolliness and inefficiency
of consensus management' (NAHAT,1991:5).
	 His conclusions were
accepted by the government and led to the creation of a general
manager at every level from national to unit, and the creation of NHS
supervisory and management boards which subsequently became the policy
board and Ni-IS Management Executive (NHSME) respectively.
	 With
-188--
particular relevance for nurse managers, the 'professional background
of officers bec.aine less important than an individual's abilities'
(ibid). General managers were appointed on short-term contracts and
some of their earnings were to be performance-related. Many came from
cocmiercial or non-NI-IS backgrounds. The priorities attached by
Griffiths to the development of outcome measures, and the greater
involvement of clinicians in management arid the resource management
process, have also had a strong impact on the management ethos in the
NHS.
The NAHAT report (ibid) suggested that it was the financial crisis of
1988 which prompted Margaret Thatcher to announce a further review of
the system which led to the 1989 White Paper 'Working for Patients',
produced by Kenneth Clarke as Secretary of State. The 1990 NHS and
Comunity Care Act encompassed fundamental changes of direction, with
one among many different emphases being to further inculcate 'free
market' values into the NHS. The concept of the 'internal market' was
that funding would follow patients to more efficient provider units.
HAS were to purchase health care on behalf of their resident
populations via contracts, according to their needs and GP referral
patterns. Hospitals, connunity health units and other services would
also be able to become NHS Hospital Trusts, giving them direct control
over their own operation. The larger GP practices would be able to
apply for fundholding status and thereby be able to purchase direct
hospital and coclrnunity health services for patients. The main
provisions of the Act caine into force on April 1 1991 and have been
the focus of much debate.
Nurse managers have been profoundly affected by these changes. The
abolition of AHAs removed many career opportunities for nurses and the
introduction of general management left them in an ambiguous position.
Although some have gone into general management, many others have lost
their line management role and have been excluded from management
boards, becoming instead nursing 'advisors'. This, combined with an
increasing tendency towards local management through Directly Managed
Units (DMUs)s or NI-IS Hospital Trusts (His), has disrupted the whole
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nursing management hierarchy. In some localities, remnants of the
previous system remain. In others, ward sisters may be the most
senior nurse in the hospital, with no clear reporting function through
to national level. With the split between purchasing and providing in
the 1990 Act, the DHAs and RHA.s now have no clear role in nurse
resource planning. It has been noted that 'there is much concern as
to how nurses are to be equipped to take on the more senior jobs if
there are fewer intermediate jobs in which they can gain skill and
experience' (NAHAT,1991:175). More generally, these changes have
entailed the disintegration of a relatively well-defined line of
planning and reporting from national through to unit level for nursing
resources, the main input into the NTIS.
In the light of the above changes, the fieldwork research design
requires some explanation. The intention was to evaluate changes in
nursing and so experts in nursing management were sought. Early
interviews were conducted with general, financial and personnel
management and regional, district and unit nursing management, along
with nurses involved at national or local level in nurse training.
The district nurse managers proved, as anticipated in the original
formulation of the fieldwork, to be a particularly rich source of
information, particularly as all the managers interviewed were
personally involved in the clinical regrading exercise from its
inception. These interviews form the core of this chapter although
other interviews have also informed its content.
The interviews at district level were based on a structured
questionnaire and lasted between one and three hours. They were
conducted in the year prior to the changes introduced in April 1991 in
eight DHAs ranging from inner city, urban and rural areas. The DHAs
were selected to include HAs which had plans to become Trusts, to
introduce Project 2000 or to initiate National Vocational
Qualifications (NVQs) and Health Care Assistants (HCAs). Otherwise,
they were randomly chosen arid an almost 100°h response rate was
achieved, thus avoiding the dangers of a substantial element of 'self
selection' amongst participants. The nurse managers were all what
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would previously have been denoted 'Chief Nursing Officers'. Their
current and proposed roles were not uninteresting; some had veered
towards an advisory role, sometimes on a contractual basis; others had
been taken onto management boards at hospital or forthcoming Trust
level; whilst some were left in a somewhat undefined and ambiguous
capacity at district level. The majority of those interviewed were
male, reflecting the disproportionate representation of men in the
upper echelons of the nursing hierarchy. All were nurses, and all of
them had at least twenty years of experience in NHS nursing, with some
of them having considerably more. Their routes into nursing had been
quite diverse and this was to prove an interesting link with other
interviews on training and skills and attitudes to nurse resourcing.
NATIONAL DECISIONS ON RESOURCING NURSES
It was argued in Chapter 4 that defining demand and supply within the
NI-IS is a far from precise exercise, much influenced by normative
considerations and therefore subject to considerable controversy. If
the economis tic jargon of demand and supply is hard to apply to the
NHS in general, it is even more so for nurses. The inappropriately
named 'nurse manpower planning' process and practice are affected by
wider problems in defining the demand and resourcing the supply of
healthcare, yet are also an integral part of such problems given the
importance of the nursing input in the NHS. Particular aspects of
these problems become apparent at different levels in the NHS and
range from what might be considered strategic decision making at
national level to the day-to-day problems of healthcare provision at
ward or hospital level.
At the national level, decisions are made on the funding of healthcare
against which background questions surrounding demand and supply are
frequently subordinated. The measure of effective demand which
emerges then plays an ambiguous role, being somewhat unresponsive to
both changes in 'pure' demand, or healthcare needs, and supply
conditions, whilst at the same time helping define them to a greater
or lesser extent.
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National decisions on funding the NHS emerge from a wide-ranging
politic.al and economic decision-making process on the economy and the
role of public expenditure within it. The Public Expenditure Survey
(PES) takes place each surmier whereby the government reviews its
expenditure plans for the next three years. The spending departments,
including the Department of Health (DoH), put forward their own plans,
which include a review of future efficiencies and service development,
prepared jointly with the Treasury within guidelines approved by
ministers earlier in the year. The PES is co-ordinated by the PES
Coninittee (PESC), a group of interdepartmental officials chaired by
the Treasury. After further discussion with the Treasury, spending
plans are finalised in November in the (lancellor's Autinn Economic
Statement. This is then published in more detail in January in the
White Paper on Public Expenditure. The NHS is not directly involved
in the PES - the DoH acts, in theory, as its representative. NITIS
management must therefore use informal routes if they are to influence
the process.
The problems with this process have long been recognised. The
disproportionate influence of the Treasury and de facto lack of
representation of NHS managers means that service requirements may be
subordinated to wider goals for the public sector and the economy.
With respect to the disproportionate influence of government as a
whole, political considerations can feed through very directly and at
the expense of longer-run strategic service considerations. This is
particularly pertinent for the electorally-sensitive NHS. The funding
of effective demand which is produced by this system thus bears little
relevance to healthc.are needs at national or local level nor to the
supply of healthcare, despite a recognition of the distinct and
particular problems engaged by the latter (see Buc.han in Robinson et
al,1992:38-51).
These problems have been exacerbated in recent years. It was noted in
(lapter 2 that a form of more or less explicit cash limit has always
existed for the Ni-IS, and can be seen in the attempts at wage restraint
that have characterised the history of the NHS. However, a subtle
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shift in emphasis took place with the introduction of explicit cash
limits in 1976. The importance of cash limits has to be understood in
terms of both planning and control. Volume planning has never been a
precise exercise in the NHS, partly because of the normative elements
involved in defining the need for healthcare and partly because of its
labour-intensive nature. As noted in Q-apter One, wages account for
nearly 80% of the RDSL-IA Net Revenue Expenditure (1991 figure
calculated from HPSSS for England,1992:15-27) so that the larger part
of planning is concerned with pay. With nurses' pay accounting for
over £5 billion and 36% of HA's Net Revenue Expenditure, peaking at
37% in 1989 following clinical grading (ibid), and their employment
accounting for around 50% of all NHS directly employed staff
(ibid:33), it could be expected that nursing employment and pay would
be particularly important targets for planning policy.
The history of the NHS and nursing described in previous chapters does
not lend much credence to the view that volume planning prior to 1976
was a careful and scientific process; such 'planning' was always
intended as a form of implicit wage control. The shift from 'volume'
planning, based on current pay levels, with supplementary votes, to a
system focused more on anticipated pay levels and cash limits must
therefore be understood in this light, and with all the subtlety this
entails. Introduced at a time of very high inflation and increasing
confidence and militancy on the part of NI-IS workers, the old system of
implicit or explicit incomes policies and the less overt form of cash
limit implied by volume planning simply did not work. Year on year
planning became increasingly 'rough-tuned' with the need to make post-
hoc adjustments for pay awards and, to some extent, for NHS price
inflation for supplies. The 1974 Haisbury award was a crisis point in
this respect. Cash limits could thus be viewed as an explicit attempt
to enforce incomes policies and 'smooth' the planning process. In the
period from 1976 to 1979, incomes policies and cash limits were
intended to 'pincer' NHS pay to the extent that NHS workers were made
to understand that the NHS would be more strongly resource-constrained
and that their pay was an important factor in NHS resources.
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This policy was taken several steps further from 1979, however, with
the tightening of cash limits and the abandonment of explicit incomes
policies. Planned cash limits were now to be viewed as being co-
terminous with the 'outturn' for the NHS. The implication for NHS
workers was that there would be an income-employment-service
development trade-off, unless substantial 'efficiency' savings could
be made. This policy was backed up by an explicit planned allowance
for pay increases (or pay assumption), which featured strongly for
most of the 1980's in the pay review process. The important changes
in planning and control therefore lay in the gradual inclusion of an
explicit pay increase assumption in expenditure plans and the
suggestion that such plans were final. Volume plans on service
expansion would therefore be subordinated to pay award outcomes or
cost efficiency savings, with the government let 'off the hook' on
both counts, particularly with the establishment of the Pay Review
Body in 1982/3 and the increasing focus on 'general management'.
Winchester made some particularly important points about the early
functioning of the new system for the public sector more generally
(1983:173). Firstly, he suggested that cash limits would provide
little indication of the details and possible consequences of pay
policies, which would depend on other expenditure decisions and
financial controls, and the government's attitude towards the
avoidance or resolution of industrial conflict in particular sectors.
This point has been amplified for nurses in the first part of the
thesis, although it has also been shown that government has a number
of tools at its disposal to skew pay outcomes towards its original
cash limits. Secondly, he suggested that the impact of government pay
restraint policies based on cash limits would depend more directly
than formal incomes policies on the decisions and choices of public
sector employers; 'the separation of national negotiations on pay and
local discretion on manpower decisions presents obstacles to an
effective income-employment trade-off in most public service
negotiations'. It is this to separation and its effects, along with
the influence of grading and training, that we now turn.
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LOCAL DE21AND FOR NURSES
When spending plans have been finalised and cash limits decided,
monies are allocated from the DoM to RHAs using a weighted capitation
formula. This is then distributed to DHAs and units. However, where
pay awards have exceeded the cash limits, cash Limits have had to be
subsequently revised to include funding for all or part of the excess
over plan. This has re-introduced the element of 'rough-tuning' into
NHS planning and created a degree of uncertainty over the future
financial position of health authorities (see e.g. NAHAT,1991:56).
This uncertainty is likely to blight the progress of the split into
purchaser and provider and the contractual form of the new NHS
ref orms, and has been further complicated by the introduction of
capital charges. Quite apart from planning uncertainty, partial
funding of the excess of pay awards over planned cash limits can cause
particular problems since this means that budgets set for the current
year at local level will automatically be overrun, unless savings can
be made through cost improvement prograrrines (CIPs) or other
'efficiency' measures, or further income generated from additiocal.
sources. A final solution is to cut staff or services. These
measures are, of course, entirely consistent with the ethos of cash
limits, though it could be argued that the longer run intention is to
put downward pressure on wage claims.
The first part of the fieldwork questionnaire was aimed at obtaining
an understanding of the perspectives on the demand for nurses at local
level. A very high degree of unanimity amongst nurse managers emerged
from the interviews, though differences in emphasis were also evident.
The majority of managers saw insufficient resources emanating from
national decisions on funding as a primary constraint on local demand
for nurses. This response was surprisingly constant across districts
or units, despite managers' perceptions that funding was unequally
allocated and much influenced by status (for example,flagship teaching
hospitals) or local politics (such as the influence of local chairman
in wider politics). Thus, although horse-trading could shunt some
funds around, underfunding was seen as the more general problem.
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The underfunding of pay awards at national level was widely seen to be
exerting a considerable constraint on effective demand for nurses at
local level whilst the national clinical grading exercise in
particular had exerted an upward pressure on the nursing paybill. In
1992 some 38,000 appeals still remained to be heard and, in theory,
regrades would be backdated to 1988, though management were attempting
to 'buy-out' appeals and to avoid backdating (Nursing Times/Standard,
13th April 1992). Managers at regional and district level pointed out
that the original grading exercise had been cash limited. DHA
managers had been required to subnit estimates for the exercise; after
these and prior to the official exercise taking place at local level,
the numbers of grades (with percentages for each) and grading
definitions were imposed providing an effective cash limit on the
process. One manager put it thus: 'The procedural arrangements were
imposed by the government. No negotiation or consultation took place
with the unions over these'. The original exercise produced quite
mixed results from district to district; however, where the cost of
clinical regrading given by the DoH was exceeded, the region withheld
money. With regrades from appeals subsequently feeding through from
1988 to the present, such extra monies therefore usually represented
both an excess over the original cash limit and an unplanned year on
year excess which had to be found outside the normal annual pay award
monies. Such excesses were then 'pinc.ered' by the cash limits imposed
at national level and applied down the NHS structure, reinforcing the
government's explicit desire for cost efficiency improvements or
income generation. The overall regional cost of clinical grading had
thus exceeded the original 157 shown in the pay review process for
1988 by several percentage points and a final figure is still unknown.
Managers argued that quite apart from the direct costs of clinical
grading, the exercise had also contained a number of hidden costs at
all levels in the region (see also Burchill,Health Service
Journal,1993). Firstly, a vast amount of management time had been
involved in the original procedure and subsequent hearings and
appeals. Numbers varied substantially by DHA, but it was not abnormal
for over a thousand informal hearings to have taken place, with many
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hundreds of appeals then going on to formal hearing at district level,
a number of which remained to be heard at the time of interview.
Relatively smaller numbers then went on to regional level bet
represented substantially harder cases to 'resolve', particularly as
the system allowed for three managers and three trade union
representatives to handle regional appeals. One manager suggested it
would be unlikely that a decision would be reached at that level. It
was pointed out by another that the changes in management at district
level would mean fewer managers were available to hear cases and this
in turn would further delay the process. Most managers felt that at
least one year of their time had been almost completely absorbed in
the regrading exercise; a most conservative estimate of the cost of
the time taken up with the process at regional level would therefore
run into millions of pounds. Secondly, the exercise had had an effect
on staff in terms of recruitment and retention and morale, but this
was rather harder to cost. It may be recalled that the stated
intention of the exercise was to improve recruitment and retention by
providing proper reward and career pathways for clinical nursing.
It was universally recognised by the managers that no clear measure of
'pure' or 'real' demand for nurses could be defined. Quite apart from
the difficulty of measuring pure demand for healthcare in the district
or locality (of which waiting lists are only one expression), the
degree of 'dependency' of patients in treatment is variable by
speciality arid by individual response to treatment. The develoixnent
of a wide range of 'dependency studies' in the late 1960's, which have
been in increasing use in the 1980's along with regional staffing
'guidelines', were not seen as providing a finite measure of the
necessary quantity, grade-mix or quality of nursing care. In
particular, such 'guides' take little account of time spent talking to
patients and caring for their psychological welfare - and the
increasing medical acknowledgement of the curative effect of such
activities. In these respects, the rather 'scientific' appearance of
some of these systems was queried, with a number of the nurse managers
appearing to regard them as having more to do with management fashion
than with measuring demand or aiding forward planning.
-197-
However, despite these problems of definition and measurement, a
picture of local demand for nurses began to emerge from the interviews
which highlighted a conflict between the effective demand induced by
national funding and pay decisions, and the 'real' pressures of local
demand. Managers were clearly united on the emphasis in changes in
the direction of real demand for nurses; these were invariably seen as
being upward. Demographic change and technological advances in
medical treatment were seen to have increased the demand for
healthcare in the localities through an increasingly aged population
and new possibilities for treatment. The resulting pressure on
service development in turn increased the real demand for nurses. At
the same time the work demands placed on existing nurses were seen to
have increased. New medical treatments enabled faster throughput of
patients and such throughput had also been influenced by political
considerations, along with the desire to decrease waiting lists. A
considerable amount of controversy surrounded the interpretation of
faster throughput; it was suggested that on some occasions ill
patients had been discharged too quickly, or discharged and then
readmitted later, thus increasing throughput statistics. However, the
net effect is that patients had tended to be more dependent whilst in
hospital and thus to require a more intensive level of nursing care.
That technological change has tended to intensify the need for nurses
provides a most unusual foil to the more general economic tendency
towards labour-replacing technological change.
	 The technology
developed for intensive care units or neo-natal units were
particularly highlighted by managers as increasing the demand for
nurses and this was particularly true for 'flagship' or teaching
hospitals with traditionally higher levels of technology.
Ccxnputerised techniques for administrative purposes and recording of
care were also largely seen as increasing the nursing workload. With a
need for detailed costing in the new 'internal market', and the moves
towards primary care implied by the Citizens' Charter, this workload
is likely to increase.	 However, as one manager put it 'the
development of technology has been uneven' and has reflected wider
interests in the NHS at the expense of developing technologies to
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assist in the care of the chronic sick or those currently needing
labour-intensive nursing care.
None of the managers identified any 'automatic' change in demand with
respect to different grade-mix implied by the changes in demography
and technology. This was seen to have far more to do with planning
and choice and the actual development of services; for example,
whether these tend to treatment of the elderly or acute treatment,
with different grade-mix implications.
Against this generally perceived increase in the real demand for
nurses, the resource constraints on effective demand have had
particularly pernicious effects. At the national level, resource
decisions have usually been made on the basis of 'historically funded
posts' on the inflation-level cash limit basis, with pay awards
sometimes funded in full, but more often only partially. Some
adjustment for service development is also made but this has more
usually involved 'shunting' funds between regions, districts or units
rather than increases per Se, particularly when pay awards are
underfunded. Resources at local level emerge as an uneasy compromise
between a historical level of nurse resourcing and a 'new' service
development level as tendered in plans by the DHA or unit, but many of
the aspects of healthcare demand increase are simply not addressed.
Staffing guidelines and dependency studies have become an increasingly
important part of planning for some localities, but appear to have
been largely motivated by a desire to contain cost at national and
regional level. They have produced mixed results as nurses at ward
level may use such instruments to argue for increased levels of nurse
provision; thus some nurse managers expressed a preference for using
'professional judgernent'.
What is asked for is naturally influenced by the 'bargaining' context
and would tend in any case to be imprecise.	 One manager mentioned
that 'if we receive 70°h of what we have asked for, we feel we've done
quite well'. Perceptions of underfunding thus occur in a context in
which real demand for nurses is probably substantially underestimated.
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Several managers made the point that their real problems have revolved
around maintaining the historical level of posts, even discounting for
service development. Cash limits have generally been based on
inflation and national pay awards in the 1980's were often higher.
tJnderfunding of pay awards can thus affect resourcing at the existing
level of nurses quite apart from any normative or planned level. In
one district, a manager ccxirnented that 'the underfunding of pay awards
constrains the management board from developing services as fast as
needed...we aim to protect the base'. Another manager suggested that:
Despite the growth in demand, our acute services were capped and
it was difficult to maintain the level of nurses. The Finance
Officer decides the nursing budget using an inflation measure.
If pay awards mean this amount is exceeded and it the diterence
is not centrally funded, we have to use service development
money.
Another manager put it more bluntly: 'If we're underfunded, it means a
reduction in staff'. Yet another manager noted that:
When underfunding occurs, we look at skillinix, reduce the speed
at which we replace staff and look at areas where reductions in
staffing levels won't be felt. We tend to rely on natural
wastage as redundancies are expensive - part of my job is to
guess where these will occur.
This last point casts light on the complex causation behind shortages.
Traditionally it has been assumed that shortages arise purely from an
inability to attract staff to fill funded posts given low pay. Here
the suggestion is that shortages also arise because of insufficient
funding to offer enough posts at low pay. As became evident in the
review process, if posts are subsequently cut from establishment, this
actually obscures the shortages which might exist for either demand-
or supply-side reasons - or both.
NATIONAL AND LOCAL INITIATIVES TO RESOLVE DE1AND DEFICIENCIES
Several national initiatives were launched in the 1980's and early
1990's designed to increase funding raised at local level. NAHAT
suggests that 'resources released from improved Value For Money (VFM)
have provided an important source of finance for service developments
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and expansions, and pay and price rises which have exceeded the
Government's cash limit provision ..
.[ and]
 
will continue to be a
significant source of finance in the future' (1991:64). NAHAT notes,
however, that Cost Improvement Prograrrines (CIPs), which increased from
a 0.27. contribution in 1981/2 to O.57 in 1983/4, have hovered around
17 from 1984/5 and face an uncertain future. About a third of such
savings were achieved through competitive tendering for domestic,
catering and laundry contracts but 'such an extensive source of
savings may have dried up'. Other sources, such as price reductions
from improved contracts with suppliers and general reductions in
labour costs 'may become the main sources of cash releasing prograrimes
for the future...However, the cash savings may not be as large as in
previous years, as health authorities have steadily improved their
efficiency during the 1980's, making further savings not only more
difficult to identify, but more difficult to achieve' (1991:65). It
is interesting to note that CIPs are not intended to be achieved at
the expense of the volume or quality of services and some of the
'improvements' involving labour have been highly contentious in this
respect. Moreoever, increased efficiency through increased throughput
can actually create an increase in total expenditure as the costs of
treating more patients rise, for example, through spending on drugs,
and medical and surgical supplies.
Income Generation Schemes (IGSs) followed CIPs onto the management
agenda. These IGSs have included selling surplus capacity to other
agencies (spare laundry or cookchill capacity), niaximising the
coarnercial opportunities of the estate (letting accomodation to
banks, newsagents, florists), direct appeals to the local coirnunity
for cash (charity), or using new legal powers under the Health and
Medicines Act 1988 providing for DHAs to raise income in the following
ways:
* acquire, produce, manufacture and supply goods
* acquire land and manage and deal with land
* supply accomiiodation
* provide instruction
* exploit and develop ideas
* apply comercial charges.
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Forecasts for income generation on this basis, with respect to the
revenue account, were for £20m in 1988/89 and £8 for each year
thereafter. With respect to the capital account considerably higher
sums have been raised - and are expected from - capital receipts from
sale of land and rationalisation of sites. However, once again there
are limits. Initial forecasts of a 17. contribution at national level
are not being realised and 0.5% is emerging as a more realistic rate.
Although the depressed property market provides good purchasing
opportunities it hinders the sale of NHS assets. A high degree of
risk is involved. Additional capital finance needed to create the
infrastructure to generate additional income is also lacking. Hence
HAs finally appear to be relying more on growth in private patient
income to increase their profits from income generation. In this
respect, the Ni-IS reforms have been seen as a fundamental means of
extending the income generation approach which has:
moved from the margin of HQIS finance to the main thrust of
resources. NHS trusts and DMUs have now to earn all their income
from quasi-cocrrnercial or truly ccxm-nerial contracts...increasingly
ccxrrnercial practices will be needed towards the mid-1990s as the
Ni-IS reforms gradually fall into place (NAHAT,1991:68-69).
Discussions with local managers broadly substantiated the types of
venture attempted under CIPs or IGSs, albeit with some differences in
emphasis. However, with respect to both CIPs and IGSs, most
managers appeared to feel that these were something of a side issue,
'peripheral in terms of the paybill - unless we go in for selling
healthcare' and of very limited value in raising effective demand for
staff, and nurses in particular.
In the early 1990s for example, an average-to-large DHA might have a
budget of £80 million, of which some £30 million would be consigned to
the nursing budget/paybill [1]. A pay award for one year might
therefore be measured in terms of several millions of pounds, and the
difference between the cash limit 'inflation' or other allowance for
pay increases and the actual settlement may again be over £1 million.
Lii DHAS' actual nursing budgets discussed in interviews varied 5%
around the national average proportion of the revenue account.
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The subsequent difference between additional funding [if] provided by
the government and that which has to be found locally may therefore be
very substantial indeed. For this notional DHA this could run into
£100,000s simply to satisfy existing demand, with no service
development. A Finance Officer suggested that a degree of 'creative'
planning and accounting could help make some allowance for unfunded
paybill excesses. However, this exercise had distinct limitations,
particularly if year-on-year underfunding were to occur. He cocrniented
that the inflation rate was nearly always underestimated in national
cash limits and that in any case top-up funding for excess pay awards
was not paid for all staff groups. In his view, clinical grading had
caused particular problems - between one and two per cent of the
nursing paybill had had to be found locally.
With respect to CIPs, relatively little scope exists for cost savings
on non-pay items such as equiçxiient and supplies. The average national
figure for non-pay items is only some 23% of H(iS net revenue
expenditure (average national figure - calculated from HPSSS 1990),
and this figure overestimates the importance of these items as it
includes a number of pay items such as indirect labour costs (for
example, contracted maintenance or domestic staff). The shift in
accounting procedure on ancillary staff on CCI contracts has
artificially held down the total NUS paybill figure.
A District Finance Officer went through main expenditure items in
interview. Drugs and medical equipment prices had been rising faster
than inflation (see Doyal, 1979:191-194) and potential savings were
limited by the medical profession, clinical judgement and by increased
throughput as noted earlier. Much of the hi-tec. equipment was imported
from the USA and exchange rates were also a factor in cost
fluctuations. Computing costs had also been increasing, particularly
fuelled by the NI-IS reforms and need to start accounting for 'manpower'
resources and items more closely for the internal market. Some
savings had been effected by the substitution of duvets for bedding
and linen, and in energy usage and costs, and 'a positive decision had
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been made to hold back on engineering and building maintenance'. CIPs
in this area were thus relatively limited.
Pay at just under 807. of RDSHA net revenue expenditure is a much more
important target and has been taking a higher proportion of revenue
throughout the 1980's nationally, with the nursing paybill being the
largest element and one of those which rose the most markedly over
this period. The District Finance Officer interviewed above saw
underfunding of pay awards as the biggest problem. Despite attempting
to make some allowances for this, his coainent was that 'we can't
manage for ever'.
The main thrust of CIPs has therefore been focused on labour costs.
All the districts had gone through the competitive tendering process
and many of the contracts had remained in-house, an exercise which,
following a national initiative, was seen by one manager as being
clearly intended as a 'means to reduce the pay of the lowest-paid
staff'. The suggestion from NAHAT, above, is that around a third of
CIP savings were made in this way. This figure was not substantiated
at local level and there may have been local variations or
inconsistencies in implementing CCI and in accounting for savings. In
a couple of cases external contractors had gone bankrupt or attempted
to renegotiate contracts. In others, contracts had reverted to in-
house provision due to poor quality service provided by external
contractors. Most managers expressed some satisfaction where in-house
contracts had prevailed and the process of CCI' did not appear to have
been welcomed by many managers. In part, this may have been because
of de facto overlaps in tasks between ancillary and nursing staff, and
in part because of resultant problems with morale. Some managers
appeared to regard the exercise as distasteful and carrying potential
costs in terms of service quality. It was coninented that services
such as maintenance and non-urgent ambulance tasks were increasingly
being targeted for external contracts, again following national-level
initiatives.
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Other forms of labour cost savings falling under the 'official'
definition of CIPs had been attempted by managers. These had
included attempts to effect savings by reducing the use of agency
nurses and making increased use of own bank staff, reducing overtime
payments, and changing shift patterns and overlaps. Most managers
reported substantial savings from changes in shift patterns, although
some industrial relations problems had arisen as a result; one manager
reported that relations with trade unions became 'turbulent' after the
changes had been effected although they were negotiated in advance. A
medium-sized district had 'saved' 20 nurses through shift changes
claiming tflese savings had then been used for service development. In
theory, changes in shift patterns could also provide more flexibility
for staff but the extent, for example, of overlaps remains much
disputed, as does its effect on quality of service as overlaps provide
time to 'handover' details on patients. The initiatives appeared to
originate mainly at national level, passing down through RI-IA and DHA,
as was also the case for so-called 'skilimix' changes.
Skilinix changes have now become a major focus for cost savings and a
predominant focus for change and debate, particularly within nurse
resourcing. These are worth noting because such attempts at cost
reduction may or may not fall outside the scope of CIPs; if such
changes are defined as changes in skilLnix rather than in grade-mix or
taskmix, the quality of services may be reduced.
There was huge local variation in the degree of skilimix exercises
already conducted; some districts had done relatively little in this
area, while others had conducted several reviews in the 1980's. Very
mixed results had been achieved. In one case, a manager reported that
'no savings were made - we actually found we were underestablished and
trierefore asked the region for more nurses'. The finding of 'no
savings' was also echoed by some other managers. Another manager
reported that the systems for skilimix were not ideal, particularly as
the real problem was 'too much work and not enough staff'; he had
therefore preferred to negotiate over workload at ward level, but this
had to be done within financial limits. A District Personnel Manager
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mentioned that clinical grading had opened up the possibility for
'skills to be more precisely arranged', but this view was not shared
by nursing managers. Every manager interviewed, however, expected
skill mix changes to be forthcoming as part of the national intiatives
on training and resourcing; in particular, those on HCAs and NVQs and
on Project 2000. The impetus behind these changes appeared to have
little basis at local level; none of the managers had identified
changes in local demand as necessitating changes in skilimix and the
majority had identified underfunding as the main problem. All
appeared resigned to change but only a minority appeared to welcome it
and with some very strong reservations. Overall, the interviews
revealed relatively limited CIP savings at local level, and more
importantly, even less potential for doing so in the future if the
'ethos' of non-reduction in service or quality was to be maintained.
Views on income generation were even more pessimistic. A number of
the districts had introduced schemes for 'selling surplus capacity',
such as cookchill. These schemes, however, had largely consisted of
selling between hospitals rather than selling to external customers.
One DHA reported that it had generated a large amount of income by
selling to other HAs. However, another coirnented that some HAs had
been 'frightened off by capital costs and listeria' and yet another
that some HAs 'had got their fingers burned here'. One manager
reported that his hospital had introduced charges for car parking at
the hospital, receiving a lot of media attention and public
disapprobation. Overall such schemes appeared to be regarded more as
a way of rationalising services than of generating savings or income.
'Developing corrnercial opportunities for the estate' had also been
tried in a number of districts, with lets to flower shops, solicitors'
shops, maternity shops, newsagents, small cafes, and so on, but income
from these sources was still seen as peripheral compared with the
paybill and uriderfunding problem. tharitable ventures and Trust Funds
had always been in existence in the NI-IS and, whilst such sources of
additional finance were welcomed, these tended to be used only for
additions to the capital account and new developments such as
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buildings, wards or equipment. One manager corirnented that charity is
deeply dependent on public preferences - 'children fare much better
than the chronic sick and elderly'. Another described a hugely
successful appeal for a new building of nearly two million pounds but
pointed out that the HA had to transfer existing staff to the building
and could 'only open up as many beds as these staff could be employed
on; we will need extra funding to open up the others'. All the
managers were dismissive of any possibilities for funding nurses
directly either through charity or 'brand name' support by private
companies, viewing this as ethically undesirable and as an
inconsistent source of finance.
With respect to the increased coamercialisation and local fund raising
envisaged in the Health and Medicines Act 1988, none of the district
or unit managers felt that the orthodox source of local funding (that
is CIPs and IGSs) had provided sufficient funding for shortfalls or
that they could do so in the future, unless local private healthcare
services could be developed and exploited to the full. All the HAs
had experienced restructuring and rationalisation through the 1980's;
in one case the niinber of hospitals had been more than halved.
Throughout the 1980s the NHS capital account was buoyed up by land
sales, initially encouraged by national level strategic decisions and
now by capital charging. However, managers were sceptical about
future additions to capital from land sales, noting once again
difficulties with the current state of the property market and the
inconsistency of this source of income for revenue expenditure.
The greater effect of such rationalisation had been to reduce in some
HAs the need for nurses through hospital closures, particularly of
mental hospitals, and to induce a tendency towards new and larger
hospitals. Nurses could then be redirected, aiding the 'solution' of
shortage problems, or 'natural wastage' could be allowed to occur,
releasing resources for nurses in other hospitals. In the case of
mental hospitals, pending any large input of resources into Coffinunity
Care, this represents a real service reduction. Several managers
mentioned that rationalisation had also included the closure or
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relocation of long-stay geriatric facilities. The 'burden' of
provision had thus been passed to the private sector, local
authorities or, more generally, back into the 'coarnunity' through care
by relatives. In one case, a manager reported that the closure of a
long-stay ward had been compensated for by contracting beds in private
facilities. The numbers of beds contracted were less than a fifth of
the original numbers however, although the manager viewed the
arrangement as being better than possible alternatives and providing
better facilities. Another manager mentioned that where the private
sector was undertaking more long-stay care, staff were bein <g poached.
The national figures on mental and geriatric beds broadly substantiate
these local changes (see HPSSS 1990) but have tended to get rather
lost in the argument that greater throughput requires fewer beds. In
the case of geriatrics, such throughput generally does not pertain in
the same way as for acute care. A number of managers also mentioned
the 'temporary' closure or part-closure of wards together with the
'freezing' of nurse vacancies as a means to reducing demand for
nurses. It will be apparent that such measures reduce service
provision.
Managers had therefore 'managed' resource constraints arising
primarily from underfunding largely through measures which can only be
termed service reductions, sterrrning either from national strategic
decisions on site rationalisation or local reactive decisions to
shortages of finance. The movement to the coninunity of the elderly
and the mentally ill must also, therefore, be understood in the light
of resource constraints; this underlines the point made in Qiapter Two
that nursing should be more widely construed to include nursing care
undertaken at home.
LOCAL SIJPPLY OF NURSES
It was noted in the discussion of the pay review process in Qiapter
Four that much current debate has centred around the existence, or
otherwise, of nursing shortages and projections for the future based
on demographic trends.
	 Before going on to explore the fieldwork
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results on nursing supply, a note of c.aution should be attached.
Firstly, many of the issues arising under 'supply' are highly
sensitive, not least because of the importance attached to them in the
pay review process and local politics. The questionnaire was
therefore devised in a manner which presented key questions in several
different ways, and contradictory answers were occasionally given.
Secondly, the interviews took place in what might be regarded as
extreme macroeconomic conditions - a severe recession following a
decade of high levels of unemployment.
Despite high levels of local and national unemployment, nurse
shortages were reported by the majority of managers in interviews,
although the extent and type of shortages were highly variable. The
questionnaire sought information on both these facets of nursing
shortages as well as data which would help establish the source of
sample variation, since this would carry implications for possible
solutions. Questions on the local labour market were also asked.
The response from most managers was that local housing stocks, the
mobility of nurses, and local labour market conditions were important
factors in recruitment and retention. However, such local conditions
were seen to interact with wider national factors, such as
unemployment and housing more generally, the numbers and types of
nurses being trained and the draw on nursing staff from the growth in
the private health sector. Recruitment and retention was highly
variable by type of hospital. For example, prestigious teaching
hospitals attracted recruits more easily but nurses trained there were
more likely to leave for other areas. It was also highly variable by
location in urban, semi-urban or rural areas; inner city DHAs and unit
managers faced particular problems. There were substantial
differences by all these factors between qualified and unqualified
staff, and married and single staff.
The majority of managers reported shortages of specialised qualified
nurses, particularly in hi-tec specialties such as intensive care,
theatres and paediatrics, and in midwifery. Post-RGN training numbers
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and funding were seen by some as insufficient and the private sector
had poached trained staff in these areas as in many others. With
regard to recruiting for own training or trained staff, mental and
geriatric nurses also presented difficulties for some managers. It
was reported that wastage was high during training; national figures
show this clearly and regional managers confirmed that highly
qualified nurses were being lost to the profession. After training,
wastage occurred when husbands were relocated in their jobs or when
nurses became pregnant. One manager surrnied up the DFIA's experience in
recruiting nurses for training as follows: 'the real problem lies in
financing them'; although numbers for teaching hospitals were set at
national level, nurses were traditionally recruited and funded for
training locally. thapter Two has noted that training numbers have
declined substantially.
Managers were particularly anxious about the future effects of
national intiatives on training such as Project 2000 and the decline
of the EN role. Turnover figures varied widely between DHAs, from
between 77 and 30%, with higher turnover for qualified staff. The
majority of managers reported few difficulties in either recruiting or
retaining unqualified staff, with several managers actually recording
'queues' for unqualified staff vacancies. However, in this respect,
urban areas were slightly more likely to experience problems.
It was clear from the interviews that the majority of managers
believed that problems in recruitment and retention had been
temporarily eased and superceded by the recession in general and by
issues on the demand side - in particular, by resource constraints. In
this respect, and despite complex local variation, the broader problem
was not how to train, recruit and retain nurses but how to pay for
them in the first place. The point was thrown into sharp focus by
responses to a question on changes in nurse numbers. In two DHAs
these had actually decreased in recent years. In others they had only
held level despite increases in service demands. The trend nationally
has been a decline in the rate of employment of nurses at the end of
the 1980's.	 Under these circumstances, 'solutions' to supply
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deficiencies were perceived by managers to be of a lower order of
importance than 'solutions' to deficiencies in funding and demand.
However, questions focused on such solutions raised some interesting
issues about the interconnections between the two.
NATIONAL AND JJJCAL INITIATIVES TO RESOLVE SUPPLY DEFICIENCIES
Managers were fairly reticent when asked about nurses' pay. Most
reported their view that pay was not a particularly important issue in
supply deficiencies, despite the evidence of surveys quoted in Chapter
Four. The regional average pay for nurses was just over £9,700 after
allowing for 15% overheads, and this kind of average labour cost might
appear very attractive to a comparable private employer, particularly
in male-dominated industries. Several managers were enthusiastic
about the possibility of recruiting more men into nursing, whilst
pointing out that personally they had been unable to manage on what
was intended as a 'single female's' salary, arid had sought early
promotion into management. One manager noted that 'male nurses could
be on grade 'G' by their mid-twenties' and that 'there should be a
national drive...the image is more of a problem than the salary' [for
men] . Another manager suggested that grades A, B and C were low-paid
(this would cover 28% of all nursing staff), and that 'we can leave
students out, as they are going on to the bursary system' (another 12-
14°!. - so that according to this manager some 407. of staff's pay is
problematic). A couple of managers suggested that nurses would leave
to obtain higher grades elsewhere, whilst suggesting also that pay
levels were sufficient. This was again potentially contradictory;
higher grades do, of course, carry higber pay rates with them, even if
status is also a factor. Another manager suggested that staff left
more because of pressure and lack of job satisfaction. One manager
noted increasing competition from the private sector for nursing
auxiliaries.
These somewhat contradictory views on the importance of pay were
further highlighted in responses to questions on childcare facilities
arid clinical grading. Before turning to other supply issues, it is
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perhaps important to note one pay solution in which managers expressed
no interest, namely, that of local or reduced pay. There was no
evidence to suggest that these experienced managers formed any
groundswell of opinion that pay rates were too high or that they
should in some way reflect local labour market wages more closely. If
anything, a number felt that demographic trends and the growth in
private healthcare suggested increasing competition from other sources
for their traditional supply of labour.
Several managers at regional, district and unit level mentioned local
pay bargaining but did so with great scepticism. One manager
cocrrnented: 'we would need industrial relations skills - no management
would want to take this on yet'. Another suggested that 'local pay
would just lead to poaching - nothing concrete as yet but the
Q-kairman's quite keen to get rid of Whitley'. Potential poaching was
also mentioned by other managers. One manager stressed that local pay
was likely to be used by managers to increase pay to obtain specialist
staff and that urban areas in particular would be likely to want to
pay over the odds to attract staff. A District Personnel Officer
mentioned that local pay seemed inevitable for HCAs and that if local
pay were to come in more generally, the HAs 'would need to band
together...or there will be a ratchet effect. We don't really have
much negotiating experience - nor do the unions'. The fullest view
was given by a manager in an HA which was just becoming an NHS
Hospital Trust:
We would expect a system where inflation was met at national
level and then any excess pay awards were negotiated locally.
However, this would still be dependent on the budget provision
and cash limits. In theory, this could be advantageous. In
practice, we would need a consortium or there would be pay
explosions and poaching. A lot of industrial relations changes
are entailed.
Performance-related pay was not seen by the majority of the managers
as offering any solution to supply deficiencies. Many managers were
deeply opposed to the idea: 'No! I don't see any need for it for
managers, either', 'No! Nursing is a team effort. It's hard to
evaluate performance, especially in low-tec areas. Too many things
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are out of nurses' control', t maybe for managers but nursing is
teamwork - how can you measure direct patient care?', 'No! Even for
general managers.	 Short term objectives are promoted and it's
especially stupid with cash limits'. A couple of managers were
cautiously optimistic about the use of performance related pay for
clinical ward managers, but said it would need much more thought for
grades below that. One manager noted that the ethos of performance-
related pay was fine 'if operated in a totally fair and unbridled
manner' and joked that some General Managers had been 'very
disgruntled' with their own performance pay!.
It has been noted in this chapter that the clinical grading exercise
within a cash-limited system put particular strains on already
constrained resources. One of the stated aims of regrading was to
improve supply deficiencies through better rewards, more flexibility
and a better clinical career path. Managers were thus asked whether
the new grading system had provided an incentive for potential
recruits, an incentive to stay or adequate promotion. This produced a
veritable flood of responses. The broad answer to each question from
the great majority of managers was 'no', particularly for unqualified
staff. However, the individual responses provided a variety of
reasons why this should be so, including some statements which
contradicted earlier responses on the adequacy of pay.
Taking promotion possibilities first, these were perceived to be
largely dependent upon wider funding constraints and also upon
national decisions on the role of nurses in management. As noted in
the introduction, many nurse management roles have evaporated. At
lower levels in the hierarchy, promotion is resource constrained -
depending on service develoçxiient. Managers pointed out that in their
areas there would be a long wait for promotion to sister, for example,
and that only the more mobile nurses could move to obtain promotion.
Clinical grading did not create more posts, and movement to higher
grades (i.e. pay without promotional shift) was largely impossible as
the grading exercise had been conducted in such a way as to reflect
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the job rather than the person doing it, despite early rhetoric and
expectations. Movement to higher grades was in any case cash limited.
Clinical grading is thus best viewed as change at the margins as far
as supply deficiencies are concerned rather than as offering a
fundamentally extended career ladder. Although clinical grades were
extended, this affected a tiny minority of nursing staff. At the
lower end where most nurses are congregated, there was relatively
little change. As one manager put it: 'there are not enough grades in
the system itself'. The effects on recruitment as far as pay and
promotional prospects were concerned were also adjudged by the
majority of managers to have been nil or negligible, with only a
couple of qualified 'yes's'. The qualifications made pertained to the
potential for managers to 'buy' grades but this evidently entails a
loss of budgetary control.
The effects of pay increases arising from clinical regrading on
retention, were again adjudged by managers to have been nil,
negligible or, in some cases, to have been detrimental. One manager
gave a qualified 'yes', with the qualification being that improved
retention would cause incremental drift. A coament at regional level
was that 'clinical grading never achieved from a management
perspective what it was supposed to, especially with respect to the
retention of good staff'. A manager of a prestigious teaching
hospital, who was otherwise quite proud of how the exercise had been
handled locally ('despite the appeals, people felt it was undertaken
fairly') was scathing about the more general way in which clinical
grading had been handled at regional and national level: 'the
definitions were inadequate in the first place, there was no initial
consultation...the exercise was handled very ineptly'. This manager
felt that the success of the exercise would now depend upon how well
cocilpetencies were set for each grade, a view echoed by a ninber of
other managers.
kst managers felt they had handled the exercise locally as fairly as
the national guidelines allowed hit, as one put it 'the unions might
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say otherwise'. All had to work within defined constraints, not the
least of which was their own budget. Most managers now saw the need
to develop advice on career development and to work out career steps
from grade to grade. A number of managers clearly felt that the
exercise may have had some detrimental effects, particularly on staff
morale which would feed through into lowered retention: 'the exercise
has been seen as divisive...morale is not at its highest'. One
manager noted that 'it was a good idea, but it should have been
implemented with more sense'.
A number of managers reported that staff and management had deviated
substantially on definitions of 'continuing responsibility' and
'supervision' - 'we probably never will agree on them...even if
national definitions were changed there would be funding problems
especially over back pay...the aims of clinical grading were never
realised...this has caused terrible upheaval...nursing auxiliaries
expected much more out of it than they got'. A manager particularly
concerned with midwifery staff said 'it was a mess..I don't see the
point of it all. The NAs were all put on the A grade. There were
very bad relations for a while - clinical grading was set up for
nurses and didn't fit midwives'. Yet another referred to the 'trauma
of clinical grading...there was no reward for service, only for the
job itself. People misunderstood that. It was hardest for NAs, the
vast majority were put on grade A and, unlike RGNs, they have no
structure to go up'. One manager pointed out that 'clinical grading
didn't really affect retention nationally'. Another manager felt that
clinical grading 'acted as a disinc.entive...regrading shouldn't have
been mixed up with a pay award'. 'Bad feelings and friction' had also
been experienced through decisions over wards where there were
previously two Sisters. Some managers felt it would be hard in any
case to accredit improvements [if anyl in retention to clinical
grading: 'our general feeling that there is less turnover at the
moment doesn't necessarily arise from clinical grading...it's more
likely that staff may not be as mobile as before because of the state
of the economy'.
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Q.iestions were also asked about 'non-pay' measures which had received
popular exposure in the pay review process and to which the management
side had cocri-nitted itself at national level. Managers' views on the
appropriateness of childcare facilities to aid supply deficiencies
reflected problems with both funds and pay. Several managers were
highly sceptical about the potential for such facilities: 'these are
things for society to change', 'they're not cost effective bet the
unions want them', 'creches are too expensive for nurses', 'nurses are
better off staying at home, at least with the first child', 'there's
no demand yet', 'we don't have any at the moment - staff would sooner
make their own arrangements and tend to sort these out in advance of
job hunting', 'the problem is 24-hour coverage needed from nursing
staff - against this, crechas will always be too expensive'.
Against these views, some managers appeared more pro-active on
childcare and this might be more understandable in the light of a huge
national drive on this issue. However, these managers also pointed
out the relative expense of their childcare facilities to nurses, even
where the district or unit had succeeded in passing on the majority of
costs of running such facilities to independent or voluntary providers
(although space was often provided with some deee. of üuLLcL(
subsidy). The district with the best facilities in the survey
provided some 70 places for over 3,000 nurses. None of the other
districts came anywhere near this number and some had no facilities.
ftst managers thought the use of bank and agency nurses and moves
towards more flexible hours were potentially more successful measures.
All the managers saw a need to attract mature leavers back into the
profession. Such people were regarded as 'very stable and motivated'.
A steady trickle of mature leavers return on bank or agency work
arrangements and a couple of districts had been very pro-active in
running 'come back to nursing' courses or searching for such staff.
However, the general view was that these measures were unlikely to
attract sufficient numbers of returners. Mature women were in general
regarded as highly desirable recruits - one district had made
particular attempts to attract mature women into nurse training, with
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quite some degree of success. Mature women were also seen as
desirable for future HCA and NA roles, although there was much
uncertainty over whether such women would be available given
demographic trends and competition for this type of labour.
Managers had all attempted to recruit from outside their own unit,
district, or region and many advertised nationally, with varying
degrees of success. However, for some specialities in particular, the
result was clearly to shunt shortages around the country, rendering
longer-term local training plans uncertain. Although some movement is
inevitable and desirable, the longer-term implications are much the
same as those which have pertained with private sector training and
poaching in the economy more generally - a skills shortage.
ODNL1JSIONS
The more general point that nursing demand and supply cannot be
considered 'in isolation' from each other or 'from the effects of
other factors relating to wider policy considerations and funding
availability' has been well made elsewhere (Buchan in Robinson et
al,1992:47). However, the categories in this chapter, albeit
mechanistic, have enabled a picture to be lxiilt up of the particular
way in which national decisions on funding and NHS policy impact on
local management, as well as to view the particular concerns of local
management with respect to nursing supply and demand. Whilst the
results are necessarily tentative, there is no reason to suppose that
they are unrepresentative of managerial perspectives in nursing more
generally, allowing for regional variation on supply shortages in
particular. Results were checked against national trends, particular
through DoH statistics and national health authority reports to see if
any particular deviations occurred, and no substantial differences
were found where there were comparable statistics or areas of
discussion. There were broad areas of agreement amongst a sample
which, as far as possible, was randomly chosen, and to which a nearly
100Z response rate was received, thereby reducing the likelihood of
self-selection.
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The main findings were that managers appeared to feel that the
stricter application of national cash limits arid underfundirig of pay
awards had imposed resource problems at local level which had largely
subordinated wider questions of demand for nurses or supply-side
problems. In a highly labour-intensive industry the potential for
non-labour savings or income generation was viewed as relatively
restricted. Pay, grading, training, work organisation and employment
levels therefore caine into particular prominence.
With respect to the links between national pay decisions and local
manpower decisions, there was little evidence from the managers that
national pay awards for nurses were a problem; nursing pay was not
regarded by them as 'too high' and national pay awards allowed them
more time to manage. The clinical grading exercise provided the first
example iii the history of the NHS of a form of 'local pay
determination'. The majority of managers interviewed had been
personally responsible for the time-consuming exercise locally. Their
experiences were on the whole not particularly positive and some 'were
explicitly negative. There was little evidence from managers with a
lifetime's experience of nursing of a demand for local pay
determination - many regarded this as highly problematic from an
industrial relations viewpoint (see also Seifert, 1990:54), and
because of the uncertainty of the results which might ensue in terms
of pay and potential skill shortages.
The way in which awards were funded and implemented was of more
concern to managers. In these respects, the main problem for the
managers was not their exclusion from the pay process and the
potential for explicit income-employment trade-off s, but rather how
to provide an effective nursing workforce against wider resource
constraints which feed through in unpredictable ways and promote
short-terinism and reactive employment policy. This problem had become
particularly acute after clinical grading and the tightened resource
constraints of the latter part of the 1980's, and managers had come
under increasing pressure to make adjustments in employment due to
limited scope for savings elsewhere. 'Local manpower decisions' were,
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however, seen to be again more limited than might be expected and
driven by national policy. In particular, hospital restructuring arid
changes in the provision of elderly and mental health services had
occurred. (langes in shifts and a more general intensification of
nursing workloads could only proceed so far. It has been seen that
nurse employment levels, against a variety of measures of pure demand,
must be considered to have been a casualty, with the effects remaining
to be fully felt, particularly in terms of the decline in service
provision.
The main alternative to reductions in nurse employment were seen as
more radical skill- or grade-mix solutions, again driven by national
policy and raising questions concerning the quality and quantity of
future healthcare provision. New national training initiatives were
seen as an integral part of the changes, combining with funding
constraints to impose the need for changes in grade-mix. Such changes
would act to change the structure of demand, but could also be seen as
being, in part, a response to supply problems. All the managers
expected radical changes in grade-mix in the near future, failing
radical changes in funding. These changes were envisaged to lead to a
smaller core of trained nurses and a larger periphery of untrained
nurses. The important reasons for this and implications are examined
in the next chapter, which reviews the issue of grade-mix changes,
training and wider healthcare resourcing in more detail and explores
their interconnections with changes in provision of services and pay
determination.
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This chapter reviews the issues 'underlying' the wage determination
process which are seen to be critical from the perspective of local
management. These concern employment levels, training, skills and
grading, in the wider context of healthcare funding and provision.
The analysis proceeds from a focus on grade-mix changes in the 1980s
to recent change and dilemmas in 'reshaping the workforce' in the
1990s. This focus highlights the interlinkages between the issues and
explores causation in grade-mix. It is argued that the role of local
managers and of trade unions in particular needs to be taken into
account. There is a high degree of uncertainty in cost minimisation
strategies based on grade-mix changes, which is located in the
conflicting perspectives on nursing work and the nursing workforce and
a lack of understanding at policy level of the effects of grade-mix
changes on wages.
GRADE-MIX IN ThE 1980s
It will be recalled from Qiapter Two that the early history of NHS
nursing employment was characterised by a general expansion in line
with the growth of healthcare, a long-term decline in training, and an
ongoing process of grade dilution. Partly due to grade-mix decisions
in the expanding 'cindarella' services and partly due to wider
nationally-led cost containment initiatives throughout the service,
the dilution was enabled by changes in training (ENs) and grade
recognition (NAs) and the use of overseas and part-time labour. Thus,
despite the Salmon Committee's 1966 elongation of the managerial
hierarchy in nursing and the granting in 1974 to the most senior nurse
managers of equal status with doctors and administrators in planning
the health service, the period could reasonably be described as
exhibiting few gains for the 'professionalisers'. Far from closing
the profession, nursing appeared to be increasingly diluted from
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below. It was argued that the changing composition of the nursing
workforce was a major stimulus to the growth of membership and
influence of the TUC-trade unions which were, in turn, able to
militate for higher pay and to influence the professional associations
in their own approach to pay.
This led in the early 1980's to what may well have been viewed by a
government coninitted to rolling back the state, reducing the power of
unions and with a much wider agenda, as a potential crisis in an
electorally sensitive area at a time of great unpopularity for the
government itself. If part of the solution was seen to be the Pay
Review Body, it has been suggested that this did not remove the
material basis for conflict and has been accompanied by a growing
ambivalence on the part of government towards levels and methods of
pay determination. The drive to pay decentralisation gathered pace in
the latter part of the 1980's, as did the severity of resource
constraints felt by local management as a result of underfunding of
pay awards. This has led in turn to a re-consideration of changes in
grade-mix at both national and local level.
Historically, therefore, there has been an interplay and tension
between cost minimisation and constraint strategies based on wage
settlements or mix of staff. It is in now turning in more detail to
the 'non-pay' aspects of nursing employment that the contradictions
within and between these strategies can be more clearly identified.
Grade Enrichment
After several decades of grade dilution, grade enrichment appeared to
occur in the 1980s and, if this passed with relatively little conent,
it also remains relatively unexplained. On the surface, this appeared
to mark a sharp break with the past.
Grade-mix refers to the differential proportions of grades of staff in
the overall nursing workforce. The interest in grade-mix which was
expressed in all the fieldwork interviews, however, stems from its
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much wider significance. Firstly, enlarging the relative proportions
of lower grades employed is a way of attempting to reduce the overall
wages bill, or as has been demonstrated of attempting to contain cost
at a time of expansion. It therefore forms a primary cost
minimisation or containment strategy in its own right. Secondly,
grade-mix tends to subsume assumptions about the skill-mix of a
workforce. For example, a 'richer t
 grade-mix might be regarded as a
'more skilled' workforce and be expected to produce a greater quantity
and/or quality of work. Most of the debate around grade-mix change
has focused on the validity or otherwise of this second effect.
Grade-mix, skill-mix and skill substitution or dilution are, in fact,
distinct conceptual issues (see Buchan and Ball, 1991:28). However,
the interlinkages are such that debates on grade-mix draw out the
deeper debates on skills valuation and usage. The emphasis of
interest in this effect has rather tended to detract from some
important contradictions with the first effect on the wages bill and
this chapter corrects for this. Interest has also tended to focus on
'qualified' versus 'unqualified' staff proportions; here it is
suggested that it is fruitful to disaggregate registered and enrolled
nurses and learners and nursing auxiliaries.
TABLE 7.1 GRADE-MIX CHANGES IN ThE 1980s
Year	 % Qualified (of which)
	
Learners
	
Unqualified
RGN E1
1982
	
55
	
39 16
	
21
	
24
1990
	
62
	
46 16 [1]
	
14
	
24
[1] The 1990 figures for RGN and E split are estimates. In 1982, Es
accounted for 16% of total nursing & midwifery staff, with other
qualified nurses accounting for some 39%. ENs cannot be separately
identified after clinical grading, but from other (HPSSS 1990) figures
they remained roughly constant. Thereafter, a number of ENs appear to
have been subsumed under RGN statistics due to inadequate methods of
data collection (interviews and HPSSS 1992 tables and notes).
Source: Calculated from PRB reports (various years)
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thoking at employment by qualification for the 1980's as a whole,
Table 7.1 shows that a change appeared to take place from 55:45 in
1982 to 62:38 in 1990. The precise measurement of this change depends
greatly upon which health service statistics are used and, for the
sake of consistency, the following grade-mix have been calculated from
nursing statistics contained in each of the PRB Reports. Interviews
with local managers also showed a split of roughly 60:40 for their
overall nursing workforces at the end of this period.
Whilst the magnitude of change may not seem remarkable, the direction
of change certainly is. Although it could be read as representing a
more 'professional' workforce, it also represents a more expensive mix
of staff in the 1980s than in previous decades which would seem at
first glance quite inconsistent with government initiatives on cost
efficiency and current policy proposals on skill-mix. Whilst this
might form a powerful explanation for subsequent policy proposals, the
question is begged as to how such a situation arose. At this level of
aggregation, the figures show a decrease in training matched by an
increase in RGNs but this does not explain the change. Such an
explanation requires a wider-ranging analysis of other changes taking
place in nursing employment over the 1980s.
flnployment Levels and Healthcare Provision
thoking firstly at the eiidence on healthc.are provision in the 1980's
in more detail, fairly conservative measures of increasing demand for
healthcare in HQiS through demographic pressure, technological change
and DoH priorities were generally viewed as being some 27 per annum
(see RHSG,1987:46 noting the DHSS's acceptance of this figure in 1986,
also Maynard & Bosanquet, 1986). From Table 7.2 it can be seen that
public health expenditure, however, stagnated then declined as a
measure of GNP in the 1980s. Although this ratio fluctuates with
changes in output, it can be seen that there has been no great uplift
in health expenditure. Using similar measures, Harrison et al. have
argued that, even taking CIPs into account, the 'available evidence
suggests that, during the 1980's, expenditure on the NHS has not kept
-223-
TABLE 7.2 NATIONAL PUBLIC HEALTh EXPE2DTJ1JRE
AS A % OF GNP (market prices)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
5.0	 5.2	 5.0	 5.2	 5.1	 5.0	 5.0	 4.9	 4.8	 4.9
Source: Calculations from CSO Blue Book 1990
pace with increased demand' (1990:37, see also Social Services
Coninittee 1988).
These figures are reflected in nursing employment levels. Figures on
nursing employment are politically sensitive and there is, partly due
to this sensitivity and partly due to default, a notorious dearth of
timely, consistent and disaggregated NHS data (see RHSG, l987:pp36-7l
on data problems). Series compiled from 1980 and which do not correct
for the change in hours from 40 to 37% which occurred as part of the
Clegg settlement can overstate nurse employment by as much as 5%.
Series from different data sources also give different results (see,
for example, tables in NAI-IAT, 1991:158, 225).
TABLE 7.3 WTE NUMBERS OF NURSING STAFF IN GREAT BRITAIN
1982 482,000
1983 483,000
1984 482,000
1985 486,000
1986 487,000
1987 489,000
1989 490,700 m
1989 490,500
1990 485,000 [1]
1991 483,500
in = figure for March, all others are September
[1] Some categories of nurses were excluded in 1990 (PRB 1992:23),
but the general decrease is not invalidated.
Source: compiled from PRB Reports, 1984-1993
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A more representative characterisation of whole time equivalent (WI'E)
nurse employment levels in the 1980's is shown in Table 7.3. This
uses a relatively consistent and uncontroversial series drawn instead
from the Pay Review Body reports and starting from base year 1982 to
avoid the problems of changes in hours [1:1. The virtual stagnation of
nursing employment during the 1980's as a whole and the decline at the
end of the decade is clearly visible here. For interest, the most
recent data for the early 1990s is also shown and it can be seen that
the speed of absolute decline in employment has increased sharply.
The above figures represent an increase in total nursing arid midwifery
staff between 1982 and 1990 of only 0.6% or around 1% at best allowing
for data inconsistencies (see also Buchan and Ball, 1991:2 who arrive
at a similar figure). Even taking the peak number in March 1989, an
average increase of only O.2°h per annum for the period would apply.
Figure 7.1 plots these movements against the hypothetical number of
nurses that would have been employed had an average 2Z increase per
annum been achieved, on the assumption that demand for nurses rose in
line with demand for healthcare provision.
FIGURE 7.1 HYPOIHEICAL DEMAND VERSUS ACIUAL NURSING EAPL0Y4EJT
Source: Calculated from PRB reports and estimated cumulative increase
in demand.
Lii This series is fairly consistent with HPSSS 1990-1992 and
Management Side Evidence for the 1991 and 1992 reviews.
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The assumption that the demand for nurses rises in line with the
demand for healthcare provision is a contentious one. The intermediate
area in Figure 7.1 , or 'gap' between an actual peak increase of 9,000
nurses and a hypothetical pure demand for an increase of 82,500
nurses, may partly have been narrowed through use of other staff
groups, changes in medical techniques, or increases in nursing
productivity/work intensity (for example, through an overall rise in
skill level, changes in work organisation increasing efficiency, or
simply harder work or informal increases in hours). 'Met demand' has
certainly been higher than the stagnation of nursing employment would
imply, with increasing numbers of outpatients, day patients and other
patients being treated each year (Buchan & Ball, 1991:2; Buchan 1992,
Nursing Times v88 n4). Although it is almost certain that 'purer'
measures of demand have not been met, the debate then extends to how
close 'met' demand has come to the purer measure through productivity
increase. Data is evidently not available for precise measures of
this effect. However, the fieldwork and aggregate data is suggestive.
Firstly, there is little evidence to suggest that demand for patient
care has been met by other staff groups. Nurses provide 80% of direct
patient care and, if anything, interviews with nurses and managers
suggested that extra pressures were accruing. There have been some
increases in other staff groups over the 1980s, mainly in professional
and	 technical	 and	 administrative	 and	 clerical	 staff
(NAHAT,1991:especially pp225). However, figures showing the
percentage increases in employment numbers of these groups usually
overstate their importance in aggregate employment terms; nurses
account for over 50% of the HCkIS workforce, and these groups could
only have had a marginal effect on increases in activity, particularly
as rises in activity also increase the demand for other staff groups.
The interviews in fact suggested that extra pressures were accruing to
nurses from other staff groups. In particular, the overlap between
medical work and nursing work, and between ancillary work and nursing
work has been historically fluid and an important factor in the 1980s.
Changes in technology and in doctors' hours, along with the drive to
'nurse-practitioners', mean that nurses have increasingly taken over
-226-
tasks which previously would have been designated for doctors. The
recent decrease in ancillary workers (even allowing for contracting-
out) has put additional pressures on nurses to undertake cleaning and
other 'domestic' tasks. Nurses also claimed that considerable
additional administrative burdens had been placed on them in the
1980s, partly as a result of the managerial and NHS reforms, an.i ts
had placed additional pressure on time available for direct patient
care.
However, on the evidence of fieldwork and aggregate data, the 'gap'
also cannot be considered to have been made up through work
intensification or 'skill-mix' changes. Work intensification has
undoubtedly occurred and can be seen not only in the PRB's
acknowledgement of increased workloads for nurses but also in the
findings from recent studies. For example, in their profile of
qualified nurses, with responses from more than 3,000 nurses, Sec.combe
and Ball found that 'in the main, nurses were dissatisfied with the
workloads they were confronted with, and the majority felt the
staffing levels were inadequate' (1992:96). The same study found that
'aL-rost three quarters of the sample agreed that working in excess of
normal hours was an inevitable part of their jobs' (ibid). An earlier
survey by Buchan and Seccombe found that 'the largest clinical groups
- sister/charge nurse, staff nurse and enrolled nurse - reported
average excess hours of between five and seven hours per week' with
staff shortages and peaks in workload being the two most coiinonly
cited reasons (Nurses Work and Worth,:vii). Much of this overtime is
unpaid. Skill-mix changes were also seen in the grade enrichment, but
is offset to some extent by that fact that technological change works
to increase the demand for qualified nurses in particular. However,
more generally, increases in activity, whether from advances in
medical technique or faster throughput for other reasons, have also
increased the demand for nurses through raised dependency levels
whilst patients are in hospital.
The fieldwork in fact suggested that the increases in demands on
nurses have almost certainly tended to counter the effects of
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productivity increase and have produced a spiralling year on year
pressure on nursing staff - and on the ability to meet demand. There
is an obv-ious physical limit to extensions to the working day and
intensification of work arid the productivity increases that could be
achieved in this way are thus limited. These pressures provide some
indication of the degree of crisis perceived by managers in
interviews, particularly at the point of an absolute downturn in nurse
employment levels, and are particularly worrying as the exercise
conducted here says little about 'quality' of care. As the health
authorities have noted 'staff shortages and an increasing workload
impose great strain on the nurse' (NAHAT, 1991:174), but this rather
underestimates the significance of this for the provision of
haalthcare. Quite apart from quality, such pressures in the late
1980s meant that most managers and nurses felt that the gap between
'pure' demand and 'met' demand was actually widening. Thus, failing
increases in nurse numbers, pressures would continue to fall on met
demand through service reductions or pressures for grade-mix changes.
The above account of the extent of resource squeeze provides some
measure of the impetus for change in the early 1990s. However, there
are further influences in causation in grade-mix changes. Less
aggregated employment data by qualification and full-time/part-time
distinction is also useful in distinguishing between nursing staff
fluctuations and aggregate levels. Losses, particularly in 1983, when
the government ordered HAs to make reductions of staff (RHSG,1987:54),
and in the latter part of the 1980's, were concentrated on nursing
auxiliaries with losses mainly amongst part-time NAs. Enrolled nurse
employment peaked in 1985 and has been steadily declining since, with
a slight shift from full-time to part-time employment. There was a
steady increase in registered nurses, mainly of full-timers, although
data from 1989 overstates their increase (HPSSS, 1990:56-57;1992:54-
55). This data gives some further clues to the complexity of effects
on grademix taking place in the 1980s but, at this level, again
provides few explanations. Thus, before turning to managerial views
on grademix in the 1980s, the service, training, and sectoral effects
on grademix need to be evaluated.
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Service Changes
The three main HCHS services in terms of magnitude of nursing
employment are: general nursing, mental illness and handicap, and care
of the elderly, with the latter two being the so-called 'cindarella'
services. These services employ very different grade-mixes. The broad
distributions in 1988 can be seen in Table 7.4.
TABLE 7.4 GRADENIX DIFFERE210ES BY SERVICE
% Qualified Unqualified Learners Total No.
General Nursing	 57	 14	 29	 161,110
Mental Illness and Handicap 	 51	 38	 11	 90,570
Care of the Elderly	 55	 45	 -	 41,150
SOURCE: Calculcated from NHS Workforce in England,1990:p C18
Data are extremely poor and unreliable at lower levels of aggregation.
However, using Management Side Evidence for the 1991 Review for the
years 1985-1989 (pp56-61) and prior to the later data confusions, it
can be seen that there was an overall decline in the total numbers of
nursing staff involved in general nursing and in care of the elderly.
In general nursing, there was a slight increase in qualified staff,
with the losses being accounted for entirely by NAs and learners. In
care of the elderly, there were losses of both qualified and
unqualified staff but the losses were disproportionately centred on
NAs (12% against 5%). The largest losses of NAs overall were in this
service. Within mental illness and handicap, by contrast, with a very
modest overall employment growth, employment of qualified nurses
remained level while NA employment slightly increased. Grade dilution
therefore continued and offset a decline in learners in this part of
the service.
There appeared to be two particular effects on the demand side.
Firstly, and consistent with fieldwork findings, the 1980's have
witnessed absolute service losses in care of the elderly in terms of
both nursing staff arid beds (for the latter, see HPSSS 1990). This
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has also occurred in parts of generalL nursing, particularly for long-
stay beds as the distinctions between care of the elderly in
specialist or general wards and hospitals have become increasingly
blurred. The flip side of this decline in NIIS provision has been an
expansion in private sector provision with private nursing homes
accounting for the largest share of the increase in private healthcare
value. This process is also taking place in provision of mental
illness and handicap facilities as large public institutions are
closed down; this has yet to feed into nursing statistics, although it
was strongly noted in fieldwork interviews.
The effect on grade-mix has been relatively 'mechanistic' to the
extent that implicit customary decisions about appropriate grade-mix
have continued or been reinforced. It was noted in Qiapter 2 that
grade dilution occurred, in part, as cindarella services expanded in
previous decades. Likewise, grade 'enrichment' appears to occur as
such services contract and disproportionate numbers of NAs and E1's
are lost. Thus, the underlying process of grade dilution is not
negated and this could clearly be seen in its continuation in mental
nursing. Under conditions of relatively stagnant overall employment,
this has been an important effect, both in explaining the stagnation
and, in part, the changing grade-mix. This 'sectoral shift' is
policy- and resource-driven and it was clear from local interviews
that the 'rationalisation' of services had proceeded apace,
particularly in the latter part of the 1980's and prior to the NHS
reforms. This cannot be considered to be unlinked to national policy
on private healthcare activity, as will be seen below.
To the extent that shifts can be observed within general nursing from
long-stay to higher-tec nursing, and with a growth in the higher-tec
specialities, it is clear that the influence of managerial or
professional judgement must also have been important in producing
specific grade-mix combinations. Such judgernent must also have been
influenced by changes in training, which are now reviewed.
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Training
Training changes have had a strong effect on grade-mix in the 1980s.
Training levels continued an historic trend of decline but this
decline became critical in the 1980s. The number of learners of all
types (students, pupils and post-registration) continued its historic
decline, both proportionally and absolutely. With the exception of
very small numbers of post-registration training specialties, the
decline has been steady in post-registration training and in first and
second level (pre-registration) nurse training, with a slight upturn
in the latter from 1989 (see Management Side Evidence, especially
1992:55). Most dramatically, pupil (EN) training, whilst previously
on a steady decline, has now virtually disappeared; there were only
347 new entrants in 1991, compared with 6,000 in 1986 and over 20,000
in 1982. This decline was under way prior to its official
incorporation into training policy as part of the Project 2000
exercise (detailed below) which has now 'red circled' the EN role.
Conversion to 1st-level registration has so far been slow (see Nursing
Times, various issues) and may continue to be so if not fully funded
by the employer (Staff Side Evidence for 1993, 1992:17) although it
may have slightly 'boosted' RGN numbers. By 1990, given slow
gestation and funding implications, Project 2000 students had barely
fed through into the overall picture with only just over 1,000
students, although this figure rose to 4,000 in 1991.
It has been argued that the decline in EN training occurred mainly
because of demand conditions with training schools no longer keen to
offer this training (Clay,1987:105). However, for a grade which has
been referred to as 'one of the health service's biggest confidence
tricks [with] pupil nurse courses filled in the 1950s and 1960s by
recruits from Mauritius, the Phillipines and elsewhere, who were
misled into believing they were doing a registered nurse training that
would put them on a secure career path' (ibid), it is also likely that
strong factors were operating on the supply side, not uninfluenced by
the grade's low pay and poor promotion prospects. Most importantly,
the supply of foreign recruits had been in decline since the 1970's.
-231-
These effects naturally fed through into employment. As noted, EN
employment peaked in 1985 and has been in steady decline since then.
Thus, despite the apparent continuation of earlier trends, the 1980's
witnessed what might be considered to be a relative crisis in training
and an impending crisis in employment as, with or without conversion,
there would be a smaller pool of qualified nurses to draw from.
Figures from Management Side Evidence for the 1992 Review (pp54) show
that the gap between numbers of nurses completing pre-registration
nurse training and the net losses of qualified staff dangerously
narrowed during the latter part of the 1980s to the extent that few
managers in interview were confident of keeping up their
'professional' workforce. The concomitant decline in post-
registration of midwives, health visitors and district nurses is also
of considerable concern given proposals for increased 'care in the
coranunity' in the 1990 NHS and Coarnunity Care Act.
Growth of the Private Sector
The growth of the private healthcare sector in the 1980s has, in part,
fuelled and accorririodated the service shifts in the public sector and
bolstered the changes in grade-mix. It has not, however, resolved the
wider pressures of demand for healthcare and nurses and it has
introduced new problems for future changes in grade-mix in the NHS.
Private healthcare expenditure rose from 0.5% of GDP in 1979 to 0.8%
in 1986 (see The Directory of Independent Hospitals & Health Services
1988/89), and has been continuing to rise since. In 1989, private and
voluntary hospitals and nursing homes supplied 15.3% of all U.K.
hospital-based treatment and care compared with 7.5% in 1984 and the
value of such services amounted to £2.7 billion in 1989, split between
acute services and non-acute nursing home care (from Laing &
Buisson,1991 in NAHAT,1991:210). 	 Even taking public and private
provision in combination, there is little evidence that this change in
public/private sector mix has improved the U.K. position in the
international league or satisfied additional demand from demographic
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and technological change. Public and private healthcare expenditure
in the U.K. jointly add up to a significantly lower proportion of GDP
than that found in many advanced capitalist countries (see EEC
comparisons in RHSG, 1987:100-101, and OECD figures in Harrison at
al, 1990:42) and overall expenditure for the public and private
healthcare sectors remained fairly constant as a proportion of GDP
from 1981 (see Harrison et al, 1990:34) against slow average annual
growth in GDP itself during the 1980's. The main change appears to
have been a substitution of private activity for public activity.
There has been a measure of success in 'rolling back the state' with
respect to healthcare in line with Conservative policy. The
Conservative Research Department stated in 1986 that 'the Government
believes that a thriving private sector strengthens the NHS by
relieving some of the pressure on it and by providing an alternative
way of developing good practice and improved forms of treatment'
(quoted in RHSG,1987:108) and this position was maintained in the
White Paper of 1989 'Working for Patients'. Taken literally, the
basis for this view remains highly contentious. RHSG, for example,
have argued that 'there is no evidence to suggest that the growth of
the private sector since 1979 has strengthened the NHS...furthermore
the question of its impact on health has not even been raised'
(ibid:121). Nonetheless, private healthcare has clearly substituted
for the public sector in some aspects of healthcare provision.
A closer examination of the two halves of private sector activity -
hospitals and nursing homes reveals, however, that this has been at
cost to the public sector and also rebounds upon nursing grade-mix and
employment in the NHS. In the private hospital sector, over 55% of
beds are now owned by for-profit operators, with this accounting for
over 60% of all revenue (Fitzhugh Directory of Health Care Information
Services 1988). The huge expansion in what should correctly be termed
the 'independent' sector has occurred in the for-profit growth of
hospitals, with charitable provision remaining roughly constant in
terms of hospital numbers and beds and therefore declining as a
proportion of total provision (see Table 7.5). American groups formed
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the largest proportion of profitable activity in 1986 (RHSG,1987:110)
although NAFIAT note the 'most remarkable trend' of the late 1980's for
European groups to be replacing US groups (1991:212).
TABLE 7.5 GROWTH OF HOSPITALS IN ThE INDEDE1T SECIOR
Year Type of Provision Hospital Numbers Beds % of Total Provision
	
1979 Qiaritable	 88
	
4775	 71.4
	
For Profit	 62
	
1916	 28.6
	
1988 Charitable	 87
	
4679	 45.1
	
For Profit	 116
	
5692	 54.9
(Source: Laing & Buisson 1987 for 1979 figures, and Independent
Hospitals Association for 1988 figures in Buchan, Nursing Standard, 28
March 1990).
The extent to which such private sector growth has 'strengthened' the
NHS through taking on work which would have been handled by the NHS,
or by setting an example of best practice, is much disputed, not least
because 'efficiency' gains would have to be offset against the need
for profit. There is little doubt that 'it is still only a small
minority of the population who have access to these services'
(Harrison et al,199O:53) and that the growth of profit-oriented
healthcare therefore distorts provision. The services are concentrated
in the South East, with 'private medical insurance [the main form of
funding] still concentrated in the more affluent parts of the country
and the social spectrum' (RHSG,1987:115) and largely promoted through
company schemes rather than individual subscribers (at the end of
1989, there were an estimated 3.4 million policy holders in the UK -
NAHAT,199O:111). However, such subscribers are 'the people who are
less likely to experience ill health' (RHSG,1987:121).
The expansion of the second main activity of the private health sector
- that of nursing homes and care of the elderly - also has wider
implications. Private nursing homes have accounted for the largest
share of the increase in private healthcare value. After ophthalmic
services and fertility regulation, care of the elderly is now the most
highly privatised sector of mainstream healthcare in Britain, with
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care provided in institutional settings absorbing the bulk of
resources. According to NAI-IAT, the run down of local authority
provision was followed by a rapid expansion of private residential
homes and, a little later, by a similar expansion of nursing homes.
This took place against a background of 'static or declining provision
in NHS long-stay geriatric and psychogeriatric wards':
Much of this expansion in private sector capacity has been funded
by supplementary benefits (now income support)...social security
funding of residents in private and voluntary residential and
nursing homes in Great Britain (all client types) rose from LiOrn
in 1979 to an annualised figure of £1,270rn in May 1990. With the
implementation of the Government's coarnunity care reforms now
being phased, income support will remain the largest and fastest
growing source of public subsidy for people entering nursing and
residential homes, until the budget is transferred to local
authorities in 1993 (1991:210,214-215).
In 1990, there were an estimated 319,000 places in private and
voluntary homes for the elderly compared with 211,000 in all public
sector establishments. 36% of the cost in long-term care of the
elderly was publicly financed and supplied, 24% publicly financed and
privately supplied (mainly through DSS vouchers with a small balance
through contracts), 34% privately financed and supplied and 6%
privately financed and publicly supplied (local authority charges).
NAHAT have suggested that the decline in the volume of NHS long-stay
provision:
is likely to continue or to accelerate as the NHS is forced to
focus its limited budget on acute and primary care. Local
authority provision has also started to decline in the last few
years as financial pressures have increased (ibid:214).
The independent sector has also been playing a 'major role in creating
new facilities for mentally ill and mentally handicapped people as
large NHS institutions are run down'. In 1990, such facilities
accounted for around 23-24% of the institutional bed stock - with the
increase also overtaking public provision (ibid), though, as noted,
these changes have yet to appear in nursing employment data.
The general lack of national standards and accountability for the
independent sector mean that little statistical evidence can be
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provided for the government's arguments about 'best practice'. A
growing amount of evidence now exists concerning standards of care in
the private homes sector, however, which would suggest that 'relief'
measured on a cash or bed basis would not be appropriate. One of the
few systematic reports on private residential homes for the elderly,
'The Realities of Home Life', coninissioned by the West Midlands County
Council Economic Develonent Unit and co-published by NUP, found
that:
the majority of homes in no way conformed, or were
attempting to conform, to the standards of care, staffing
levels and quality of life as laid down by the Government's
own Code of Practice (1986:22; see also tharter for
Coninunity Care, COHSE, NA1.G0, NUPE, 1991:10).
Sharp practice on fees in nursing homes has been acknowledged by Tony
Newton, Conservative Minister to the House of Coninons Social Services
Select Coirinittee (11.6.91): 'the exploitation is widely
acknowledged...t*it there is nothing I can do about it' (11.6.91,
HMSO).	 Fraudulent practice and abuse of patients has also been
reported (see, for example, Observer,21.7.1991). In part, as a
divisional trade union official explained, the problem lies in the
fact that council and health authorities lack the physical resources
to check on standards of care and the financial resources to take over
responsibilities if a home has to be closed 'so social services fight
shy of deregistration'. Interviews with the appropriate manager at a
district health authority in the West Midlands region in an urban area
suggested that standards vary between HAs: 'we're strict on 24-hour
RGN or RMN cover here but some other HAs allow second level nurses'.
The particular HA concerned had never closed a home despite the recent
growth in numbers. Thus, although growth in private homes has
nominally 'relieved the NHS' it has been largely funded from public
expenditure elsewhere (DSS) which now has also to allow for a profit
element, and the 'quality' of care remains very contentious.
Both types of private sector expansion have affected the type and
variety of provision in the NHS and to this extent have affected
grade-mix and employment of nurses in the NHS. The growth of
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employment of nurses in the private sector is shown in Table 7.6.
This shows that between 1982 and 1988, the number of qualified nurses
in the independent sector (hospitals, homes and clinics) doubled,
while there was a three-fold increase in the number of unqualified
nurses. The trend has been continuing upwards since then, so it is
likely that there are now more than 60,000 nurses working in the
independent sector. This probably understates the increases due to
definitional problems over unqualified staff working in nursing or
non-nursing residential homes, for example as care assistants.
TABLE 7.6 NURSING STAFF IN ThE INDEPE2DENT SECI'OR
(whole-time equivalents, England)
Trained	 Untrained	 Total
1982	 12,208	 10,416	 22,623
1988	 25,836	 30,611	 56,447
Source: J. Buchan, 'Growing Independents', Nursing Standard,
March 28, 1990) and the National Audit Office,
The NHS and Independent Hospitals, (1989, HMSO).
A study on the movement of nurses between sectors indicated that the
NHS experienced a gross loss to the independent sector (hospitals and
homes) of about 1,800 qualified nurses in 1985 with the net loss
representing about 0.4% of their total qualified nursing manpower
(Thomas, Nicholl and Williams, 1988). Though this figure may appear
small, it may be set against the total increase in total nursing staff
for the NHS of only 0.6% mentioned above for the whole period 1982-
1990 as opposed to the single year covered in the study. The
'leakage' is concentrated, in the case of private hospitals, in
specific regions and specific groups within the N}{S workforce,
especially nurses under 30 years of age with specialist skills such as
theatre nursing, renal nursing, intensive care and oncology.
The study suggested that the future growth of private hospitals might
quite substantially deplete the poo1 of qualified theatre nurses
available to the NHS. Regional concentration has traditionally been in
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the South East, but the evidence in the previous chapter suggested
that develoxnents in the West Midlands are now giving rise to
shortages of nursing staff in certain specialities through competition
with the private sector. Younger, specialist nurses are very mobile,
so leakage spreads to all regions. NAHAT have observed that 'the
increasing scale of private activity alongside the expected national
nurse shortage will ensure that transfer of scarce skills from the NHS
remains a live issue' (1991:212).
Evidence on unqualified staff, where the greatest leakage has
occurred, is even less satisfactory than that on qualified staff.
Whilst it is apparent that leakage has occurred it is not possible to
identify the balance between experienced ax-employees of the NHS (a
formal loss of expertise for the NHS) and people employed from the
same pool that the NHS would obtain staff. One nurse manager
suggested in interview that, in either respect, this had become an
increasing problem in the 1980s and would have implications for the
proposals on NHS grade-mix in the 1990's. In the DHA concerned, there
had been a massive expansion in local private homes at the same time
that the HA was attempting to change grade-mix in favour of cheaper,
unqualified staff.
The growth in private healthcare activity has thus had mixed effects
on nursing grade-mix and employment in the 1980's. In one respect, it
has relieved some of the pressure of demand in the NHS, although the
extent of such relief and standards of care remain very contentious
and much of the shift has still been underwritten by the government
from public funds. In another respect, it has increasingly been
competing for scarce staff and benefiting from Ni-iS training. With the
major growth in healthcare demand coming from the growth in the
elderly population, this analysis cautions against simplistic
propositions on future grade-mix in the public sector and demonstrates
the importance of locating grade-mix against the wider provision of
healthcare.
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Managerial and Professional Judgemerit
The preceding sections have shown the increasingly narrow margins
within which management have been able to exercise judgernent on
staffing but this may be seen to be particularly important in general
acute nursing and the higher-tec specialities. Such judgement may be
influenced by national initiatives, by local resource constraints and
by 'professional' or 'judgeinental' values. Nurse managers have to
make day-to-day decisions on appropriate grade-mix. Whilst this
process remains relatively invisible in the large and poorly
docunented area of general nursing, fieldwork interviews with managers
and nurses suggested this was an important issue, despite the
Griffiths managerial reforms and a generally-acknowledged loss of
power and jobs for senior nurse managers (see Strong and
Robinson,1990). In part this is explained by the tenacity of those
managers who have remained in place and managed to define a role for
themselves, but in part it is also explained by the fact that
'professional' values are inculcated at much lower levels in nursing.
Interview results were relatively invariant to the level of nurse
manager (district, unit, ward) and demonstrated a 'collective' view on
professionalism.
It is difficult to see how nurses could be entirely excluded from
employment decisions as nurse managers who have been placed in
'quality assurance' capacities or asked to assune managerial
responsibility can hardly separate who is hired and on what grade from
questions of quality. Whilst there were some nurse managers in
interview who felt they had been excluded from this process and
despaired of it, others had managed to make plain to other managers
that they had a vital role to play. There can be little doubt that
wider politics, macho styles of management and views on
professionalism and quality of health service provided on the part of
other managers, particularly general managers, has had a vital
influence on the differential outcomes for nurse managers.
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The pay review process and the develoxnent of Project 2000 ensured
some measure of success for the 'professionalising' element in
nursing, in terms of both pay and status, arid this could have been
expected in the context in which the PRB was formed. The employment
statistics reviewed earlier suggest that full-time qualified nurses
were 'preferred' in the 1980's, particularly in higher-tec areas, even
under resource constraints and within the overall stagnation of
employment. Managers, whilst conducting skilimix reviews inspired by
national initiatives, appeared to resist grade dilution and the
potential cost saving to be made in this way.
The fieldwork interviews suggested that the great majority of nurse
managers had a strong professional identification and clearly felt
that they had exercised 'clinical judgement' in grade-mix decisions.
In the changed circumstances of the 1980s, the grade-mix of 60:40
represented a new and desirable 'benchmark'. A fairly typical manager
reported his view of grademix in the 1980's. He identified some of
the pressures of the 1980's as he saw them in terms of staffing the
wards of his hospital. New technology and increased throughput had
increased the demand for qualified nurses, with more complicated
equipment to monitor. Shorter stays produced a higher dependency of
patients. Qualified nurses' time had been increasingly occupied by
administrative duties in line with national and regional initiatives
and the NHS reforms. Learners, who are part-trained, were in
dwindling supply.
Faced with the choice between filling a vacancy previously occupied by
a qualified nurse with an inexperienced NA or a qualified nurse, he
would opt for a qualified nurse albeit, if possible given labour
supply constraints, one on a lower grade (F1'Ts were target groups for a
number of managers). His hospital had seen a run-down of its elderly
and long-stay facilities in favour of limited, hi-tec service
development. Where service developments did occur, this manager and
many others had staffed according to their perceived needs for grade-
mix. Thus, although skill-mix reviews of various types had been
conducted, this manager clearly felt that his professional judgement
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remained the final arbiter in balancing quality and cost
considerations. The manager also noted that professional judgernent
could also be used on occasion to overrule the findings of skill-mix
reviews when these suggested more staff were needed: 'skill-mix
reviews are a double-edged sword'.
This general view was echoed by many managers. Whilst work had
undoubtedly intensified for all the nurses under their remit, and
whilst 'extra pairs of hands' had not been available because of
resource constraints, most felt they had aimed to survive the 1980's
with a nursing workforce just about intact and able to attend ill
people. There was a high degree of agreement over the 60:40
benchmark and one manager defended it, suggesting that:
'the grade-mix is a conscious decision, made for clinical
reasons...fewer qualified nurses would represent a drop in
quality'.
However, a number of the districts, and the region as a whole, were
moving rapidly towards a 50:50 grademix and all the managers saw grade
dilution occurring in the future. The main impetus was perceived to
be the change in training taking place in the late 1980s under
circumstances of already tight resource constraints.
RECENT Q-IANGES AND PROSPECTS FOR ThE 1990s
If managers viewed the end of the 1980s as an emerging crisis point in
nursing provision, changes in training were to exacerbate this
position, but also to expose the underlying contradictions and
disagreements over 'professionalism' and 'professional judgement' and
thus to challenge notions concerning the ideal shape of the nursing
workforc.e and its grade-mix.
thanges in Training
It was noted in the first part of this chapter that the historic
process of grade dilution appeared to break down in the 1980's,
despite a continuation of the basic principle of grade dilution in the
-241-
c.indarella services. This occurred through a complex interplay of
changes in employment, service, training and sectoral provision, and
partly as a result of managerial judgernent. An increase in the
proportion of registered nurses was thus achieved, particularly in
higher-tec areas.
The importance of managerial judgemerit becomes less surprising against
the background of the early 1980's. It was seen in Chapter 3 that the
balance of power was shifting in the 1970's and early 1980's towards
the TUC-trade unions, in part as a result of grade dilution. The
'greater' problem for the government in the early 1980's was how to
resolve the industrial relations and electoral issues and avoid a pay
spiral occurring. The first step was the establishment of the Pay
Review Body and there seems little doubt that the intention was to
restore the 'balance' in favour of the more moderate professional
organisations and that this, in membership terms, succeeded. The pay
review process, however, had the slightly unexpected effect of
highlighting recruitment and retention problems. The shortages noted
throughout the pay review process were almost universally acknowledged
to be a growing problem. On one account:
The one brute demographic fact on which everyone is agreed is
that the traditional ,pool of recruitment for nursing - girls with
5 '0' levels or 2 'A levels - will contract until the mid 1990s
and will not recover to the levels of the 1970s and 1980s in the
present century. On current trends, nursing would need to
recruit almost half of this population by 1995 in competition
with higher education, other health and welfare occupations,
teaching and the wider employment opportunities for women
resulting from the weakening of sex discrimination. Just to
state this is to recognise its implausibility. (Dingwall et al,
1988:224)
It would, of course, have been possible to address existing and
potential shortages through higher pay settlements for trainee and
registered nurses. However, pressure had also been building from the
professionalisers for educational reform. Numerous 'stalling'
operations on the part of successive governments over potentially
expensive training changes had included the establishment of the
United Kingdom Central Council for Nursing, Midwifery and Health
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Visitors (UKcC) and English National Board (ENB) (see Dingwall et
al,1988:Qi.10) which had an important influence on the project along
with the RON. With the shift in the balance of power, these pressures
became more urgent.
It was against this background that Project 2000 was born. Project
2000 was in part a response to prior pressures from the profession, in
part a concession and in part an attempt to address future shortages
of qualified nurses in the context of de facto reduction in EN and SRN
numbers, high wastage and demographic trends without increasing pay.
Project 2000 was also very much a continuation of the much older
debate on professionalism and education 'whicth dates back to the 9th
century and was explored in Qiapter Two.
Ostensibly, Project 2000 represented a remarkable achievement by the
professionalisers. The Nurses and Midwives Act of 1979 bad
established the UKCC and given it the responsibility for maintaining
the register of nurses, and co-ordinating nurse education throughout
the UK. In 1985, the Council established a project team to review and
recoarnend a new approach to nurse preparation which produced its first
report, Project 2000: A New Preparation for Practice (UKCC,1986). The
final report, suhiiitted to the government in January 1987, became
known as Project 2000. Its proposals were broadly in line with
earlier reports from the RCN (1983-5 Judge Report) and the ENB (1985).
Project 2000 proposed that nurse education should be more closely
associated with the rest of the higher education system in the UK.
Thus, student status should be protected and student nurses not used
as a significant part of the labour force. It was envisaged that
students should receive training grants which would be primarily NRS
controlled and derived from a separately identified education budget
(1986;70), which also had the effect of removing another large staff
group from the remit of pay review. A comon foundation progranrne for
all students, after which they could specialise, was also proposed.
The period of education and training would remain three years of which
18 months would be core prograrrines and a further 18 months branch
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prograrrines in which students would concentrate on nursing of adults,
children, the mentally ill or the mentally handicapped. The new
single-level 'registered practitioner' was to replace the present
first- arid second-level nurses (SRNS and ENs). The Report was
initially greeted by professionalisers as 'the biggest change in
nursing since the days of Florence Nightingale' (Clay, quoted in
Health Service Journal, 26 May 1988).
Many of the TLJC trade unionists saw it instead as a confirmation of
union fears that the government wanted to bring in cheaper nursing
(Bob Jones, ['TUPE in ibid) and this quickly also became a concern of
the professionalisers. At first glance, there seemed to be little in
Project 2000 to reassure policy makers on either demographic or cost
grounds. Far from widening the entry gate, Project 2000 looked set to
raise the standards and slam the gate shut to achieve a degree of
professional closure. The inmnediate cost and staffing implications
included the reduction of student labour input on wards, extra
investment in educational facilities, and the loss of ENs. Potential
cost benefits were supposed to be grants rather than a competitive
wage, reduction of wastage during training and of ward staff teaching
time. The cost-benefit estimates on the RCN and UKCC proposals that
suggested moderate or no additional expenditure (see Dingwall:225-226
for a detailed discussion of some of the problems) failed to be very
convincing; particularly given the general assumption that auxiliary
labour would be used to fill the gaps created by supernumerary status
of students. Thus, 'a warm government welcome for such an expensive
venture seemed unlikely' (Could, 1988). However, the government
appeared prepared to proceed with Project 2000. Reactions quickly
followed, firstly on the terms of Project 2000 itself; for giving
nurses in training true student status, the profession would have to
be generous and flexible in formulating entry requirements so more
school leavers and mature students could qualify for admission to the
craft, with credit being given for experience, and 'aides' would have
to be able to earn a place in training schools; time scales and
funding were left vague (ibid, also letters from Moore, Kenneth Clarke
and Audrey Eznerton of iJKCC).
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Secondly, and almost concurrently with Project 2000 and the idea of
aides or support workers, the government-led proposals for National
Council for Vocational Qualifications (NCVQ) certificates for Health
Care Assistants (HCAs) arose and undoubtedly added to the speculation
over grade dilution. NVQ5 are a national scheme, spanning the NHS,
local government, private and voluntary sectors across the labour
market. NVQs were intended to be acquired mainly on-the-job with
maximum horizontal and vertical flexibility for both worker and
tiployer through a system of module and performance-assessed credits.
A Care Sector Consortium was established to examine all wor3
 below tb
'professional' level (i.e. below RGN level) with different 'levels'
being envisaged (NHS Training Authority, October 1988).
The scheme had already been linked with the idea of Project 2000 and
Support Workers. A prior NHSTA report, which Dingwall et al note
'ceased to be available shortly after its publication in March 1987'
(1988:226) had already put forward a view of support workers which
differed 'radically' from that of the nursing professionalisers
involved in Project 2000. Here support workers were seen as having
clear and direct responsibility for patient care, with specific
training which would form part of a modular pattern of education
extending right across the service. Entry might come from unqualified
school leavers on YTS or mature men and women with limited past
educational opportunities. Most importantly, an appropriate
acc.ixnulation of credits would qualify support workers for entry to
nurse training. Along with these reports, the DHSS, MSC, NHSTA and
UKCC conniissioned a 'Feasibility Study into YTS in Health and Social
Care Progranines', the final report on which was presented in November
1987. The report concluded that YTS would be 'less costly from the
NTiS perspective than alternative programes for training support
workers' and that 'YTS in care within the NTiS is feasible, and should
be encouraged' (in ibid:3-4).
It was the question of 'levels' and entry points which raised the
greatest speculation aniongst professionalisers. If the 3rd level was
to be an entry point to RGN training (Nursing Times, 1st June,
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1988:13), this would threaten the 'educ.ational' qualification basis of
entry to Project 2000 training. Moreover, a 4th level was envisaged
as a 'professional' level with further levels being planned and this
led to further speculation about how this scheme would sit with
Project 2000 and traditional nurse training.
The vast majority of interviewees for this fieldwork, saw grade
dilution as the overwhelming reason for the government's acquiescence
to Project 2000, with the project providing an excuse for
significantly fewer expensively trained and reasonably paid nurse
practitioners working alongside many more of the cheaper aides
carrying out a lot of the duties currently conducted by qualified
staff. According to Gould, these views appeared confirmed by a press
briefing, shortly after the government's welcome for Project 2000, in
which a Department of Health and Social Security spokesman:
revealed that this is exactly what the government hoped to see
happen, particularly in the case of chronic invalids, the
handicapped, the elderly, and others whose condition is not
liable to sudden change...similar ideas were contained in a
report on the future of coninunity care prepared by Sir Roy
Griffiths (1988).
Whilst professionalisers were worrying about the widening of the entry
gate or a completely alternative training structure, other worries
were surfacing about whether training would be provided in time or at
all. Initial concern was expressed by unions and NAHA that 'since
full details of the national training and accreditation package for
Support Workers will not be available until the surrrner of 1989,
Authorities introducing Project 2000 in 1989 will initially need to
develop their own training arrangements based on such national
material as is available' (letter from Len Peach, thief Executive of
the NHS Management Board to General Managers, October 1988). COHSE
expressed particular concern that there was 'no assurance that local
managers will be obliged to train Support Workers according to the NVQ
framework. However, we do know that the 'opt out' hospitals will not
be forced to do so' (Briefing Memo, 17 April 1989).
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Concern about the lack of adequate funding for both Project 2000 and
NVQ training has continued to the present. A senior manager of a
large training college for a 'flagship' hospital in the West Nlidlands
admitted in interview that they had been forced to put carefully-laid
preparations for Project 2000 on hold because of 'the major cost
implications and underfunding'. The manager noted that solutions to
this delay would involve either 'more funding or cheaper nursing'.
The latter solution, however, conflicted with a need to improve
retention in clinical areas and to recruit ever more HCAs or nursing
auxiliaries to fill the gaps left by 'supernumerary' status of
students which might imply the need for higher wages. As Staff Side
have noted, replacement staff 'will have to be employed from outside
the currently available pooi of recruits' (Evidence to PRB,1992:17).
The extent of this need is clear; employed student nurses form around
307. of the nursing workforce (1988 figure) and account for well over
half the staff available on some wards (Audit Cournission, 1991:32).
It could also be seen in Table 7.4 that students have been
disproportionately employed in general nursing where managers achieved
some degree of success in exerting their 'professional judgement' and
enriching grade-mix in the 1980s. Staff Side, taking into account the
conclusion of the Audit Cocrrnission that an overall assumption of a
50:50 grade-mix of additional registered nurses and NAs is
appropriate, estimated that full-scale implementation of Project 2000
would 'result in a shortfall of around 33,600 (wte) nursing staff at
the 1990 staffing levels (taking into account the 207. Service
contribotion estimated for Project 2000 students)' (Evidence to
PRB,1992:17).
In these respects, the irony of the 'professional' advance signalled
by Project 2000 is that it has caused irrinediate problems for nurse
managers in the very areas in which they have managed to exert a
degree of professional judgeinent and against an already perceived
crisis in resourcing. Paradoxically, the slow advance of Project
2000 has staved off an exacerbation of the irrinediate crisis whilst
failing to correct for the decline in training.
	 Equally, the slow
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advance of NVQs and Health Care Assistants has staved off any
exacerbation of training costs whilst also failing to provide a
possible solution along the lines envisaged for these groups.
Managers in interview were gloomy about the trends and grade-mix
implications. From their view, Project 2000 was costly and any
serious attempt to train for NVQs would also be costly in terms of
supervision and training time. To the extent that both these projects
advanced, they would leave a gap of both ENs and students to fill and
the training changes in the 1980s had, in any case, already been
inducing this effect. ENs were viewed as, in one manager's words,
'the backbone of the service', with relatively low turnover. Another
manager noted that 'if you get rid of the EN, you will have to
reinvent them' and this point was made by many managers and staff side
representatives. Most managers saw a target group of mature women for
the role of 'plugging the gap' and only one felt that YTS would offer
any possibilities, with the others feeling that a lack of experience,
in particular life and caring experience, would largely make YTS
trainees more troublesome than useful as they would need a large
amount of supervision. An interview with a TEC manager overseeing
YT/HCA progress in a London Trust Hospital also suggested very limited
scope: youth trainees were poorly motivated because of low pay and the
nature of the work, there was a high turnover and only a very small
proportion were taken on in permanent employment or went on to nurse
training.
Managers viewed part-timers as target staff for both qualified and
unqualified posts, and the proportions had been rising in nearly all
the districts, along with competition for this group of workers.
Managers were divided over whether the use of agency staff was cost-
effective or not; few, however, wanted to increase agency staff use as
quality of care was generally considered to be reduced and tensions
created with permanent staff. Bank staff were preferred but one
manager noted that these were frequently nurses who already worked at
the hospital but could not manage on their salaries. The scope for
expansion was therefore limited. All the fieldwork interviews revealed
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fears over grade-mix changes. One nurse manager put it thus: 'where
will all the qualified nurses be when I am old and in need of nursing
care?'.
The Drive to 'Reprofile' the Nursing Workforce
Alongside the above changes in training and their grade-mix
implications, have gone a number of studies, initiatives and
exhortations at national and regional level. These have mainly
addressed the issue of 'skill-mix' from the premise that an
'efficient' mix has not been achieved in terms of cost.
As noted earlier, rather different, though interlinked, concepts are
in practice involved in most of these exercises. First, skill-mix
might be defined as 'an assessment of the relevant skills and
experience required of staff in a particular work environment' (Buchan
& Ball, 1991:28). The inclusion of 'experience' may or may not be
appropriate and it will be seen that experience is frequently
considered apart from 'skills'. Second, grade-mix refers only to the
assessment of different mixes of staff in a work environment and
grading may or may not reflect required skill and experience. Third,
task-mix, or skill substitution, refers to those parts of a job or a
whole job that could be reallocated to other workers. Buchan and Ball
note that few studies have addressed the issue of quality of standard
of care/outcomes and some publications purporting to address skill-mix
actually address grade-mix (ibid). A general lack of clarity in the
literature, which was fully reflected in interviews, relates to the
vital interlink between these concepts and the potential for
subjectivity. For example, a logical ordering of the concepts from
the point of view of management might be: to identify tasks to be
performed, designate appropriate or necessary skill, and assess
relevant grades and pay.
It may be envisaged that in a purely operational sense as soon as a
combination of tasks arises, the assessment of skills becomes more
complex. Moreover, the 'necessary' skill may be much disputed as will
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be the valuation of that skill. As was seen in Chapter Two, the
linkage between tasks, skills, and grading may not be clear, and may
be influenc.ed by other factors. Moreover, experience frequently does
not enter directly into this analysis at all as it does not relate in
any easy way with skills or the recognition of skills. Related to
this last point, the problems are multiplied several times when the
operation is regarded less as an abstract exercise and the background,
experience, personality and motivation of particular individuals need
to be matched to a combination of tasks, skills and grade.
Nonetheless, from the mid-1980s in particular, there has been a range
of studies produced purporting to address the issue of 'skill-mix' for
nurses. A National Audit Office report in 1985 found large variations
in nurse staffing levels (NAO, 1985). This was followed by 'Mix and
Match', a report from the then Department of Health arid Social
Security (DHSS, 1986) which found wide variations in skill-mix and
staffing levels which, it was claimed, appeared unrelated to
dependency levels and standards of care. Studies by Robinson et al
arid Ball et al (both 1989) suggested that some degree of 'non-nursing'
duty reallocation to support staff was possible.
More recently, the issue has been driven along by the DoH. Staff Side
Evidence for 1993 has a special section on 'Reprofiling' in which the
cost-driven nature of these studies is noted, along with the potential
for 'de-skillirig' of the workforce. Staff Side notes that the NHS
Management Executive Personnel Unit has been providing human resource
workshops for NHS managers discussing changes to labour utilisation.
The Doll's 'Value for Money Unit' has also been 'touring the country
reconinending reductions in the level of qualified staff' (1992:14).
This drive has been supported by specially comnissioned academic
studies. For example, Dyson's April 1991 paper on 'reprofiling',
coirinissioned by the Policy Develoixnent Unit of the DoH and published
as part of the NHSME Trust Network series in September 1991 advocates
changing skill-mix in favour of a larger 'peripheral t part of the
nursing workforce, although some interesting additions have been
introduced in the form of individualisation of pay and conditions and
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casualisation of work through his proposals for personal contracts and
self-employment. It is argued in the paper that standards of care can
be improved at the same time that personnel costs are reduced.
Countering the above studies have been a ni.miber of studies suggesting
that registered nurses actually provide a cost-effective method of
delivering patient care, not least because they can perform the widest
range of tasks arid spot potential problems earlier (see for example
review in Buchan and Ball, 1991, Centre fcr Health Economics,
University of York, October 1992, corrnissioned by DoH).
Staff Side have attacked the drive for 'reprofiling' on two main
grounds. Firstly, the drive is seen as 'deskilling' in its
implications for the contraction of registered staff. Secondly, and
crucially, the impetus towards employing 'non-nursing generic care
assistant' posts is being resisted as being in no way comparable to
existing NA posts and the skills acquired through experience (1992:14-
15). It is argued here that the drive to 'reprofile' has been enabled
by the fact that it exposes the Achilles 1eel of nursing, namely the
historical conflict over the acquisition, recognition and valuation of
skills and their relationship to tasks actually performed. This
argument is pursued by exploring 'ideal od' of the nursing
workforce.
Ideal Models and the Skills Debate
It became increasingly clear throughout the research and interviews
that a number of normative 'ideal type' models of the composition of
the nursing workforce are visualised by the government, managers,
nurses and their representative organisations. These have tended to
be implicit and largely unexplored in any consistent way for their
logical coherence or pragmatic feasibility. The main models are
sumarised in Table 7.7. This incorporates the main training changes
of the 1980's; thus, Es are removed as 'red circled' and
supernumerary students under Project 2000 also come out and the focus
is placed on the registered/unregistered mix which is the logical end
result of current changes. These models represent the main 'extremes'
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that emerged through interviews though there were many variants on
these models.
The Professional model assumes that some need for a second tier of
workers remains although it may readily be envisaged that a more
extreme version of 'successful' professionalisation could lead to an
'all qualified workforce'. It is axiomatic in this model that skills
can be fairly clearly aligned with qualifications and grades and that
valuation bears some clear relation with skills.
The 'Traditional' model encapsulates the historical develonent of
nursing and is associated with government or management cost
minimisation strategy. Its two main distinguishing features are that
grade dilution occurs as a general tendency and 'less-qualified' or
'unqualified' staff balance out or even surpass registered nurses. In
these respects it is the converse of the Professional Model. The
Model does not address the barrier to the profession - this remains
intact and NAs/aides/support workers, and ENs for as long as they
remain, are still clearly subordinate. The system is thus
hierarchically based and it is axiomatic that it does not explicitly
address skill or valuation issues. The demise of ENs does not
invalidate the general theoretical thrust of the model, although it
has profound pragmatic implications.
Counterposed to both the above models, is the Radical Model. Its main
feature is that it has a much more complex hierarchy and blurs
traditional grade boundaries. It consists of a number of 'levels'
with greater flexibility and mobility from level to level and far less
likelihood of a professional barrier. On some views, there is
possibly also a less hierarchical structure. The model seeks to deal
much more explicitly with tasks, skills and valuation to explain the
basis for its challenge to the other models. For this reason, it has
been called the 'radical' model. From this point, however, fieldwork
demonstrated some very different perspectives on the model. This was
partly because of its relevance to radical right and radical left
supporters.
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NoYes
No Yes
Implicit Explicit
TABLE 7.7 IDEAL MODELS OF ThE NURSING WORKFORCE
MODEL 'lYPE
MAIN FEATURES	 PROFESSIONAL TRADITIONAL RADICAL
Acadnic entry/training 	 Yes	 Yes	 No
On-job learning/experience
stressed	 No	 No	 Yes
Employment ratio in
favour of qualified staff Yes 	 No	 Depends on
Definitions
Curative role stressed
	
Yes
Prior caring experience
valued	 No
Task-based rather than
Practitioner-based ethos	 No
Mobile promotion
structures	 No	 No	 Yes
Flexible task borderline	 Only if
with doctors	 incorporated Unacknowledged Possibly
Flexible task borderline
with ancillary staff	 No	 Unacknowledged Yes
Higher ratio qualified
viewed as cost effective	 Yes	 No	 Unclear
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The counterposition of a professional model with a government (or
managers) keen to cost minimise and resolve shortages through grade
dilution underlies much writing on nurse employment. For example,
Dingwall et al. argue:
The professionalizers appear to favour moves to strengthen the
competitive position of nursing by increasing the attractiveness
of its training, working conditions and salaries. The managers
seem to prefer the idea of dilution, looking for nursing tasks
that could be performed by less expensive arid more readily
available labour. (1988)
However, the Radical Model, has become increasingly important in the
1980's and early 1990's (Dingwall et al are in fact airiongst the few
recent corrrnentators to explicitly allow for this alternative type of
grade-mix, albeit briefly, see paragraph, 1988; 227). It emerged as
an important, though minority, strand in interviews with managers and
trade unionists and accords with much of government rhetoric on
'flexibility' of both labour utilisation and pay.
If the ethos of NVQs ostensibly raised the possibility that government
strategy now favoured a Radical Model, with or without accompanying
pay flexibility, few actually interpreted this to be the case, as will
be seen. However, the concept of NVQs hit upon the Achilles heel of
the nursing professionalisers and caused great excitement amongst
Radicals and it is therefore important to understand what 'enables'
alternative models to the professional model. If the
professionalisers were right, grade dilution would be a de facto skill
dilution, the introduction of HCAs would be neither here nor there,
and there would be a subsequent deterioration in either quantity or
quality of nursing. In this respect the models would not be
comparable. However, skill definition, acquisition, recognition and
valuation axe no more clearly defined in nursing than in any other
occupation and the models frequently carry internal contradictions.
This becomes apparent in looking more closely at the models. For
example, the debate over the training changes involved in Project 2000
and NVQs illustrated that deep-rooted differences between
'professional' associations and unions and TLJC unions still exist on
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the issues of grading and training, despite some apparent narrowing of
conflicting interests through the pay review process. These
differences not only reflect far deeper divergences over the issues
of skill definition and valuation but also, more simply, the material
basis for representative organisations' strategy. Different nursing
representative organisations wish to hold or increase membership arid
represent members to the best of some defined interests. In this
respect alone, though some agreement might be achieved over pushing up
the ante and 'ratcheting' pay, unions and associations must
necessarily maintain some basis for a coainon identity within their
organisations with which to attract and represent members. However,
these goals are not always clear or consistent and Project 2000 and
NVQs perhaps challenge the basis of previous staff side organisations'
strategy.
The Professional Model, and problems with it, are well illustrated by
the debate over Project 2000. Despite a clear attachment to the
concept of an 'all professional workforce' (see Clay,1987), it quickly
becomes apparent that this is an idealist model which carries with it
problems of access and therefore of shortages and inequalities.
Moreover, the cost and pay implications could be expected to be
prohibitive in the short term at least. In illustration, 'academic'
entry standards, which appear to be a vital factor for most
professionalisers, disqualify many people from gaining professional
qualifications. This dileirma can be seen in the very obvious
difficulty Trevor Clay has in putting the argument for Project 2000
and an 'all-qualified' nursing workforce. He points to the problems
involved in 'the need to find ways to give young people who are
educationally disadvantaged the opportunity to enter nursing',
eventually suggesting that they should be 'sufficiently [self]
motivated' and that 'much more needs to be done' to provide such young
people with more opportunities to collect the necessary Tot levels
(1987:80-81). It is not so much that Clay neglects wider social and
educational disadvantage as that his whole philosophy is founded upon
a certain view of socio-economic structures and behaviour. This is a
most fundamental divide, as was noted in thapter Two. It thus also
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becomes apparent that nursing auxiliaries are seen, failing 'an ideal
world', as a vital component in the cost estimates for Project 2000
(ibid:104-105).
A further insight is given by the UKCC's own dociinents on Project
2000. The jargon used in the reports is of more than semantic
interest. The UKCC proposed the replacement of the present 1st and
2nd level nurses with a single-level 'registered practitioner'. The
later report called for the developnent of certified 'specialist
practitioners' who would occupy a distinct clinical career grade as
consultants to other nurses. The Project includes the recoctnendatioa
that the 'practitioner should at all times retain responsibility for
the care given to the patient or client and be accountable for that
care...where the registered practitioner assigns work to a helper, the
practitioner should remain always in a position to monitor that work,
having due regard for the limits of competence of the helper'
(1986:43). The following excerpts are instructive with respect to the
perceived role of the helpers:
The helper should have a form of instruction which is limited and
is suited to the setting in which s/he will work.
There must be no ambiguity on questions of the qualification, its
transferability, and its possible status as a 'credit' for the
entrant to professional preparation. The Project Group is of the
view that a course of instruction for a helper prepares that
person to work in one kind of setting. Further instruction is
necessary if it is proposed that that person transfer to other
settings or transfer between authorities.
Should the helper wish to prepare for professional practice, no
barriers should be put in his or her way. Such a person, after
all, will probably have a more realistic view of the role than
will the new entrant from outside. The would-be entrant should
be advised, however, that all the normal entry requirements will
apply and that while work as a helper will serve to give an
appropriate character reference, it cannot operate either as an
entry gate or as a credit towards professional preparation.
It remains to suggest a title for the helper. We were anxious to
avoid all the existing titles, in order to underline that the new
?ractitioner had a new kind of helper. This eliminated [sic]
nursing assistant', and tnursing auxiliary'. 'Assistant nurse'
not only has 'nurse' in the title which is misleading, but is
also associated with the early days of the Roll and hence linked
to a statutory grade. 'Care assistant' is a term in use in
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social services. We have settled finally for 'Aide' [later to
become Support Worker]. It is simple, it conveys the notion of
being a helper and not a practitioner. There is even a chance
that, being short, it may actually pass into ever'day use and put
an end to the indiscrimate use of the term 'nurse
The deep-rooted nature of the professional versus trade union divide
is illustrated by these coirinents. The cost implications are also
revealed in the obvious fears of the professionalisers. Perhaps in
an effort to forestall the inevitable policy reaction, the UKCC
suggested a 70/30 split between practitioners and aides, and noted
that:
To conjure up a notion of a small cadre of registered
practitioners supervising care, and a larger group of helpers
delivering that care, would be quite contrary to the spirit of
this chapter, as well as in contravention of the UKCC Code of
Professional Conduct. It is emphatically rejected by the Project
Group (ibid).
The 'Professional' view of skill is also well demonstrated in the
following quotation in an argument for Project 2000 and the demise of
the E role:
Nursing requires a certain level of intelligence, skill and
knowledge: it is a complex operation in which the so-called
'basic' and 'routine' part cannot be separated from the
rest...the pace of life on wards and in the cocrmunity is now such
that the notion of qualified nurses adequately supervising,
teaching and monitoring the work of the less qualified or
unqualified is totally unrealistic. Such a separation of work
and responsibility is not viable...The parallels drawn in the
1950s (Nursing Times 1955) between care of a sick person at home
being carried out by an untrained relative and the utilisation of
someone less qualified than a registered nurse to do 'basic'
nursing in hospital are now totally outdated...patients in acute
hospitals in the 1980s are admitted for much shorter periods in
which they are usually very sick and dependent (Clay,1987:106).
The Professional Model reveals its flaws in that the skills required
for nursing are not fixed or ininutable or agreed upon and this
represents the failure of the professionalisers to 'close the
profession'. Whilst there might be a range of 'intellectual' capital
that might be acknowledged to be necessary, the extent of this range
and the way in which it is acquired (for example, through full-time
academic study or on-the-job tuition or by simple experience and self-
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tuition) would still be deeply disputed. Moreover, practical skills
or comunications skills may be underrated and influenced by wider
social valuation. The skills thus become defined, acquired, recognised
and valued by the complex interplay and negotiations between nurses
and their employers, and between nursing organisations, professional
or trade union, set in the wider context of relatively rigid socio-
economic systems (see Wootton,1955). As was noted in Chapter Two,
this also relates to the division of labour between paid and domestic
activities and the 'undermining' of the valuation of nursing by the
existence of (currently) over six million carers at home. It is in
these respects that the Professional Model is always vulnerable to an
attack on its Achilles Heel.
The Traditional Model has largely played upon these contradictions in
the Professional Model. By leaving the 'ethics' of the nursing
hierarchy well alone but by exploiting the variation between learning
actually acquired and tasks actually performed and current valuation
systems, grade dilution was 'enabled' and ostensibly consistent with a
cost-minimisation strategy. However, as was seen in the review pay
determination in the 1970s and early 1980s, such a strategy was not
good for all time. 'Simple' grade dilution does not resolve the
central conflict over valuation and material outcomes, and the grade
dilution itself has union membership implications thich then impact on
pay and labour cost. The necessary shift to a more professional model
in the 1980s and the embracing of Project 2000 could not be regarded
as a steady state as this model always carries its own higher cost
implications and therefore stands in the way of cost-minimisation.
Against this background, the emergence of a Radical Model, has been a
natural develoxnent in terms of both the search for cost minimisation,
and, paradoxically in the search for 'fairer' valuation. However, the
roots of this model again lie in the deeper historical controversy
over valuation. Proponents of the Radical Model would criticise
Clay's view of professionalism for failing to recognise current
realities and being elitist. For example, the role that a married
woman, with caring responsibilities at home, plays in a part-time NA
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or EN job with twenty years of work experience cannot be classified
as 'unskilled'. Moreover, these staff groups are not utilised as such
- there is thus a mismatch for many individuals between their grade,
tasks actually performed and skill recognition. This mismatch became
particularly evident during the clinical grading review, which could
be seen as providing the basic structure for a Radical Model and pay
individualisation. Thus, an apparent proponent of a Radical model,
a nurse currently working in the Nursing Division of the Welsh Office,
on clinical grading:
The creation of this new pay scale has to be viewed as a radical
change in the culture of the traditional nursing orgartisation,
not least because it has provided a measure of the worth managers
give to the work allocated to different grades of nurse. In an
organisation that has previously kept the roles and work of
qualified and unqualified nurses so interchangeable that nursing
auxiliaries, student nurses and registered nurses carry out the
same care giving activities, any differentiation between the
categories of nurse is a significant break with the past.
(Keyser, in Robinson et al, 1992:115).
A number of interviewees made the same point about interchangeability
of roles, particularly for the case of night duty, but the Radical
Model emerged only as a minority view in interviews with managers and
trade unionists. Although the 'valuation' debate underlay both
versions, they differed in emphasis. Managers proposed a kind of
'meritocracy' whilst trade unionists were seeking more egalitarianism.
The managerial or meritocratic perspective proved to be a strange
mixture of desire for managerial control and flexibility combined with
some recognition that the current system is not 'fair' Thus,
clinical grading offered a way of escaping the professional hierarchy
but also, by having a more task-based approach, recognition via
grading and pay could be given to individuals for the work they
actually perform, thus linking pay more explicitly to performance or
productivity. Implicit in this view is the assumption that both
experience and training add directly to the capacity to perform tasks
in some measurable way and can thus be abstracted from the person
performing them and geared directly towards the job. In this view
skills are defined by the tasks to be performed and the 'meritocracy'
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occurs as people acquire skills, by whatever means available. Such
skills are firmly within management's remit for definition. The view
further splits, however, over whether the emphasis for management of
this system lies in having individuals carry out a multiplicity of
tasks labelled as skilled and unskilled, the balance and drive for
acquisition of skills being largely defined by managerial needs for
flexible deployment, or whether the emphasis should be less 'radical'
and lie in having tasks more accurately targeted to people who are
defined as skilled or unskilled through such task allocation. The
latter view coninonly asserts that qualified nurses should be
'relieved' of mundane chores, although rarely addresses the issue of
whether NAs and ENs, for example, should be relieved of more qua]iiied
work for which they receive no recognition.
In the case of the managers, there was an interesting coincidence of
personal experience with the radical viewpoints they expressed. A
not-unrepresentative background would be entry from the forces,
sometimes at the lowest (orderly) level, and working their way up,
acquiring formal nursing and educational qualifications along the way.
Despite having 'made it', there was a clear feeling of resentment
against the hierarchical and sometimes class-based attitudes they felt
they had encountered along the way and the lack of meritocratic
appraisal in the system. In a couple of cases, notably for
educationalists involved in NVQs, there were clear vested interests in
being identified with the changes. However, during the course of the
interviews, it became clear that there was little agreement over the
pay and cost implications of the model. In practice, managers were
also very uncertain about the role of the HCA and NA in particular,
whether NVQs would supplement or challenge the current hierarchy, what
kind of people would take these jobs, what the training and funding
implications were and how pay rates would emerge (see also
Buchan,1992:17-27). At this point, most acknowledged that the model
could spiral pay; it would therefore be necessary to limit upwards
mobility and pay. One manager, involved in the setting up of NVQs in
his unit, clearly outlined the emerging shape of his nursing workforce
against normal resource constraints; the model, far from resembling
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the Radical Model, in fact looked like an extreme version of the
Traditional Model.
In the case of the trade unionists, there was a subtle difference of
emphasis in their view of the Radical model towards a more
'egalitarian' perspective. The fair reward of individuals in an
unfair society was of more concern than flexible task allocation.
One officer, experienced in professional affairs, welcomed the debate
that grading and training reforms had raised, feeling that. it was long
overdue. He noted that NAs in particular had been 'losers' throughout
the history of nursing despite the fact that they were regularly
'exceeding' their job specifications and sometimes used
interchangeably with qualified nurses, even to the extent of being
left in charge of wards and giving out drugs.
He noted that such 'facts' were unpalatable to most managers and trade
unionists alike as they raised uncomfortable questions about the
status quo. Another trade unionist, a National Officer, confided that
in practice, nurses were over-qualified for the jobs that actually
existed. Caring for ill people involved a range of tasks and skills;
if nurses simply attempted to 'educate' themselves out of the
apparently more menial tasks then they also educated themselves out of
the actual job to be performed. In this view, the problem was the
valuation of skills and tasks rather than their distribution. This
was emphasised by a senior nurse educational manager who noted that
'the problem is the low valuation of care work'. Many qualified RGNs
felt that 'psychic' care (talking to, comforting patients) and the way
in which physical care is conducted to be at least as important as the
more 'technological' aspects of care or planning. A lack of value
assignment to such a role, however, often left this to the lower, or
unqualified, staff leaving a 'professional' role for RGNs which was
some way distant from a rounded view of nursing as encompassing a wide
variety of tasks and skills acquired both through the job and through
life experience. As RGNs progressed, they thus got trapped into a
'medical' role of cure rather than care, as well as considerable
pressure to relieve doctors of their tasks.
	 A Research Officer
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mentioned that inequity extended beyond nursing staff: 'why is it that
ancillary work is regarded as non-direct care? It seems that male
concepts of work are applied here - the whole value system needs to be
queried'.
However, trade unionists were equally uncertain about the resource
implications of a Radical Model, not least because their own success
or otherwise in pushing for improved recognition, upward mobility and
pay for NVQ staff would impinge directly upon these. There was a high
degree of scepticism about the government's apparent support for a
'meritocracy'; all those interviewed felt that the Traditional cost-
minimising model was bound to re-emerge in full force. There was a
feeling, however, that the chance was too good to miss; the TUC trade
unions were therefore highly active in ensuring that the terms and
progress of NVQs were favourable and were keen to push through the
beneficial parts of the scheme. This has been pursued with vigour in
the latest Staff Side Evidence, where the term 'non-registered' was
substituted for 'unqualified' and it was noted that 'in view of the
fact that these nursing staff may possess NVQs in health or social
care, the use of the term "unqualified" is no longer appropriate'
(1993:3). As noted, semantics and status are important in nursing.
That these differing ideal models of the nursing workforce are held by
various parties to the process of grading and grade-mix, and that
their cost implications remain largely unknown, should caution a
simplistic policy approach to 'reprofiling' the workforce. The
workforce 'profile' in fact emerges as a historical progression
through the interplay of government, managers, professional
associations, trade unions, and nurses themselves, and the divergent
views within these groups further complicate the process and produce
uncertain outcomes.
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A Return to Professional Judgement?
Despite the intense debate over different models, the majority of
managers and nurse managers in the 1980's and early 1990's were more
concerned with resource constraints. These managers clearly held a
personal, normative identification with the Professional Model and it
is this above all else which has occasioned the attack on their status
and the attempt to put 'professional managers' in charge of workforce
decisions rather than 'managers who are professionals'. It has been
shown in this chapter that managers have undoubtedly had some
influence in local hiring policy during the 1980's, albeit relatively
unquantifiable against other changes influencing the enriched
grademix. Managers' explanations for their own behaviour, however,
was based far more upon pragmatic and cost considerations and it has
been shown that there is some evidence for this view.
In their judgement, the 1980's produced particular problems which they
had resolved to the best of their ability against severe resource
constraints. To this extent, gloom rather than idealism characterised
their view of the debate around ideal models. In the early 1990's,
most felt that whatever views they held personally would be railroaded
by the NUS reforms, even greater underfunding and the drive to
'reprofile' the nursing workforce. The training changes were also
seen as imposing costs which would force through what might be termed
a New Traditional Model. The difference for them was that this New
Model took no account of the fact that the system was already
stretched to the seams. Nurses throughout the hierarchy had assumed
extra work in the 1980s, pushed at both ends from the reduction in
ancillary support and the expansion of nurses' clinical role and
squeezed by extra administrative work, technological change and higher
dependency of patients. The reduction in doctors' hours and move to
primary nursing implied in the Citizens' Charter would exacerbate
these effects (see Staff Side Evidence, 1993:12-17). This has
provided the impetus to review 'skill-mix' and reallocate non-nursing
duties. However, against a background of a declining nurse employment
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level, the 'solution' sought by managers was more resources not a
change in grade-mix or task allocation.
The attempt to bypass nurse managers may be flawed at a more
fundamental level. On their view and on the evidence, clinical
grading had raised, in a most uncomfortable way, the possibility of a
radical overhaul of historical inequities - and then failed to deliver
because of the cash-limited nature of the exercise and deep divisions
over definitions of tasks and skills and how individuals should be
trained, deployed and evaluated. The following quotes from local
managers illustrate some of the diverse views and confusion with
respect to task allocation, skills and valuation:
Clinical grading was more or less a once and for all exercise -
we now specify job tasks in the job description and advertise it
as such. People either accept it or not, with the possibility of
developing the job later and then applying for a regrade. This
will mainly be an internal affair - not the same as clinical
grading.
Clinical grading means that skills can now be more precisely
arranged - this links in to HCAs and Project 2000.
Clinical grading was traumatic because there was no reward for
service - only for the job itself. People misunderstood that.
NAs were all put on grade A and it's now harder for RGN5 to go up
the structure.
For NAs, the criteria for advancement were based on
'supervision'. No recognitIon was given for competence but we
need to recognise those that are 'exceptional'.
Management and staff didn't agree on the definitions of
'continuing responsibility' and 'supervision' - and probably
never will! The aims of clinical grading were never realised.
The above quotations illustrate that, at the sharp end, there is
little agreement on the normative basis for work organisation and
valuation. Clinical grading opened a Pandora's Box, took a peek
inside and then slarirned the lid shut again because of the cost
implications and the major points of conflict that were revealed. In
this view, professional judgemerit has always been a fundamental part
of the hierarchy within a system, which is internally and externally
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unfair. Their major role has been as mediator in their attempt to
make the system work and this has attracted criticism from nurses and
other managers alike. The attempt to bypass such managers may,
however, prove a very high-risk strategy particularly in the context
of a cost-minimisation strategy which may prove ill-founded and
confused in the light of historical experience and the analytical
framework provided here with which to view it.
QN2US IONS
The analysis conducted for grade-mix in the 1980s has suggested that
grade-mix changes occur for a variety of reasons, some of which have
been relatively mechanistic and others less so. However, a critical
linking factor has been the wider underresourcing of the public
healthcare system and the nursing workforce in particular. It has
been argued that this led to a 'crisis' in the late 1980's which has,
if anything, been exacerbated by training changes and the drive to
'reprofile' the nursing workforce. The normative ideal models held by
various parties reveal the deeply-contested nature of skill evaluation
and valuation. None of these models offers a simple 'cost
minimisation' strategy for government. Against this background, the
analysis cautions against 'quick-fix' and simplistic approaches to
grade-mix, skill-mix or skill dilution changes in the 1990s. The
analysis similarly warns against the policy of attempting to dilute
the role of experienced 'professional' managers as this neglects the
nature of their mediating role in a hierarchical and conflictual
sys tern.
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aiAn irr
CONGUJSIONS: PAY POLICY AND ThE LIMr.L'S 1) DFXENIIALLSArIC
In this concluding chapter the main strands of the thesis are drawn
together in a consideration of changes in policy towards the
determination of nurses' pay in the 1980s. This analysis sets nursing
pay policy in the wider theoretical and empirical context of public
sector pay and collective bargaining and addresses the thorny issue of
the role of government as employer. It is argued that an assessment
of the degree of change is influenced by the time horizon and level of
aggregation employed. Inevitably, the methodology empioyed gives rise
to a particular view of the role of government as 'model employer',
which has interest for current academic debate on public sector pay
policy. In the course of this discussion, the research findings on
the importance of non-pay issues and of a joint analysis of
institutional processes arid outcomes will be highlighted.
An underlying theme in the chapter is the long-standing debate on the
relative importance of economic and institutional factors in wage
determination, discussed briefly in Chapter One. Some conclusions of
broader significance can now be drawn from the study of nurses' wage
determination. In particular, it is argued that the modern form of
this debate needs to be recast along the lines advocated earlier by
writers such as Phelps Brown and Wootton to re-address questions of
power and political choice and to view wages as primarily a social
relation. The discussion of changes in the 1980s is extended finally
to a consideration of the prospects for nursing pay policy in the
1990s. It is concluded that a policy of decentralisation, to whatever
extent it is realised in practice, carries attendant risks and
uncertainties as it is based on a policy of confrontation rather than
acconinodation and neglects sources of conflict inherent in the conduct
of wage policy.
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TRE CONTEXT AND COVERAGE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
One of the most important debates in industrial relations in recent
years has concerned the extent to which the industrial relations
environment has changed with the election of four successive
Conservative governments since 1979. These governments have been
cocrndtted to the philosophy of 'market forces' and 'rolling back the
state', but equally they have exhibited a 'deep antagonism to trade
unions, which are seen as impeding the functions of the labour market'
(Fredman & Morris,1989a:1). A major part of this debate has concerned
pay determination and in particular the structures, processes and
outcomes of collective bargaining over pay, as one of the more visible
and economically significant features of industrial relations systems.
As Miliward et al note: 'none of the main economic actors in the
country could be indifferent to levels of pay and changes to those
levels' (1992:217), and this could be considered to be particularly
pertinent to the government in its role as employer in a labour-
intensive sector. Government policy in the 1980s and early 1990s:
'both through its dealings with its own employees and through
persuasion and advocacy to other employers, encouraged a move
away from national, multi-employer pay settlements towards more
locally determined ones which were more sensitive to local labour
markets and the circumstances of the employer...with this there
was a pervasive advocacy of payment systems that reflect the
performance of individual employees' (ibid).
The wider context of labour market arid legislative changes are clearly
important, though their relative impact remains deeply disputed, and
trade union membership and density declined in the 198Os. In
reviewing the WIRS3 evidence on collective bargaining, Brown has noted
that 'the coverage of collective bargaining has contracted
substantially...the scope of bargaining has narrowed...the depth of
union involvement has diminished...and...organizational security
offered to unions by employers has deteriorated' (1993:197). With
particular respect to pay determination, the most striking change in
the 1980s has been the shift to non-collectively bargained pay
settlements which has occurred in private sector manufacturing,
services and the public sector (Millward et al,1992:Qiapter 7).
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Whilst multi-employer bargaining remains the most important bargaining
level across the economy, the level of bargaining has shown
differential change across the sectors with a shift to single-employer
bargaining levels most marked in private sector services.
For the public sector, Miliward et al note a substantial drop in the
proportion of workplaces with collective bargaining, with almost all
of the fall being in multi-employer bargaining in local government
(1992:232-3). However, the shift for manual and particularly non-
manual workers from collective bargaining to determination by a review
body is another major change, along with the greater influence of
management at a higher level. Taking the public sector as a whole,
Miliward et al were able to report that 'in early 1990 it remained the
case that rates of pay were hardly ever settled at the level of the
individual workplace in the public sector...there is no
indication...of any delegation of pay determination to local levels'.
They did, however, include a special note to the effect that 'there
have been several moves in the public sector which are intended to
increase the amount of decision-making at local level' (Note 14,
ibid:271).
At this level of aggregation arid detail, and given the 1990 survey
date, there is little evidence to suggest widespread change in the
nature of pay determination in the public sector in the 1980s other
than in the coverage of collective bargaining. The view of pay review
is evidently crucial here to a perspective on the extent to which
collective bargaining has diminished and change has occurred.
This evidence may be contrasted with the perspective provided by a
change in focus and level of aggregation to that of the public sector
alone and the role of government as employer and formulator of public
sector pay policy.	 A recurrent concept in industrial relations
literature has been that of the state as 'model employer' and this is
given recent expression and particular emphasis in the work of Fredman
and Morris (1989a, 1989b). This perspective undoubtedly hinges upon
an emphasis on the autonomous role of government and structural and
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procedural arrangements. Thus, Fredman and Morris are able to argue
that tan important aspect of the State in its role as employer was its
desire to set an example to tie private sector...indeed, this was one
of the primary motivations for the introduction of collective
bargaining into the civil service in 1919' (1989a:1O). Despite noting
some problems with the 'model good employer ideal' in terms of pay
outcomes in parts of the public sector, they argue that the ideal
'remained a central part of the ideology of successive governments
until 1979' (ibid:11), with the encouragement of trade union
organisation, corrinitinent to collective bargaining and high degree of
job security offered (ibid:1). The period since 1979 is then
contrasted as representing a transformation of the role of the State
as employer, with the direction of influence reversed and the
government attempting to 'apply private-sector, free-market ideas to
its own employment practices' (ibid).
Fredinan and Morris argue that 'the attitude of the government has
changed radically...inc.reasingly opposed to industry-wide collective
bargaining' and placing more emphasis upon market forces and
individual performance than on the criterion of 'comparability' which
was previously, and especially since the Priestly Comission (mid-
1950s), 'the primary principle, combined with the desire to be a
generally "good" employer' (ibid:142-3). They note that collective
bargaining remains the most widespread method of determining pay and
conditions in public services but also that there have been twin
strands of change in both increased centralisatiori and control (review
bodies are seen as an expression of this) and fragmentation and
dec.entralisation (ibid:195, see also Brown & Rowthorn,1990:1O-11). At
this lower level of aggregation, therefore, change is given a greater
emphasis and is traced directly to a change in the role and
perceptions of government. Implicit in this analysis, is the linked
idea that institutional expressions of comparability and fairness, as
opposed to 'economic' criteria, traditionally formed the main basis
for public sector pay determination.
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The view of 'model' or 'good' employer has been a comon one in
industrial relations writing on the public sector. Thomson, for
example, agrees with the basic concept but argues that the breakdown
occurred earlier:
There has arguably been a breakdown in the tacit agreement
whereby public sector employees...did not use their full
bargaining power in exchange for the acceptance by public sector
employers of "good employer" obligations...in considerable part
this breakdown has been the result of what has been felt to be
discrimination by governments in the operations of incomes
policies' (1983:144).
The form of analysis conducted by Allen (1960:Ckapter Two) of the
relationship between trade unions in various parts of the public
sector and the government contrasts starkly with this perspective.
Allen worked from first principles in an empirical account of the
history of wage determination, particularly for the civil service, to
obtain a view of the role of government. His findings could be seen
as period-specific but have interesting resonance with Wootton (1955)
and Clegg and Qiester (1957). In his coverage of the develojxnent of
wage determination mechanisms for the civil service, it is clear that
concepts such as 'fairness', 'comparability' and 'model employer' have
played a shifting historical role, dependent largely on the power
relationships of the time. At one stage he notes that the Tomlin
Conrnission (1929-31) 'rejected the proposal that the Government should
be a model employer because it considered the phrase was meaningless
(1960:86). 'Fair relativities' were here substituted and used in the
sense of an economic signal to ensure equilibrium between labour
supply and demand: this concept was in turn swiftly attacked and
finally rejected by the 1953 Comission. The notion was replaced by
that of 'fairness', which as Allen notes 'had no precise mneaning...its
definition varied with every interest group in civil service affairs'
(ibid:87).
Coirinenting on wage outcomes in the first decade after World War Two,
he concluded that the behaviour of the successive political
administrations of the time denoted a failure to 'behave as a good
employer' (1960:102). In practice, the government gave priority to
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its role as regulator of the economy:
where this...required a policy of wage restraint, the government
applied the policy directly to its own employees...it did so not
only because it was the easiest course to take but also because
it acted as an example to private industry' (ibid:113)
This literature begs some questions on the causation, extent and
timing of change. These issues are now addressed through a review of
the findings on nursing pay determination.
CONTIt'UITY AND 0-lANCE IN NURSING PAY DEI'ERMINATION
This thesis has provided an account and evaluation of nursing pay
determination employing a methodology which has used overlapping and
increasingly shorter chronological periods and increasingly lower
levels of aggregation. In this way, the evolution of change from
underlying continuities in past practice has been emphasised, along
with the importance of non-pay issues. This detailed analysis of
nursing pay determination allows some reference back to the above, and
wider, debates on pay determination and the extent of change in the
1980s.
In Q-iapter Two, it was emphasised that the determination of nurses'
pay exhibited a degree of historical intractibility which could only
be understood by a broader understanding of the development of public
healthcare provision and of nursing in the healthc.are division of
labour. The development of nursing representative organisations was
seen to be rooted in these; in particular in the forms of segmentation
and hierarchy in nursing, influenced by wider changes in the labour
movement and wider social and political change. On this account, it
was the delicate interplay between, and relative strength of, the
different nursing organisations that led change in industrial
relations systems. In particular, the growth of trade union
organisation, as opposed to professional associations, led change in
the latter and in employers' strategies. Although professional
associations also had an impact on employers, their effect on labour
costs remained ambiguous. In part, their incorporation into the
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health hierarchy could be viewed as supportive of the system more
generally and counter-productive to the unity of nursing
representation along wider trade union and political lines. Their
strategy of professional closure, however, presented a costly
alternative, as could also be seen in aiapter Seven.
In this context, the two major changes in nurses' pay determination
this century - 'free' collective bargaining under the Whitley system
in the new NHS, and various pay review exercises - could be seen as a
reaction to the dramatic growth in trade union membership which
threatened to become the dominant form of representation both prior to
WW2 and prior to the establishment of the PRB. In turn, the growth of
trade union membership and militancy could be seen as part of nurses'
reactions to continuing low pay and grade dilution, premised on
successive private and public sector employers' attempts to cost-
minimise. The main alternative reaction by nurses appeared in this
broad historical sweep to be 'voting with their feet'; the history of
nursing pay determination changes is peppered with episodes of public
pressure applied over nursing labour shortages.
It has also been argued that the establishment of 'new' pay
determination systems did not mark as sharp a break with the past as
might have been imagined. In this respect, the adoption of 'free
collective bargaining' for nursing pay determination under the new NHS
was accompanied by systems of representation in the new institutions
which were weighted in favour of professional associations and
government and gave little voice to local managers. It was noted
that, on some arguments, the gains made by trade unions through
external pressure and militancy thus accrued to the professional
associations. Perhaps most importantly, it was argued that government
exhibited disproportionate power to influence the structure, processes
and outcomes in this system, albeit with temporally-dependent and
diverse objectives. In particular, the importance of 'ability to pay'
or 'economic and financial' considerations were seen to be constant
emphases in government rhetoric along with a desire to set an example
to the private sector through the suppression of nursing pay. The
-272-
criterion of 'comparability' came to the fore at times of greater
conflict and unrest, but was still bounded by 'economistic'
terminology and reasoning. This was particularly evident in the
process of arbitration and special reviews (below). On this reading,
pay determination systems did not work fully to either 'incorporate'
trade unions or take their collective voice into account, and the
material basis for conflict - that of poor pay and conditions -
continued, giving rise to sporadic crises in the system and the need
for arbitration or special reviews. It was further argued that these
latter institutions were again 'skewed' in terms of structure, process
and outcomes to the maintenance of the status quo, whilst allowing
some latitude for government to distance itself from more favourable
settlements designed to reduce conflict in the short term.
The establishment of the Pay Review Body arose from the contradictions
in past practice, particularly in the poor material outcomes in
nurses' terms and conditions and the growth of trade union power.
In thapter Three, it was argued that the PRB emerged from prior forms
of arbitration and review in nursing pay determination and the extant
system of pay review bodies for other staff groups in the public
sector. Viewed in this perspective, the PRB made some sense: it
provided a filip to professional associations - in particular, the RQ
with its 'no-strike' clause; it split nurses from other health service
workers, notably ancillary workers who subsequently experienced
considerable deterioration in their terms and conditions of work; and
it restored the status quo. However, this particular form of pay
determination - a non-representative, non-accountable body - makes
less sense against liberal pluralist theory or the government's own
rhetoric of market forces.
The structure, processes and outcomes of the nurses' PRB were
explored in Chapters Four and Five. It was argued that the review
body system works in a complex way and with ambiguous results and
consequences. Both the structure and processes could be seen to be
'skewed' in conservative directions and weighted in favour of
government. However, the ability of Staff Side to persist with a
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'negotiating style', the publicity of the proceedings, the necessity
for the PRB to appear 'independent' and take arguments into account,
and the continuing importance of negotiation over linked, but not
directly pay-related, issues which has proved essential for the
functioning of the PRB, begs the extent to which collective bargaining
has been replaced and goes some way to ex4ainirzg why Staff Side
appear attached to the practice of the PRB. Focusing on outcomes,
however, provides an alternative way of viewing the pay review system.
Here again the disproportionate power of government is evident, yet
this might be viewed as a component part of this system rather than an
aberration.
In this view, the structures and outcomes of the system provide the
strongest basis for, and understanding, of the material outcomes. The
ceremony and apparent 'fairness' of the intervening process
legitimate conservative and 'unfair' structures and outcomes, not
least of which is the continued low valuation of nursing in the
occupational wage hierarchy and particularly as a gendered profession.
The complexity of this system arises from the fact that some degree of
material accocrrnodation is afforded through the Review Body. The fact
that such acconinodation appears to occur on electoral cusps suggests
again a strong role for government. A corollary to this argument
would be that the material basis for conflict has not been fully
addressed and conflict may have been driven down to lower levels and
other, non-pay, issues. This latter point could be seen both in the
detail of arguments put forward in process and in the particular
conduct and outcomes of the clinical grading exercise and both of
these have significance for wider debates on pay determination and
decentraljsatjon.
Perhaps the most significant points which would strike the casual
reader of arguments put forward in the pay process in thapter Four are
the degree of conflict generated over most criteria and the relative
strength of Staff Side arguments as the basis for longer-term
stability. It was noted in earlier chapters that the basis on which
public sector pay policy should operate for distinct staff groups is
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by no means clear even in the government' s own rhetoric and terms of
reference. Thus, ability to pay and recruitment and retention are not
'compatible' criteria and this problem is exacerbated if more
localised or individualised pay determination is successfully
encouraged. In practice, however, a strong historical and economic
argument lies in the 'satisfying' of occupational labour supply
deficiencies and it is thus not surprising that recruitment and
retention have come to the fore in most public deliberations of
nursing pay, including in the PRB process, although it has been argued
that this also occurred for tactical reasons.
The continuing importance of the comparability criterion could also be
seen in the occupational supply and demand arguments. It was argued
that the breadth of the arguments entering under the comparability
criterion are frequently underestimated, along with their potential
for tactical use by both Sides. Moreover, and contrary to the
established wisdom, comparability does not necessarily constitute an
'institutional' or 'customary' argument which can be automatically
counterposed with 'economic' arguments. In the case of nurses, and
using a grossly simplified economic model, an illustration would be as
follows. Nursing pay determination could be modelled historically as
a bi-lateral monopoly, with a disproportionately powerful monopsony
(government) and a weaker labour monopoly (Staff Side). Under these
conditions, and using a private sector model, both wages and
employment would be below 'competitive' levels. The comparability
argument enters here as a signal of the 'going rate' or 'competitive'
wage levels and trade unions can act to positively increase economic
welfare. An interesting corollary of this, admittedly imperfect,
argument is that labour demand rather than labour supply is here seen
as the factor inducing lower employment. This has some interest for
the findings in Chapter Six from fieldwork interviews with managers,
where the system emerges as one which is largely demand-driven. These
findings suggest a more complex historical picture where shortages may
be as much a reflection of resource constraints as of labour supply
deficiencies. Paradoxically, severe resource constraints could also
-275-
lead to the underestimation of labour shortages as establishments are
actually cut and vacancies therefore go unreported.
The above model can provide only an imperfect characterisation of some
of the economic forces in nursing pay cleteitnination. It draws fto a
private-sector, profit-motivated, model which may not be appropriate
for the public sector, where government has additional, and often
countervailing, objectives to labour cost minimisation. It fails to
capture the dynamic nature of power flows within and between the
Sides, and fails to capture the social structures and relations
involved, and the role of mediating institutions and non-pay issues,
all of which this thesis has emphasised as important in an
understanding of nursing pay determination. Nonetheless, it provides
an interesting way of looking at the role which has been played by the
comparability criterion in the pay process arid its linkages with
recruitment and retention and wider resourcing issues.
It was also argued in thapters Four and Five that the pay review
process was notable for the general failure to take low pay and equal
pay arguments seriously and thus, that the PRB plays a role in
suppressing pay aspirations. These criteria carry great force against
the evaluation of material pay outcomes conducted in Qiapter Five for
this highly gendered and occupationally segregated workforce, with a
substantial representation of part-time and ethnic-minority workers in
the lower parts of the nursing hierarchy. These issues address the
more fundamental questions about wage hierarchy and social structures
raised in a much earlier literature by writers such as Phelps Brown
and Wootton and return us to the issue of 'normative' public sector
pay policy.
For these writers, the debate over the relative importance of broadly
economic and broadly social factors in wage determination is in some
respects a false dichotomy. As Phelps Brown argued, 'the starting
point of economic and sociological theory are alike - the abstraction
of certain human propensities...the difference between them lies in
the propensities they abstract'. Thus, for the sociologist, 'there is
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not so well defined a boundary as for the economic man between self
and others...an act of exchange is essentially the manifestation of a
personal relation'. Under this view, the inequality of pay is seen as
'one of, and one with, the various manifestations of social
inequality'. Social status and a 'hierarchy of esteem' are thus
important factors expressed through 'deference' and 'derogation' (this
has evident significance for the hierarchical organisation of
nursing), and such factors lead writers such as Talcott Parsons,
Wootton and Pen to relegate economic factors to secondary place.
Moreover, Phelps Brown went on to explore the fact that social status
and hierarchies do not arise as accidents, t*it as part of wider
structural factors, notably class and the linkage between class
privilege and the exertion of power (1977:17-21). Thus 'without
reference to the purposive exercise of their power and advantage by
more privileged groups and strata...it has not proved possible to
explain social inequality otherwise than as a structure with important
self-maintaining properties' (Goldthorpe, 1974:229, in ibid). For
Phelps Brown, the importance of this debate between 'economic' and
'social' factors turned on its empirical testing and had great
implications for the potential for reducing pay inequality.
For Woo ton, too, the dichotomy between economic and social factors was
miscast. Rather she saw 'the contemporary wage and salary
structure...as the accuiiulated deposit laid down by a rich mixture of
economic and social forces, operating through considerable periods of
history'. However, economic forces, though important, were here
clearly seen as subordinate: 'political and social factors do not
operate in complete disregard of economic realities' (1955:161). In
concluding her study of the relative rigidity of social and wage
hierarchies and relative lack of normative wage policy, Wootton notes
the extreme forms of conservatism which are embedded in institutional
wage determination (ibid:162-3). Unfortunately, she remained somewhat
ambivalent on the relative part played by those structures and
processes and the relative part played by social attitudes. The
structural nature of pay inequalities is signalled though, this time,
with a rather different line of causation. 	 For Wootton, 'these
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inequalities must carry the lion's share of responsibility for the
division of our society into a hierarchy of social classes' (1955:161-
165).
The important point for Wootton was that 'wage policy is in fact the
instrument as much of social as of economic purposes; and on economic
and social grounds alike, some policy is imperative' (ibid:166).
Wages thus become a 'political' question, pertaining to the
desirability of relative factor share distributions, and policy cannot
be 'taken out of politics by the simple device of handing it over to a
non-political body' (this has evident connotations for the PRB)
(ibid:167). However, Wootton notes in passing her disappointment that
the Labour Party had abandoned its equalitarian goals and restates her
view, quoting Tawney (1952) that social equality is not only a
desirable good in itself but 'also that the future of democracy
depends upon this broadening of its foundations; and that the
broadening of those foundations means the "destruction of plutocracy
and the setting of an equalitarian society in its place" (ibid:177).
Woo tton could be criticised in her conclusions for a relative failure
to explore power and an inadequate explanation of the directions of
causation between class and inequality. However, the importance of
the above debates by Phelps Brown and Wootton lies in their power to
redirect attention from the more banal and econoinistic discussions of
wage determination and wage structures to the social relationships and
decisions embodied in them. Without this reminder, it might be
possible to specify a 'rational wage policy' towards the determination
of nurses' pay as being one which might address narrowly construed
issues of long term equalisation of demand and supply, as opposed to
one which acknowledges the fundamental conflict raised by differing
social evaluations of worth and uneven power relationships.
Expressions of this deeper point of conflict were seen in the latter
chapters of the thesis and raise some critical questions for the
future conduct of government policy. The clinical grading exercise
and notions of 'ideal models' of the nursing workforce were seen to
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embody some basic points of difference over work organisatiori and
valuation which, again, are rooted in unresolved historical problems.
What to some might appear the relative stability of the pay and social
hierarchy in nursing could here be seen to be based on a morass of
contradictions and conflict over whether pay should pertain to the job
to be done, its constituent tasks and 'skill' requirements, the job
which is actually done, or the person doing it. Most significantly
for the clinical grading exercise, the words 'skills',
'responsibility', 'experience' and 'supervision' raised more questions
than they solved. The debate on 'ideal models', training and 'grade-
mix', reviewed in Chapter Seven, was similarly seen to hinge on
differing social perspectives and views on hierarchy or
egalitarianism, which, in some respects, made for some strange
political bedfellows.
It can be seen that the relative stability of the nursing structures
at any one time is the brief reflection of the relative balance of
power within and between the Sides. However, in Chapters Six and
Seven the role of managers was also signalled. It was suggested that
managers perform an important role in the mediation of conflict
through their adherence to some notion of 'professional and adequate'
standards. This role may act mainly to sustain an 'unfair' system,
and almost certainly reflects the balance of power between the
'professional' and 'trade union' strands of representation, and
between these strands and government. As such this role performs a
crucial function in the maintenance of hierarchy and can only be
ignored by government at its peril. One of the major changes was, in
fact, seen to be the treatment of nurse managers by government. In
its search for a cheaper grade-mix, the maintenance of the status quo
is also threatened by the downgrading of managerial responsibility.
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ThE TREND TO DECENTRALISATION
A similar threat to the wage hierarchy and wage determination and an
important change in emphasis in the 1980s might be seen to lie in the
constant trend to decentralisation seen in Qiapters Four and Five to
be undermining the pay review system. In the latter Qiapters of the
thesis, the importance of non-pay issues was signalled, both to the
wage determination process and to a broader consideration of
influences on wage determination: employment changes. Pay restraint
and grade-mix have historically been the twin strands in cost
minimisation strategy and these are viewed as the main elements in the
recent arguments for decentralisation. It should be evident that
these are by no means the only possible cost rninirnisation strategies,
and the lower level of aggregation in thapter Seven enabled the
perception that the consistent underresourcing of the 1980s has
'squeezed' employment levels and led to an intensification and
extension of nursing labour along with a shift in actual service
provision.
However, there are qualitative differences between these 'strategies'.
It has been demonstrated that there is an 'ordering' of areas where
policy may have more or less direct effects, in which pay is a primary
area. Grade-mix changes have been shown to arise as partly an effect
from decisions on pay and funding and partly a result of policy
emphasis, but with some unpredictable effects due to the lower levels
at which grade-mix is decided. Labour intensification or extension is
driven down to yet lower levels of determination, has very finite
potential and eventually spills over into declining service provision
and problems of morale. Similarly, employment changes will be made at
local level and may be unpredictable. The thesis has shown the high
degree of interlinkage between these areas, but it can be stressed
that 'policy' instruments which have have no target objectives can
hardly be viewed as policy. In this respect, a 'policy' of tight cash
limits and underfunding is no policy at all as it produces uncertain
consequences. Neither can policy instruments which work only
indirectly, such as those on grade-mix, be considered very effective.
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Pay determination is thus a primary area where goverment can and
should be expected to have a policy and to anticipate the impact of
such a policy.
It is here, however, that the central dilefrina for government is
revealed along with the major policy deficiencies of the 1980s. It
has been argued that pay determination mechanisms and processes for
nurses have historically acted mainly to suppress pay outcomes, not
least through the restoration of differentials and the hierarchical
status quo. However, it has equally been argued that such mechanisms
and processes have not 'resolved' fundamental conflict over pay but
have rather provided temporary expedient 'solutions' largely as a
reaction to industrial pressure and conflict. The background to the
establishment of the nurses' PRB was located in both this context and
the context of representational changes brought about by lower order
effects of grade-mix changes. The main function of the PRB in a
strategic sense was to curtail the growth of the TLJC-unions and
redress the balance towards the professionalisers. In this respect
alone, the PRB might be viewed as a strategic success.
In its 'permanent' nature, however, the PRB has presented new
problems. The need to 'restore the balance' in favour of
'professionalisers' in the 1980s has been costly. It has been argued
that the mechanism itself has largely constrained pay. Unqualified
staff have done badly and qualified staff, though doing rather better,
have yet to regain their 1974 position in the pay league. However,
the filip to the professional lobby has carried attendant pay
pressures and, more particularly, associated costs in terms of
training and grademix. Indeed, in this light both clinical grading
and Project 2000 may look like critical policy weaknesses as opposed
to strategic moves. Project 2000 was found to have enormous cost
implications at a time when most managers felt they were already at
crisis point.	 It is perhaps not surprising that training
responsibility is currently being devolved (to regional level) away
from more public levels of accountability. At the same time repeated
exhortations to change grade-mix had little effect and it has been
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argued that tnis was due in part to the strength of the professional
lobby and managers. Even if the concurrent moves to institute NVQs
arid HCAs is viewed as strategic and aimed towards grade dilution, as
many nurse practitioners and trade unionists have viewed these, the
manner of such change must be regarded as convoluted and expensive.
In this respect, cost-minimisation policy may be seen as currently
severely constrained. At the same time that the filip to
'professionalisers' granted through the PRB and its recoimnendations
has made grade dilution an ever more attractive option through the low
pay awards for the lower end of the nursing hierarchy,the professional
unions and lobby are in a good position to resist such change.
Altering the balance of power between 'professional' and 'TUC' unions
is not currently an option, partly because in its antagonism to trade
unionism the current government has no means so to do.
The drive to decentralisation of pay determination - and the limits to
it - may be understood in this light. It is instructive first of all
to distinguish the rationale put forward by government and management
for decentralisation more generally and specifically for the NHS and
nurses. It was argued in thapter Five that change for nurses has
occurred on three related, but conceptually different, levels:
fragmentation, decentralisation and individualisation which are
cocrrnonly considered under the broad title of decentralisation. It has
also been seen that change in all three respects is well under way and
has already undermined the force of national pay determination in
nursing, as in many other areas of the public sector.
Coverment rhetoric for the public sector more generally has emphasised
individualisation. The government has thus appeared keen to:
'encourage employers to move away from traditional, centralised
collective bargaining towards methods of pay determination which
reward individual skills and performance; respond to the wish of
individual employees to negotiate their own terms and conditions,
and take full account of business circumstances [and to]...embed
these changes in the public sector, which in some places has
lagged behind best private sector practice' (People, Jobs and
Opportunity, 1992).
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At the same time, and with a slightly different emphasis, the
government has fuelled the debate around 'managerial prerogative' and
'local decision-making'. For the NHS, the Warlow Report presented the
results of a review of the conditions of employment of NHS staff, the
purpose of which was 'to identify management's requirement for change'
(1989:1). The conclusions of this report were that 'the great
majority of managers are looking for changes to the conditions on
which staff are empioyed in the NHS', with the direction of such
desired change being seen as more local determination of conditions
and, implicitly, pay - 'rewarding local staff so as to stimulate
motivation and improved performance' (ibid:45).
The same report indicated some of the thinking behind the desire for
more localised determination of pay and conditions. It was argued in
the report that the lack of 'individual staff or group transactions
with the employer' and the prevalence of national arrangements
cournunicated largely by professional and trade union organisations
generate circumstances in which it was 'not surprising that many staff
appear to have greater allegiance to their professional body or trade
union than to the local employer' (ibid:46). Following on from this,
it was claimed that:
'Providing effective and efficient services requires the
coniriitment of staff. Engaging that coirnitment...requires local
managers to have a more significant and comprehensive
relationship with local employees and the reduction of influences
outside of that relationship. An essential element in the
relationship is the employer's control of the arrangements which
apply to individual members of staff and to groups in the
employment' (ibid:47).
The NHS Management Executive (NHS ME) subsequently adopted the report
and signalled to Staff Side of General Whitley Council that it wished
to discuss changes (in Letter from Ma Maddocks, Staff Side Secretary,
13.3.1990).
If the desire to bypass collective representation and collective
bargaining is fairly clear from the above, it is less so in Dyson's
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1991 paper for the NHS ME which omits to mention industrial relations.
However, this orrrnission is explained to some extent by his focus on a
'human resource strategy' (1991:1). Having recognised that such a
strategy must be composed of both 'a remuneration or reward strategy
and a labour utilitisation strategy', in order to effect the
'substantial reductions in unit labour costs...vital to the success of
many Trusts' (ibid:2), he goes on to focus ostensibly on the labour
utilisation aspects. The report however goes much further than skill-
mix to discuss conditions of employment arid, implicitly, pay. For
example, it is suggested that more 'flexibility' can be achieved
through the use of contract (self-employed) staff arid staff on
'personal contracts' (ibid:6-7). For Dyson:
'personal contracts offer the most exciting prospect across the
range of labour utilisation issues...the offer of personal reward
for a personal service can be tailored to meet the needs of
staff, patients and Trust objectives' (ibid:7).
This corrrnent on the need for change in pay determination and grademix
is echoed in coarnents made by the NHS Deputy Personnel Director in
1989:
'[managers] have not had the benefit of controlling two main
levers available to managers in other organisations; first, pay
and payment systems, and secondly, the freedom to profile the
workforce in the way that they felt would best deliver high
quality, cost-effective services...The changes now taking place
provide a window of opportunity to break free of the constraints
to effective human resource management, and to focus events and
attentions at local level' (Johnson, 1989:10).
It can be seen from the above, that the force of the arguments for
decentralisation concern 'individualisation' of pay and other terms
and conditions and the 'freedom to reprofile' the workforce. Cost
minimisation is clearly seen as an objective of such change. The
actual arguments for decentralisation range from importing private
sector 'best practice, the desire of individual employees arid managers
for change, and the establishment of effective human resource
management. These arguments are now discussed in turn, and highlight
the limits to such decentralisation.
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Looking firstly at the arguments around private sector best practice,
it has been strongly argued by a number of academics that this more
general argument for decentralisation in the public sector may be
based on a very flawed view of a more general decentralisation in the
private sector. As noted earlier decentralisation to some extent has
occurred in the private sector (Miliward et al, 1992), but it has
been argued that product market competition rather than labour market
changes have been the driving consideration (see Purcell, 1991;
Purcell & Ahis trand, 1988). Brown & Rowthorn have emphasised this
point, and also pointed out that private sector managers have reacted
to particular geographical labour market problems, for example in
London by building up 'specific and identifiable London allowances'
(1990:12) rather than by deviating from a pay structure based on
product rather than geographical markets. Related to this point,
Brown & Walsh have further suggested that decentralisation in the
private sector should also not be 'exaggerated' as 'plant management
may only be given freedom to negotiate within strict financial limits,
or it may have to check with the divisional or corporate management
before concluding a pay deal' (1991:50). Thus, Brown & Rowthorn have
argued that 'decentralisation of pay fixing is feasible in the non-
geographic, functional sense only insofar as the separate functions
are truly independently accountable' (1990:13).
Quite apart from actual practice in the private sector, the relevance
of this practice for the public sector has also been questioned.
Thus, Brown & Rowthorn have argued that neither geographic nor
functional decentralisation make any sense for many areas of the
public sector which 'still possess clear national coherence in terms
of finance, regulation, and occupational integrity'. In the latter
context, they note that in any case 'in contrast to the rhetoric of
decentralisation, most public service pay bargaining has seen
continued tightening of central Treasury budgetary control during the
1980s' alongside the continuation and establishment of new review
bodies. Moreover, it is extremely hard to establish performance
indicators for many public sector services and therefore to develop
management tools employing such indicators. They also argue that a
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national pay structure 'is an integral part of the means they [the
service professions] use to maintain their professional
standards' and also facilitates labour mobility. Thus, the attempt
to decentralise would be a 'prescription for leapfrogging
comparability claims, geographical irrinobility, and low professional
morale' (ibid:1O-13).
The second major argument for decentraLisation - that it reflects
desires on the part of employees and managers - can now be evaluated.
In the documentary and fieldwork research for this thesis, not a
single argument was heard from either employees or managers for
decentralisation or iridividualisation of pay determination. Staff
Side have been deeply resistant to the erosion of national pay
determination and the fragmentation of arrangements and this continues
to be their position. Individual nurses and midwives in interview
expressed no desire for individualisation of their terms and
conditions. The only exception to this, was the readiness of some
national and local union representatives to respond positively to
local pay determination if such a situation arose, given a degree of
private frustration with the conservatism of national pay
determination mechanisms. Similarly, there was no desire on the part
of the managers interviewed, and who have been for the most part
intimately connected with nurse resourcing for decades, to see local
or individual pay determination. If anything, the individual claims
involved in clinical grading had convinced most of the undesirability
of such a change. National pay determination left managers free to
manage.
Likewise, managers in interview expressed no desire for greater
'freedom' in 'reprofiling the workforce'. Taking skill- or grade-mix
as the core of this argument (rather than personal contracts which
more properly relate to pay - see above), it was seen in Cbapters Six
and Seven that most managers had indeed exercised the freedom they
already had to take decisions on grade-mix and that such decisions may
actually have stalled or even countered centrally-driven policy
initiatives towards grade dilution. That many also felt that training
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changes and resource constraints would drive such dilution changes
through in future would rather express their greater desire for
freedom to make professional judgeinents about the need for different
staff and to have such judgements properly backed by adequate funding.
It was clearly seen in thapter Seven that the few dissenting voices to
this view - managers who would like to see different systems of
grading and reward as part of a more flexible package locally - had
little idea of the cost implications of such a package. Again, Staff
Side indicated that they would pursue any grading or grade-mix changes
that did arise to get the best possible deal for their members.
Thirdly, the argument for 'effective human resource management' can be
evaluated. In many respects, this can be viewed as the crux of the
internal logic for decentralisation and the area in which wider
objectives link in. Looking firstly at the argument which might be
viewed as 'internal' to nursing staff, the above quote from the Warlow
report clearly spells out the rationale for labour exclusion and
reassertion of managerial prerogative. 'Effective human resource
management' is thus largely presented in unitarist terms despite being
a reaction to the policy conflicts around nurses' pay and conditions
in the 1980s. Alternatively viewed, the unitarist terms belie a more
radical desire to weaken and bypass trade unions. On either
interpretation, there is little to reconrnend such an approach for
nurses.
Nurses remain highly unionised; indeed nursing unionism has actually
increased over the 1980s against the trend in the trade union
movement. The thesis has shown a high degree of conflict over nursing
pay and conditions, sometimes latent, sometimes overt. There is thus
a de facto argument against a unitarist or exclusionary perspective.
However, to the extent that there is a degree of antagonism towards
trade unions in these perspectives, it is perhaps worth sumarising
the findings on trade union effects in nursing. Firstly, it is
difficult to conceive how the PRB could have functioned without the
trade unions. In effect, a couple of dozen people are able to
consider and decide the pay of some half a million workers - an
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inexpensive and streamlined system which the majority of private
sector employers would envy. Trade unions effectively present through
Staff Side what is already a relatively 'united' claim by these half a
million workers, in a process largely dominated by the 'modest' claims
of the non-TUC unions. Failing this activity, management would need
to seek, whether individually or in groups, and at different levels,
the same measure of agreement. The costs involved may easily be
perceived to be staggering for such an exercise (see
Seifert,1990:56/57) and were well-demonstrated in the clinical grading
exercise.
It has been argued that pay determination mechanisms have largely had
conservative effects on nursing pay and conditions, which still remain
poor against many comparators. In this respect, nursing trade unions
have historically acted mainly, and modestly, to protect terms and
conditions for nursing staff, whether this be through improved
professional status or direct wages and conditions demands. They have
had to do this largely to counter successive governments'
intransigence in a largely monopsonistic employment. The alternative,
where trade unionism has been weak, has been a loss of skilled staff -
nurses voting with their feet. There is thus a strong argument that
'effective human resource management' in the case of nurses must
include 'efficient' wages and a reconsideration of nurses' claim for
'fair comparability' in the national wage hierarchy. There is
therefore little to suggest that nurses could willingly be separated
from their unions, nor that de-recognition or failure to negotiate at
local level would be desirable in terms of service delivery.
Perhaps more significantly, given the focus on power and conflict in
this thesis, the strategy of decentralisation embodies some
fundamental flaws in underestimating union response. The major growth
in nursing trade unionism in the 1980s has been in the RC, although
the TUC unions' membership has held constant given compositional
change. The linkages in the RC between professional practice and
trade unionism have become increasingly tight since the late 1970s and
as Seifert has argued 'those from closed labour markets will respond
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with ever tighter definitions of professional practice' (1990:56/57).
At the same time the merger between (X)HSE, NUPE and NALGO has been
ratified and the new union, UNISON, comes 'on stream' at the very time
that local pay bargaining would reunite staff at the lower end of the
NIIS hierarchy. The separation of auxiliaries and ancillaries in the
establishment of the PRB has had deleterious effects for both staff
groups in the 1980s. The re-uniting of these and other groups could
help counter the effects of competitive tendering and provide a
powerful boost to all nursing staff pay as it did in the 197Os.
UNISON would span the NHS hierarchy up to the higher end of nursing
and this could have the effect, once again, of 'galvanising' the
degree of unionateness of the RCL Perhaps most significantly, many
of the trade unionists interviewed pointed to the increased membership
caused by the experience of clinical grading. If pay is no longer
determined in a 'remote' fashion bit in local negotiations, conflict
could come out at full force. This is only likely to be exacerbated
by individualised pay which, in any case, has limited relevance where
there are nationally and statutorily set standards of competence and
de facto promotional barriers. It is thus entirely conceivable, as
NHS managers are only too aware, that:
a trade union renaissance at local level is probably inevitable
as unions re-assert themselves on the back of local pay
bargaining (Glascott,1990:291).
It is doubtful whether NHS management are in any sense prepared for
local bargaining. Considerable scepticism was expressed by managers
in interview about their ability to cope with such an exercise and as
Glascott has also noted '[pay determinationi will be a stern test for
the personnel function' (1990:291). Most felt some sort of 'network'
to avoid pay leap-frogging and poaching would be necessary and this
has already been established for Trusts by the NHS ME. However, this
goes deeply against the grain of 'market forces' local bargaining, and
it is likely that staff side would respond by coordination at similar
and higher levels.
This evaluation identifies, at the very least, some very real risks
for government if centralised financing is to remain and if the
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government still regards overt conflict over nursing pay as
politically sensitive. Paradoxically, the PRB has already been
undermined by the various forms of dec.entralisation that have already
taken place and in this respect, the government is likely to find its
policy options increasingly constrained. However, a real challenge to
nursing trade unionism, despite demographic change working in its
favour, is the level of redundancies occurring under the new NHS
system and the growth of the private sector outlined in Qiapter Seven.
In conclusion, this chapter has emphasised that changes arise in this
endogeneous system as a result of contradictions in existing practice.
Apparent stability can thus obscure dynamic changes. Above all,
perhaps, it is this opaque image and an ahistorical approach which
lend credence both to the view that government's traditional role has
been that of 'model' employer, with the associated - if implicit -
view of a relatively stable role for the welfare state. In contrast
to this approach, the account of nurses' pay determination in this
thesis has emphasised the importance of understanding the causation
behind change: which includes the need to locate pay determination as
the nexus of a wider set of economic, social and political relations.
As Winchester has noted, a fuller appreciation of the particular
nature of public policy and future develoLxnents awaits:
'more systematic analysis of the forms of state economic
intervention and the nature of power in collective
bargaining...c.ombined with an institutional analysis of public
sector industrial relations' (Winchester,1983: 178).
Fortunately, there have been some signs in the late 1980's that the
interest and significance of public sector industrial relations is
beginning to be recognised.
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